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Through its judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment and equal protection clause, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has profoundly impacted racial diversity in the nation’s public schools. This 
study found four shifts in judicial interpretation that align with actual changes in racial-make up 
of students. Second, this study examined the 2007 Parents Involved decision and the future of 
desegregation student assignment policies. The Supreme Court’s initial endorsement of 
segregation during the time period 1899-1938 resulted in widespread legally sanctioned school 
desegregation. The second phase of judicial interpretation is marked by the Court’s eventual 
move towards ending K-12 segregation by first outlawing racial segregation in institutions of 
higher education during the time period 1938-1954. In 1954 the Court entered its third phase of 
interpretation as marked in the iconic Brown v. Board decision thus, beginning a nearly two 
decade phase wherein racial segregation in public schools sharply declined. However, by 1974 
the Court began a fourth phase of interpretation wherein it refused to expand its interpretation of 
the equal protection clause to further promote methods of desegregation. This fourth phase 
parallels an increase in school segregation through present day. Second, this study examined the 
ways in which the recent Parents Involved (2007) Court decisions will influence future student 
assignment policies. Schools districts seeking to pursue racial integration face barriers such as 
patterns of intense residential and economic segregation. Because the Parents decision held race 
cannot be used as the deciding factor in student assignment policies, schools and districts 
wishing to promote integration must do so through assignment plans that do not violate the 2007 
holding. Several methods of legally permissible integration plans are reviewed. 
Recommendations for how future policies can withstand judicial scrutiny are made. 
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Chapter l: Introduction 
 
I. Overview 
In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Parents 551 
U.S. 701 (2007) - the Court’s most recent decision directly impacting school desegregation 
issues. Reaction to the decision among parents, administrators, policy makers, and academics 
was diverse and highly charged.  Many scholars, policy-makers, and school administrators 
accused the Court of disregarding precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) and making the goal of integrated public schools impossible (Sneed, 2007).  
However, schools were required to immediately follow the law as set forth in the lengthy 
opinion: race cannot be considered as the deciding factor in school assignment policies even 
when the ultimate goal is racial balancing within districts. In 1954 Brown was a symbol of 
change and progress, but it also marked the beginning of over half a century of litigation 
centered on the issue of school desegregation.  It remains no secret that now more than 50 years 
after the monumental Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, the nation 
continues to struggle with issues of equal educational opportunities and racial integration in 
public schools. Now more than ever it is important to consider the ways in which the Supreme 
Court has influenced the path of desegregation given the recent growth of resegregation in the 
nation’s schools and the Court’s most recent school desegregation decision in Parents.  
Because schools must work within the bounds of the law when structuring desegregation 
plans, major desegregation issues turn on how the Supreme Court, the High Court of the nation, 
interprets the Constitution. In particular, judicial interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment directly 
impacts the ways in which schools can achieve integration because historically, the Court has 
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applied the equal protection clause of the 14
th
 amendment to evaluate desegregation cases. 
Access to education is not guaranteed under the Constitution but the Court has invoked the equal 
protection clause to rule racially segregated schools unconstitutional and to subsequently 
evaluate methods of integration.  
In this study, I first analyze the ways in which the Court’s judicial interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment has evolved over time and how the current law will influence future 
integration efforts. My second research analysis aligns the evolution of judicial interpretation 
with national changes occurring in racial make-up of public school enrollment during the period 
from 1954-2007. My research questions were based on the hypothesis that because the Supreme 
Court directly influences the ways in which schools can legally implement methods of 
desegregation, an examination of the Court’s interpretation method would reveal a correlation 
between the Court’s approach to interpreting the fourteenth amendment and actual racial makeup 
in schools during roughly the last fifty years. After conducting my research, I found that shifts in 
the Court’s interpretation do indeed influence the racial makeup of schools. The Court has 
shifted its interpretation four times over the course of the time period studied. These shifts 
parallel distinct changes in school enrollment. When I examined specific modes of already 
defined modes of constitutional interpretation (i.e., constructivist, originalist) I found no 
relationship exists between school enrollment and methods of interpretation as commonly 
defined and established under constitutional law tenant. Further, I found the Parents decision 
will greatly influence the ways in which schools can integrate. Schools are currently 
implementing diverse assignment plans within the bounds of the law but the widespread effects 
of the 2007 decision are great.  
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Through examining these issues, this study seeks to build upon and contribute to 
scholarship that has addressed the impact of Brown and subsequent Court decisions on schools 
and students. Analysis of desegregation cases has focused on evaluating outcomes of Supreme 
Court decisions with respect to student achievement or school composition. Central to the 
questions already currently examined in current literature is whether or not the original goals of 
Brown have been met. This study seeks to push the evaluation of desegregation issues further by 
examining how the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and changes in schools align to 
improve understanding of the path desegregation has taken since 1954. Further, this study 
provides a framework of where desegregation law, as promulgated by the Supreme Court stands 
today, thus helping schools address the problem of de facto segregation within the bounds of the 
law.  
II. Importance of the Research 
The Supreme Court and its interpretation of the Constitution with respect to school 
desegregation has been the subject of heightened attention and analysis since the controversial 
Parents case. In 2004 much attention was given to the 50
th
 anniversary of the Brown decision 
(Clotfelter, 2004; Ferguson and Mehta, 2004; Friedman, 2004; Gay, 2004; Ladson-Billings, 
2004). Much discussion surrounds the nation’s struggle with racial integration in public schools. 
However, current literature stresses the role of the Supreme Court through individual cases, 
sometimes grouping opinions into different ‘eras’ for desegregation. However, little work has 
been conducted evaluating judicial interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment as basis for Court 
opinions, that which, at its heart, has driven all the desegregation cases.  At this time, linking the 
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Court to the actual issues schools are and have been battling serves the important purpose of 
evaluating where desegregation stands today.  
Second, after the Parents decision, schools have been left to structure integration plans in 
compliance within the bounds of the law as dictated by the Court. By considering the ways in 
which the Court’s 2007 interpretation of the 14th amendment may or may not allow for the 
implementation of student assignment policies, schools can evaluate legally permissible plans for 
integration.  This dissertation will provide a clear picture of the Court’s interpretation of the 14th 
amendment as it juxtaposes actual changes in racial make-up of public schools.  Establishing an 
understanding of this juxtaposition will show the extent to which the Supreme Court has 
influenced actual changes in schools over the time period studied. Further, in order to avoid 
lengthy and costly litigation schools must focus on legal integration plans. These plans must 
conform with federal law as promulgated by the Supreme Court thus, making a clear 
understanding of the law paramount to the successful future of school integration. This study will 
provide a clear framework of current federal law as promulgated by the Supreme Court thus 
allowing schools the ability to confidently structure legal assignment plans. 
Third, this research builds upon current research on desegregation litigation by broaching 
the topic from a new perspective: judicial interpretation. Judicial interpretation is the way in 
which the Court interprets the law, and in this study specifically how the Court interprets the 
fourteenth amendment.  While current literature does address desegregation cases and the 
Supreme Court’s role, little attention is paid to examining changes in 14th amendment judicial 
interpretation over time specifically in the desegregation case law. While much research and 
literature exists closely surrounding my two major areas of inquiry (Supreme Court and 
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desegregation), I believe a gap exists between the literature that addresses the Supreme Court 
and its role in desegregation and literature on judicial interpretation.  This research adds to 
foundational work on segregation in schools, desegregation and the law, and current evaluations 
of federal law by considering the role interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment plays within the 
broader scheme of desegregation literature. The intended audience for my research is three-fold. 
First, I intend to speak to scholars in law who focus on constitutional law and Supreme Court 
judicial interpretation. Second, I intend my research to be relevant to scholars in both law and 
education focusing on analyzing and commenting on school desegregation. Lastly, this research 
will serve those involved in crafting school assignment policies including school administrators 
and parents. 
III. Current Context of the Problem 
The nation’s schools have experienced wide-spread resegregation in recent years. This 
has occurred at the same time as public school enrollment in the aggregate has become as 
racially diverse as it ever has been (Frankenberg, 2007). Latinos are the largest minority group 
among public school students and by 2050, more than half of the nation’s students will be 
‘minority’ (Orfield & Lee, 2005). African-American students are now more racially isolated than 
in 1960, a time before the Civil Rights Act or major Supreme Court decisions such as Swann or 
Green wherein the Court approved integration methods such as bussing or ruled several aspects 
of the school must be fully integrated beyond simply allowing African-American students to 
enroll (Orfield, 2001).    
This reality is also reflected in the racial make-up of schools themselves. A total of 70.2 
percent of African-American students attend predominantly minority schools, up from 62.9 
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percent in 1980 (Orfield, 2001).  Since 1990, the percent of African-American students attending 
schools with over 50 percent minority student enrollment has increased from 66 percent to 72 
percent (Orfield and Lee, 2004, p.20). Further, African-American students attending schools with 
over 90 percent minority students rose from 34 percent to 38 percent, showing an increase in 
intensely segregated minority schools (Ibid).   A study by Frankenberg and Lee (2002) 
commissioned by the Civil Rights Project
1
 in 2002, examined the Department of Education’s 
National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD). The CCD collects fiscal 
and non-fiscal data from all public schools, districts, and state education agencies in the United 
States. The study (2002) found that levels of inter-racial exposure had declined since 1986 in 
virtually all of the 239 largest districts in the country (enrollment over 25,000). Districts showing 
the least amount of resegregation were mainly in the south. Orfield and Lee (2004) cite 
supporting evidence:  
The four most segregated states in 2001 for black students by two different 
measures (Black Exposure to White and Percent Black in Majority White 
Schools) were New York, Michigan, Illinois and California. In California and 
New York, only one black student in seven was in a majority white school and the 
typical black student was in a school with 82 percent nonwhite students in New 
York and 77 percent in California. (p.26)  
       The most pronounced trends in segregation affect Latino students. While segregation is 
often highlighted as the separation between African-American and White students, important to 
note is that Latino students are also segregated in public schools. In 1973 the Supreme Court in 
Keyes ruled that Hispanic students are not only constitutionally entitled to desegregation 
                                                          
1
 The Civil Rights Project/ Proyecto Derechos Civiles is a University of California Los Angeles-based group of 
scholars, lawyers, policy-makers and education whose mission is to help in renewing the civil rights movement to 
achieve equity across society. Led by Gary Orfield, the Project is widely respected and conducts numerous studies 
and analyses on inequities in education.  
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remedies, but that schools must help Hispanic students be proficient in English. Wells (1989) 
examines the situation of Hispanic students in today’s schools:  
Gaps in educational attainment and earning between Hispanics and non-Hispanics 
continue to widen, offering strong evidence that segregated schools are not 
preparing the rapidly growing Hispanic student population to succeed in a 
predominantly non-Hispanic society… Many Hispanic students attend school 
districts with low per-pupil expenditures, high pupil-teacher ratios and limited 
resources. If current practices continue, Hispanics are not only destined to become 
the nation’s largest minority group, but also the most disadvantaged. (Wells, 
1989, pp. 2-4).  
In 1998, 36.6 percent of Latino students attended schools with a minority enrollment above 90 
percent (Orfield, 2001). In addition, Native American students attend schools in which more than 
a third of their peers are also Native American (Ibid).  
       Impossible to ignore is the link between school segregation by race and segregation by 
poverty in the nation’s schools. Racially segregated schools are also schools with high 
concentrations of poverty, the exception being racially segregated schools with majority white 
students (Orfield, 2001).   Similarly, Darling-Hammond (2007) cites inequities based on funding:  
African-American and Hispanic American students continue to be concentrated in 
central city public schools, many of which have become ‘minority’ in the past 
decade while their funding has fallen further behind that of the suburbs…The 
continuing segregation of neighborhoods and communities intersects with the 
inequities created by property tax revenues, funding formulas, and school 
administration practices that create substantial differences in the educational 
resources made available in communities serving White and minority 
children…Not only do funding policies create a situation in which urban districts 
receive fewer resources than their suburban neighbors, but schools with a high 
concentration of minority students receive fewer resources than other schools 
within these districts (pp. 320-321, emphasis added). 
However, important to note is that residential segregation and school desegregation do not 
always go hand in hand. A study released by Logan (2002) of the Mumford Center for 
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Comparative Urban and Regional Research indicates that segregation by race in schools is 
increasing while residential segregation for African-American students is slightly declining. In 
addition, the study found that segregation works to benefit White students. Lee (2004) supports 
these findings and concludes:  
there is strong evidence that districts where desegregation orders have  
 been weakened or vacated show a trend towards resegregation that is over and 
 above what would be expected by demographic [and residential] changes alone                                                                              
 (p.9).  
Logan (2002) also examines the link between race and poverty in schools. Logan (2002) found 
that during the 1999-2000 school year,    
the average poor student attended a school that was 63 percent poor, while the 
average nonpoor student attended school that was only 27.5 percent poor. White 
students were in schools that were 30 percent poor, black students were in schools 
that were 65% poor, Hispanic students were in school that were 66 percent poor, 
and Asian students were in school that were 42 percent poor. This suggests that 
racial segregation works to the benefit of white students, placing them in very 
different schools from minority students.  
Further, Logan (2002) found that the national average level of segregation of African-American 
elementary school children from their White peers increased by 2 points during the 1989-1990 
school year whereas residential segregation declined by 3-4 points the same year (Logan, 2002, 
p.4).  
The following table illustrates the relationship between segregation and poverty through 
showing schools with high percentages of minority students are those where the majority of 
students receive free and reduced lunch: 
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Public School Enrollment Data in Schools with High Minority Populations, 
2007-2009 Academic Year, McNeal (2009) 
 
 Ethnicity (%) Total (%) Total (%) 
Public School 
District 
Black Latino Asian Native 
American 
White Students 
of Color 
Free & 
Reduced 
Lunch 
Atlanta 86 4 1 1 8 92 75 
Boston 41 35 9 1 14 86 71 
Chicago 49 39 3 1 8 92 85 
Detroit 90 5 1 1 3 97 70 
Los Angeles 11 73 4 3 9 91 76 
St. Louis 82 2 2 0 14 86 82 
 
Student achievement has been influenced by both the resegregation of schools and the 
standards-based and market-based reforms of recent years. Graduation rates are declining - down 
from 77 percent in 1969 to 69 percent in 2000 (Barton, 2005 as cited in Darling-Hammond, 
2007, p.318). Further, while graduation rates were increasing from the 1950s to a high of 75 
percent for African-American students during the 1980s, rates have not risen since (Darling-
Hammond, 2007, p.321). Further, dropout rates have increased as graduation rates actually 
declined in some states in the wake of standards-based reforms (Ibid). Recent resegregation in 
schools is linked to student achievement, poverty, and racial isolation for both white and 
minority students.  
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IV. Research Questions  
 
This study builds upon past and current research focused on the Supreme Court’s role in 
desegregation issues in America’s public schools. This analysis centers on chronicling the path 
of judicial constitutional interpretation as employed by the Court and as administered to 
desegregation cases with specific attention paid to interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment. In 
addition to this major research question, analysis of judicial interpretation is then applied to 
established research on how desegregation and subsequent resegregation actually occurred in the 
nation’s schools from 1954-2007 by using student enrollment data from secondary sources. 
Using both the basic analysis of Supreme Court constitutional interpretation and the currently 
established research on the racial make-up of school enrollment, this study will provide current 
and legally permissible frameworks for how schools can structure plans through which 
integration can occur today given the most recent Court decision affecting K-12 desegregation in 
Parents.  
 Research Questions:  
1. What were the shifts, if any, of the United States Supreme Court’s 
judicial interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment as shown in Court case 
law relating to desegregation in public schools from the period of 1954-
2007?  
2. How, if at all, did these shifts parallel general changes in racial make-up 
of student populations in public schools from 1954-2007? 
3. Given the most recent 2007 decision, what is the current state of federal 
desegregation law and how can schools structure legally permissible 
integration plans? What, if any, are the effects of the Parents decision 
both on schools and institutions outside of K-12 education?  
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V. Historical Context of Supreme Court Cases: Brown I and II  
The significance of current resegregation cannot be understood without considering the 
critical role Brown played not only in the context of education, but also in American history. 
Historical contexts within which Supreme Court decisions are issued play a crucial part in 
evaluating goals and outcomes of the Court of the Schools, especially in the highly-charged area 
of school desegregation. This overview is meant to be an introduction to Supreme Court 
desegregation case law; Chapter IV will include a detailed discussion of this topic. 
The end of Jim Crow laws began with the Court’s decision in Brown, marking a turning point 
not only for integration in schools, but integration in all aspects of society. It is for this reason 
that Brown is one of the most famous cases ever decided by the Court (Friedman, 2004). 
Friedman writes,  
From the end of Reconstruction to the 1950s, a vast legal structure was in place that 
effectively kept the black population in a second-class status. Laws segregated 
schools, parks, libraries, and public facilities, as places of public accommodation. It 
was a crime for a black person to go into places that the laws preserved for whites. 
Placing blacks in such an inferior position made it virtually impossible for them to 
use political power to correct their situation. Education was clearly the heart of the 
problem. First, segregation in education affected the largest number of black citizens- 
the tens of millions of children of school age. Second, segregation and lack of 
political power by blacks necessarily led to inferior schools with few books or 
teachers, and no science labs or other teach tools. It made it difficult or impossible for 
the black population to acquire then necessary skills to raise itself from its second-
class status. (Friedman, 2004, p.viii) 
Friedman (2004) makes an important connection between schools and society. School 
segregation was simply one facet of discrimination African-Americans suffered pre-Brown. Jim 
Crow laws, the laws upholding de jure segregation in public facilities, were powerful tools used 
to maintain the status of African-Americans as ‘second-class’ citizens.  
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 It would be incorrect to think, however, that Brown was decided quickly. A long struggle 
fought by activists to end school segregation began as early as the late 1800s. The Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of state’s rights to implement racial segregation in public facilities as long as 
these facilities were ‘equal’ in Plessy v. Ferguson (Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [1896]). In 
1899 the Court upheld a Georgia school board’s right to close an African-American school while 
still collecting taxes from all to support the white schools citing the state’s reserved power to 
control schools. (Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S 528 [1899]).  
Further, in 1908, the Court upheld racial segregation in institutions of higher education (Berea 
College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky 211 U.S. 45 [1908]). 
Several cases to reach the Supreme Court pre-Brown dealt with issues of segregation in 
higher education and were headed by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. The NAACP’s legal 
strategy was to challenge segregation in higher education, first with law schools, and then other 
colleges or professional schools (Friedman, 2004, p.ix).  In Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada 
(305 U.S. 377 349 [1938]) the Court ruled that the University of Missouri policy, one that 
offered no law school for African-American students, thus requiring them to seek a law degree 
outside the state, was unconstitutional. The Court ruled the state must provide a law school for 
African-Americans.  This was the first in a series of Court opinions striking down segregation in 
higher education (Sipuel v. Bd of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (332 U.S. 631 [1948]), 
McLauren v. Oklahoma State Regents Board of Higher Education (229 U.S. 336 [1950]). The 
most progressive of these cases was decided four years before Brown wherein the Court ruled an 
African-American student be admitted to the University of Texas Law School on the same terms 
as white students (Sweat v. Painter (339 U.S. 629 [1950]). 
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In the mid-1950s, parents and students began to challenge K-12 public school segregation, 
shifting direction from the Defense Fund’s initial strategy. The case commonly known as Brown 
v. Board of Education is actually a set of five cases all challenging the same issue of segregation 
by race in the nation’s public schools. The cases originated in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia, South 
Carolina, and the District of Columbia. As Kluger (1975) recounts, the South Carolina case 
originated from a lawsuit filed by African-American parents demanding a school bus for their 
children citing the white students had more than 30 buses for transport to school. The case soon 
became a challenge to the basic idea of segregated schools and unequal education in general. 
Similarly, the case in Virginia challenged inadequate educational facilities for African-American 
students.   The Court issued one opinion in Brown because all five of the cases challenged the 
same fundamental issue: desegregation in K-12 public schools. The opinion is brief, uses simple 
language, and is clear in its impact on public education:  
In the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal…School children 
irrespective of race and color shall be required to attend the school in the district 
in which they reside and that color or race is no element of exceptional 
circumstances warranting a deviation of this basic principal (347 U.S. 483 [1954]) 
The Court’s decision in Brown was brief but resonated as a symbol of change and progress.  The 
Court ruled segregation unconstitutional based on the14th amendment which states that,  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., Fourteenth 
Amendment, sec. 1) 
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The Court’s legal rationale rested on the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause and centered 
on the fact that segregated schools denied African-American children equal protection of the law 
as guaranteed by the clause.  
Important to note, however, was the absence of a time-line for desegregation or a mandate 
for how long schools had to comply with the opinion. Lack of any articulation by the Court 
concerning either a practical directive or time-line for desegregation allowed for massive 
resistance on the part of those schools, communities, and states opposed to desegregation. The 
decision was met with resistance by the Southern states and school districts through methods 
such as closing schools (e.g., in VA), or simple inaction. When it was clear Southern schools 
would resist the original decree in Brown, the Supreme Court issued a second opinion commonly 
called Brown II in 1955 (349 UC. 294 [1955]) wherein it mandated schools to integrate with ‘all 
deliberate speed.’ The Court recognized the need to implement a flexible standard - the method 
and speed of integration would be determined locally. Peter Moran (2005) examines Brown II in 
relation to the original decision:  
The implementation decree was handed down in May 1955 and bore a striking 
resemblance to the style and language of the original decision. The decree 
invested district courts with the authority to determine ‘whether the action of 
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing 
Constitutional principles.’ Furthermore, it ordered segregated school districts to 
‘make a prompt and reasonable start towards compliance’ with the 1954 decision. 
Again, the language was exceedingly vague, and no definitive timeline was 
established. In one respect  the 1954 and 1955 Brown decisions marked the 
culmination of more than two decades of NAACP litigation challenging the 
legitimacy of ‘separate but equal’ On the other hand, the Brown decisions marked 
only the beginning of another protracted series of legal campaigns to define the 
standards of ‘all deliberate speed,’ ‘earliest practicable date,’ and ‘compliance.’ 
The reactions to the ruling ranged from immediate compliance and desegregation 
to complete intransigence. (Moran, 2004, p.9) 
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Moran references here the continued resistance by many Southern schools against integration. 
Many Southern members of Congress signed the Southern Manifesto, denouncing the Supreme 
Court’s decision (Clotfelter, 2004, p.23). The Supreme Court did not hear any cases relating to 
public school integration for the better part of the decade post-Brown and Brown II. During this 
time integration occurred slowly (p.25).  
  Many argue that it was not until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 that any real 
progress was made in achieving integration, a full 9 years after the Court’s opinion in Brown 
(Friedman, 2004, p.xiii). The Civil Rights Act prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance 
from discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, religions, sex, or national 
origin. In addition, Title VI of the Act grants authority to the United States Attorney General to 
investigate all public and most private schools and colleges.  
VI. Historical Context of Supreme Court Cases: Green-Parents   
Given widespread resistance to integration across the nation, the Supreme Court turned to an 
era of supporting specific methods of integration such as bussing. After Brown II to the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 many schools resisted integration. These years included National 
Guard deployment to oversee the integration of Little Rock High, and Price Edwards County, 
Virginia schools, which had closed down for five years in order to avoid integration mandates. In 
1968 the Court made clear its support for integration methods in Green.  
 In Green the Court ruled ‘freedom of choice’ plans unconstitutional based on the 
precedent set in Brown. Freedom of choice plans allowed students to choose which schools 
within the district they wanted to attend. There was no barrier to African-American students 
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attending previously white schools but the schools implemented no plans to support or push for 
integration. In many cases, schools remained segregated even though these plans were put in 
place. Often times, African-American students enrolled in ‘white schools’ were intimidated and 
harassed (Caldas & Bankston, 2005, p. 24). The Court ruled these plans operated to “burden 
students and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School 
Board” (Green v. County School Board of New Kent County [1968]). The Court writes,  
Where a "freedom of choice" plan offers real promise of achieving a unitary, 
nonracial system, there might be no objection to allowing it to prove itself in 
operation, but where there are reasonably available other ways, such as zoning, 
promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary school system, 
"freedom of choice" is not acceptable. (Green v. County School Board of New 
Kent County [1968]) 
Green also required schools to come forth with a plan to integrate schools until it was clear 
‘state-imposed’ integration had ceased. Lastly, Green required integration must be achieved in 
several aspects of the schools: facilities, staff, extracurricular activities, and transportation.  
Caldas and Bankston (2005) identify a period of litigation marked by the Court’s ruling 
on specific methods of integration (p.24). In Swann (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education 402 U.S. 1 [1971)]) the Court ruled that bussing in the Charlotte school districts was 
constitutional even when the school districts were segregated not through deliberate action on the 
part of the school districts, but was a result of a student’s geographical proximity to the school. 
14,000 African-American students in the Charlotte, North Carolina school district attended 
schools that were over 99% black even though de jure segregation had ended fifteen years 
earlier. This was largely due to geographical segregation in the city. This decision was crucial 
because the Court also recognized there were limits to judicial oversight in dismantling 
segregated schools. Along with approving bussing, the Court also ruled that,  
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neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make 
year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the 
affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education 403 U.S. 1 [1971]) 
The period between 1970 and 2000 is marked by the Court’s willingness to release districts 
from court-ordered desegregation if they had made reasonable efforts to integrate their schools.
2
 
This release from court-ordered segregation is called being granted ‘unitary status,’ meaning a 
dual system of ‘black and white schools’ had ended and a unified school system implemented 
(Swann (1971)).   
 In the 1974 case of Milliken, the Court ruled that cross-district bussing was unconstitutional. 
This was a pivotal case as it was an illustration of the Court’s intent to return power to the 
localities in which segregation existed. In Milliken the Court ruled that bussing of Detroit City 
School district students to one of Detroit’s 51 suburbs was unconstitutional. The Court wrote,   
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set 
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a 
cross-district remedy, it must be first shown that there has been a Constitutional 
violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in 
another district; i.e., specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory 
acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a 
substantial cause of inter-district segregation. (Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717 
[1974]) 
 The Court here implicitly recognized residential segregation and again, its own limits on 
authority in local schools.   
                                                          
2
 Important to note is an exception to the series of cases wherein the Court began to release schools from court-
ordered desegregation mandates. In Keyes (1973), the Court ruled that the City of Denver, Colorado school district 
was operating an intentional de facto segregated school district, and thus, even though not segregated by law, the 
segregation was unconstitutional. The Court’s decision recognized that the neighborhood school districts in Denver 
were segregated by race due to district rezoning policies. The Court recognized that these policies resulted in the 
establishment of de facto segregated schools and that the African-American schools were largely inferior to the 
White schools. Keyes v. School District No. 1., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
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Many believe the Court began its most obvious abandonment of integration efforts in the 
1990s. (Orfield and Eaton, 1996). Orfield and Eaton (1996) argue that  
After decades of bitter political, legal, and community struggles over civil rights, 
there was surprisingly little attention to the new school resegregation policies 
spelled out in the Court’s key 1992 decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma 
v. Dowell, Freeman v. Pitts, and Missouri v. Jenkins. The decisions were often 
characterized as belated adjustments to an irrelevant, failed policy. But in fact, 
these historic High Court decisions were a triumph for the decades-long powerful, 
politicized attacks on school desegregation. The new policies reflected the victory 
of the conservative movement that altered the federal courts and turned the nation 
from the dream of Brown toward accepting a return to segregation. (p.1)  
In Dowell (1991) the Court ruled that once a school district had achieved ‘unitary status’ and had 
shown ‘good faith compliance’ the district was released from its obligation to maintain 
desegregation. The Court identified ‘good faith compliance’ as the school’s showing of its 
reasonable effort to adhere to federally mandated desegregation.  Here, the Court continues its 
line of reasoning from Swann (1971), wherein it reaffirms the idea that judicial intervention can 
only go so far and that reasonable efforts on the part of a district to integrate should be 
acknowledged. In Freeman (1992), the Court ruled that unitary status could be granted to a 
district even when integration had not yet been achieved in all previously mandatory areas 
spelled out in Green (1968) (facilities, staff, extracurricular activities, and transportation). In 
Missouri (1995) the Court ruled that states could not be mandated by law to pay for 
implementing state-wide remedial programs or teacher salary increases to resolve racial 
inequities in schools through tax increases. Missouri v. Jenkins (515 U.S. 70 [1995]). In the 2007 
Parents decision the Court ruled race cannot be used as the deciding factor in student assignment 
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plans within districts
3
. This study will unpack the ambiguity around this decision thus providing 
a current legal framework for integration.  
VII. Overview of Policy Initiatives and Empirical Evidence 1954-2007 
Black’s law dictionary defines policy as ‘a course of action adopted or pursued by a 
government’ (Black’s Law, 2006).  While this study will not focus on federal policy as pursued 
by the executive or legislative branch, it is important to consider ways in which federal policy as 
adopted by these branches outside the judiciary have influenced school desegregation. The three 
branches together in totality comprise federal law and policy on school desegregation and 
therefore a brief review of policy initiatives will help understand how school segregation has 
evolved over time beyond the Supreme Court. Additionally, a major basic tenant of this study 
and of desegregation law is based on the general fact that integrated schools are a beneficial and 
worthy goal in K-12 schools. Here, empirical evidence on how and why racial integration is 
beneficial to students, schools, and student achievement levels is discussed. The widening 
present-day achievement gap highlights the gross disparities in educational opportunity between 
races, socioeconomic status, and between urban and suburban education. From a policy 
perspective, the nation’s schools are currently facing an overwhelming task: raising academic 
achievement and evening the playing field in terms of educational access in the face of growing 
economic and residential inequalities.  
Brown represented a marker of social progress and was an important part of the Civil 
Rights Era. The case sparked a new wave of policy: “education reform, integration, and social 
                                                          
3
 Note because in depth discussion of the Parents decision will occur in Chapter IV, only a brief summary of the 
Court’s holding is provided here.  
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progress” (Pitre, 2008, p.552).  Although schools resisted, the Court insisted on desegregation 
through a continued commitment to legal support for integration plans through court-orders and 
a growing body of case law. In addition, policy after Brown was also influenced heavily by 
federal legislation and the Executive Branch. Policy initiatives were fueled by empirical 
evidence supporting integration, though the two were not always harmoniously aligned. Need for 
action arose because while the Court is endowed as being the highest and most powerful court in 
the nation, it has no power of enforcement. The Court does not have the power to implement the 
law, but must simply rule on Constitutional issues brought before it on appeal.  
Social science research during the 1960s and 1970s influenced political support for general 
desegregation efforts but did not justify specific methods of integration such as busing. Evidence 
showed benefits for African-American students in several areas of achievement. Attainment of 
higher education for African-American students was a factor supporting integration.  By the 
early 1970s research revealed African-Americans in racially mixed schools were more likely to 
complete high school and go onto college (Crain, 1970). Crain and Mahard (1978) found 
African-Americans students in the North who graduated from predominantly white high schools 
were more likely to reach their third year of college. Research at the K-12 level also supported 
integration.  African-American first graders who transferred from metropolitan to suburban 
schools had math scores three grade levels higher than their peers remaining in segregated 
schools (Zdep, 1971). Release of Coleman’s report “Equality of Educational Opportunity” in 
1966 fueled the integration policy movement. The report focused on equality in opportunity as 
measured by educational outputs (achievement) rather than resource input (money spent on the 
school).  Using data from over 600,000 students and teachers in 3,000 school districts, Coleman 
found that achievement was more tied to the social composition of the school than to educational 
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resources available to students (such as per pupil expenditure and size of school library). That is, 
school quality did not influence achievement of students from comparable social backgrounds as 
much as factors such as the background of a student’s peers. One message summarized the 
movement for integration: African-American students could achieve more if put in white 
schools. Further, the Report supported the conclusion that it was school composition, not school 
resources that influenced achievement. While the report and relevant research was unequivocal 
in this, the means to achieve such integration was unclear. 
 The use of busing as an effective and reasonable method by which to achieve integration 
was the subject of much research. While research supporting the positive outcome of integration 
itself was widespread, research specifically on busing produced mixed conclusions (Schoefield, 
1976). A 1971 report released by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 
analyzed the effect busing would have on 39 urban districts and found that busing seemed a 
reasonable solution to the barriers of neighborhood segregation because it did not exceed 
practical budget or reasonable travel time limitations. The study also showed that in most of the 
29 districts substantial decreases in racial isolation could occur without transporting students 
who lived within walking distance of their neighborhood schools. The report emphasized the 
effective use of existing levels of busing instead of employing additional busing and reviewing 
the assignment of those already bused to school. The increase in transportation time was found to 
be trivial when compared to time spent in pickup for neighborhood school systems.   In 
contrasting findings, a 1971 report issued by Syracuse University’s Research Center did not 
support the conclusion that busing was an effective solution to the problem of segregated 
schools, citing further problems with research methods such as inaccurate busing routes leading 
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to inconclusive findings.  Coleman released another report in 1975 showing busing had failed as 
an integration method due to the massive ‘white flight’ from desegregating districts.4 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, executive branch influence on the issues of integration 
and busing was notable while the Court decided several cases showing its approval and support 
of integration (Cooper, Griffin, Green). President Johnson oversaw several key pieces of 
legislation centered on school desegregation and educational equity as part of his ‘Great Society’ 
agenda for social reform during his time in office from 1963-1969. Johnson was known as the 
‘Education President’ and highlighted education reform as a major issue facing America during 
his 1964 campaign (Boone, 1992).  Humphrey, Johnson’s VP , described Johnson as an 
‘education nut’ who felt that education was the best thing he could provide the American people, 
often believing in miracle cures to education problems (Boone, 1992, p. 4).  Johnson appointed 
the Gardner Commission in 1965 with the purpose of evaluating the issue of federal education 
aid to the states. Ultimately, the Commission recommended federal aid be linked to Johnson’s 
War on Poverty and recommended targeted aid to help poor children (Thomas & Brady, 2005, 
p.52). The War on Poverty articulated three main goals: to prevent entry into poverty, provide 
exits from poverty, and provide support for those who could not benefit from funding for the first 
two goals (Vinovskis, 2005). Johnson viewed education as a crucial mechanism by which to aid 
in achieving goals, especially at the secondary school level (Vinovskis, 2005).  
 The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 grew out of this push for 
equal educational opportunity (Vergon, 1990, p.5) and has remained the single largest financial 
support legislation for educationally vulnerable children (Thomas & Brady, 2005).  The overall 
                                                          
4
 White flight to be further discussed in relation to Swann.  
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purpose was to improve educational opportunities for poor children and provided states with the 
funds to implement plans aimed at improving the teaching of reading and other subjects (Pub.L. 
89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. ). Title I of the ESEA provided funds for aid in math and reading to 
schools with disproportionate numbers of low-income students and was “to provide financial 
assistance to local educational agencies serving areas with high concentrations of children from 
low-income families to expand and improve their education programs by various means” (cited 
in Thomas & Brady, 2005, p. 52). Because the South was one of the poorest regions of the 
country, Southern schools had much to gain through compliance with federal legislation and 
desegregation laws.   
Important to note is the explicit role of the federal government as articulated in the language 
of the ESEA.  The federal government was not to exercise any “direction, supervision, or control 
over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel, or over the selection of 
any instructional materials in any educational institution of school system” (as cited in Thomas 
& Brady, 2005, p.52). Many argue that this language allowed for the initial misuse of ESEA 
appropriated funds (Vinovskis, 2005; Thomas & Brady, 2005).  
In the first four years after passage of the ESEA, Congress appropriated $4.3 billion to 
schools, but was widely criticized for allowing funds to be inappropriately distributed and 
misused (Martin & McClure 1969). Immediately subsequent to passage of the legislation, 
Congress debated heavily on whether or not funds should be restricted to only poor students, or 
if aid should also be distributed to academically vulnerable students (Thomas & Brady, 2005). 
Due to ambiguity in language of the ESEA, funds were legally able to be distributed to both 
types of students. In the 1970s, 94% of schools received some form of ESEA aid (Ibid).  In the 
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1969 report “Title I of ESEA: Is It Helping Poor Children?” authors Martin and McClure found 
about 15% of ESEA funds had been misused because funding had not reached eligible children 
nor were they given to the areas most in need. Common examples of federal money being 
misused included supplanting local tax efforts and the building of swimming pools and other 
facilities that would benefit all students.  
 National policies and initiatives for implementing bussing began in earnest with the Court 
decision in Swann. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger cited the inadequate measures 
taken to integrate schools to date including freedom-of–choice plans (see Green) or deliberate 
resistance and the now-common use of bussing to transport children to school. Burger recognizes 
that 39% of the school children nation-wide were transported to school by bus and identifies bus 
transportation as “perhaps the single most important factor in the transition from the one-room 
schoolhouse to the consolidated school district” (Swann). From 1921 to 1971 the number of 
students transported to schools by bus rose from 600,000 to nearly 20 million. The number of 
vehicles had grown from about 60,000 to over 250,000 (Commission on Civil Rights, 1972). In 
many cases, desegregating schools reduced the amount of busing. For example, the practice of 
busing black children past white schools to a faraway black school ended. Between 1965 and 
1969, 42 districts in Georgia saw a decrease of 173,000 in total student miles travelled as a result 
of bussing to desegregate (Commission on Civil Rights, 1972). Similar numbers were seen in 
Mississippi.  Specific to the Charlotte school district, Justice Burger recognizes the average 
bused student travelled more than an hour a day even before the desegregation busing plan was 
implemented.  
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Given the emphasis on the role of bussing in Swann, the decision resulted in over a decade of 
forced busing though resulted in even more racial isolation in the nation’s schools (Reynolds, 
1984). The Court had approved bussing as a constitutional means for combatting racial 
imbalance in schools, though many parents resisted the busing methods. This resulted in what 
they deemed to be ‘unnecessary’ traveling to schools by enrolling their students in private 
schools or moving outside of the city to avoid forced busing (see Milliken). Public resistance to 
bussing was widespread: in 1971 two buses were overturned and buses were burned in Denver 
and Pontiac, MI (Commission on Civil Rights, 1972). White-flight resulting from this resistance 
created increased racial residential and therefore increased school segregation.  
The majority of those in Congress also disagreed with the Swann decision. Congress 
considered an anti-busing amendment to the Constitution as a way to combat the Court’s 
decision (McKay, 1975).  In 1972 President Nixon voiced his opposition to busing and called for 
a stop to forced busing in the long run and constructive alternatives to it in short term (McKay, 
1975). No such amendment was ever realized, but Congress’ long opposition to busing can be 
seen in its decision to prohibit federal funds to be used for student transportation to overcome 
racial imbalance through mandates within the ESEA.  
Despite this, the Brown decision and subsequent pieces of legislation led to progress in 
academic achievement and school desegregation (Orfield, 2001) Academic progress as measured 
by college attendance as well as access to resources improved post-Brown (Arrington, 1981). 
Student access to qualified teachers increased as did racial gaps in student achievement (Darling-
Hammond, 2007, p. 271).   
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By 1971, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare statistics showed that the South 
had become the most racially integrated region in the nation. Research from the last decade now 
documents that dropout rates declined by two to three percent post- Brown nation-wide and 
graduation rates increased as a result of desegregation orders and legislation (Ashenfelter, 
Collins, & Yoon, 2006). The percentage of African-American students in majority White schools 
rose from two to thirty-three percent between 1964 and 1970. By 1968, the number of African-
American attending majority white schools had risen to 32% (Arrington, 1981). By the late 
1980s the number had reached an estimated 44% (Epperson, 2008, p.5).  
The early 1990s stands out as a turning point in the progress made post-Brown in terms of 
progress towards integration and policy shifts. The Supreme Court heard and decided three 
desegregation cases during the early 1990s that may have been contributing factors to lower 
academic achievement because the cases made it is easier for schools to achieve unitary status 
and is considered a general shift away from school desegregation by the Court (Orfield, 2001). 
Simultaneously, academic achievement has slowed and in some ways regressed since the 1990s. 
The widening achievement gap is evidence of inequitable educational opportunity and access to 
resources for the nation’s public schools students. Disparities between races and students of 
different socioeconomic backgrounds in academic achievement are now evident in college 
enrollment, grades, test scores, drop-out rates, and course curriculum (Harris & Herrington, 
2006).  
The Reagan administration also played a major role as an obstacle to desegregation 
during the 1980s. During his time in office, Reagan continued to implement policies resulting in 
road blocks specific to progress towards integrated schools. Reagan opposed enforcement 
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proceedings against desegregating schools by the Executive Branch and also supported the 
abolishment of the Department of Education altogether (Epperson, 2008, p.6). The Reagan 
administration opposed desegregation orders and research came to a halt. As Vergon (1990) 
argues, the Reagan administration sought to turn control over education to the states and local 
communities. The federal role was cut back through limiting federal funding for research and the 
revocation of federal government regulations governing educational program (Vergon, 1990, 
p.7). Important to note is that the Reagan administration did support one area of research in 
regard to desegregation in schools. However, this small area of research centered on ‘white-
flight’ and was used by the Reagan administration to justify opposition to integration 
(Frankenberg & Orfield, 2007, p.4).    
Obstacles to school desegregation continued during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. 
Under the direction of Bush I’s administration, the OCR released eight states from any 
obligations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Under Bush I, Dowell was decided 
making it easier for schools to gain unitary status. This was the first time the Justice Department 
argued against mandatory school desegregation and succeeded (McAndrews, 2009).  
After the Reagan administration, standards-based policies became known as the America 
2000 Program under Bush I. Under Clinton the Program became federal law known as Goals 
2000 and then reauthorization of the ESEA in 1994 propelled the standards movement ahead by 
requiring all states to adopt a system of standards and accountability to measure achievement in 
order to qualify for federal funding (Frankenberg & Orfield, 2007). Under President Clinton, the 
number of investigations conducted by the Office of Civil Rights doubled. The OCR targeted 
overrepresentation of minorities in special education programs and their underrepresentation in 
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gifted and talented programs (McAndrews, 2009). The Supreme Court showed its intention to 
proceed against Clinton’s focus by deciding Jenkins in 1995 by rejecting both compulsory 
busing and court-mandated implementation of magnet schools.  
  In 2001 the ESEA was again reauthorized as the No Child Left Behind Act with a 
school choice component under Bush II. Although Bush did not specifically focus on issues of 
race in public schools, education was a major theme on which he often spoke out publically 
(McAndrews, 2009). For Bush, schools were not separated by race but rather by quality:  
“In Bush’s color-blind vision of American education, there are not Black schools 
or White schools. There are only “failing” and “succeeding” schools. When he 
unveiled his No Child Left Behind Act, the only statistic Bush cited did not allude 
to the public schools of Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Detroit, and Baltimore, 
where over eight percent of the students were Black or Latino, or to the seventy 
percent of African-American children in the country who attended predominately 
minority schools, but to the high-poverty schools where nearly seventy percent of 
fourth-graders are unable to read at a basic level (McAndrews, 2009, p.70).  
Bush spent as much in the first two years of his administration on public education as had been 
spent in the eight years prior to his presidency (McAndrews, 2009).    NCLB focused on 
vouchers and transfer out options for students in failing schools. Parents was decided during the 
Bush administration and the Court’s interpretation of the fourteenth amendment as intolerant of 
any racial distinctions parallels Bush’s attitude towards issues of race in schools.  
 
VIII. Researcher Orientation  
This study rests at the intersection of law, policy, and education because of my 
background in both education and law. I approach this research with a strong law and policy 
background given my previous practice as an attorney. My research interest is also founded 
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in my teaching experience as a former high school classroom teacher. My true interest has 
always lied with education and specifically with issues of race and equity in schools. I 
became interested in these issues because throughout my own K-12 education I was the only 
person of color not only in my grade or school, but in the entire school district. At a very 
early age I was aware of the role race plays in education.  From my own experience grew a 
desire to understand why schools remain segregated, how segregation is tied to equity, and 
what legal factors influence progress towards racial integration.  
While pursuing my law degree with a focus on public policy, I simultaneously earned my 
teaching certification. After earning my law degree I taught social studies at an urban school 
outside of Boston, Massachusetts and then at a suburban school in Syracuse, New York. My 
experience teaching in these two districts coupled with my knowledge of policy drove me to 
seek further understanding of how the law influences education through pursuing a doctorate 
degree in education with a focus on social policy. This research study is influenced by my 
own experience in a racially segregated school district, my experience teaching in K-12 
classrooms, and my training and understanding of the law and the ability it has to profoundly 
influence education.  
IX. Limitations 
This study focuses on the legacy of desegregation-related Supreme Court cases through 
the intersection of law and educational policy and practice.  State and lower federal court 
cases have been excluded from this analysis as I am primarily concerned with the role of the 
United States Supreme Court. The case law analysis draws from cases within the specific 
time period 1954-2007, only those dealing with desegregation in K-12 schools and, where 
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appropriate, higher education issues. Further, this study considers only secondary sources to 
provide student enrollment statistics, mainly from the work of Clotfelter (2004).  Secondary 
sources will include periodicals, journal articles, and sourcebooks of historical documents 
(Cohen, 1985, p.6).  A study of primary sources to ascertain the racial make-up of student 
enrollment during the time period falls outside the scope of this study. Further, I align Court 
interpretation with student enrollment data for African-American students throughout the 
time period studied. While other racial groups are undoubtedly important to consider in 
issues of equity, race, education, and integration, I chose to focus only on African-American 
students as student enrollment data throughout the time period studied is most complete for 
this racial group. Additionally, I have positioned myself primarily in the field of education 
although this is a study of how law and education align. Therefore, while literature within the 
field of law will be consulted especially regarding judicial interpretation, the major focus will 
be literature in the field of education on the topic of desegregation. 
 
Chapter II: Literature Review 
I. Overview  
In addition to massive commentary on the legacy of Brown in the year of its 50
th
 
anniversary, recent literature addresses the impact of the 2007 Parents decision. Fundamental to 
issues of integration in schools is literature examining the basic goal of integration and its 
benefits to school-aged children. Therefore, in this chapter I review the three main areas of 
scholarship within the wide breadth of literature addressing desegregation in K-12 education. 
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Literature citing both empirical evidence and the theory supporting integration will be reviewed. 
Second, there exists much scholarship evaluating the great impact of Brown and subsequent 
integration policy. This literature evaluates the extent to which the decision and the series of 
desegregation cases subsequent to it actually resulted in progress and is well established in the 
field of education.  Third, the recent 2007 Court decision resulted in speculation on the future of 
racial integration in the nation’s schools. This third section of the literature review will be 
advanced in Chapter IV given that my third research question will require an analysis of where 
the future of desegregation is headed post Parents.    
 
II. Literature in Support of Integration: Empirical Evidence and Theory 
Despite recent resegregation, the benefits of school desegregation are well established in 
education research and literature. Research supports the fact that integration helps students in 
many ways while segregation produces negative results on student achievement.  Rothstein 
(2004) found that while family income level does indeed affect achievement, even when income 
level is equal, African-American students still fare worse than their white peers if enrolled in 
racially segregated schools. Further, Kurlaender & Yun (2006) found that desegregation can help 
achievement as measured by individual ability to interact and feel comfortable with peers from 
different ethnic and racial backgrounds. Further, Orfield and Lee (2004) identify three primary 
categories of student outcome in relation to desegregation: higher achievement (as measured by 
test scores), greater educational or occupational aspirations and attainment, and increased social 
interaction among members of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Additionally, Martinez & 
Klopott (2005) found three of the five strongest predictors of minority student college attendance 
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are directly related to school environment. More than 70 of the largest schools districts in the 
county are majority minority students (Pitre, 2009). Minority students are aware of the inequities 
in educational opportunity (Sortz, 2008). Sortz (2008) found that urban middle school students 
were angry about and aware of the shortcomings in their education due to lack of proper 
materials, lack of permanent teachers, and lack of funding.  
Wells and Frankenberg (2007) identify two major themes in the literature on negative 
impact of segregation on schools and students: the first strand focuses on inequitable inputs to 
schools (i.e, resources), the second on the outcomes of segregation (p. 180). The author’s 
conclude that  
Within the first strand, four characteristics of segregated schools stand out: 
concentrated poverty, poor teacher quality and high turnover, inadequate 
curriculum and supplies, and limited aspirations and social networks. The 
second strand emphasizes low academic achievement and graduation rates 
as well as instability and lack of support. Taken together, all of these 
factors demonstrate the layered, all-encompassing nature of racial 
inequality and its impact on separate public schools (p. 182).  
The authors go on to reason that despite some arguments citing the need for socio-economic 
integration instead of racial integration in schools, race is a strong predictor of where students 
live regardless of socioeconomic status. The authors point to the fact that black and Latinos with 
relatively high incomes are far more likely to live in poor communities than whites with similar 
incomes: “Race is a strong predictor of whether or not a child will live in a mostly poor 
community and attend a mostly poor school” (p. 181).  
Further, in a qualitative study examining the long-term affects of attending racially 
diverse schools on adult graduates confirms the basic and logical conclusion that students who 
attend racially integrated high schools prepare young people for participation and inclusion in a 
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diverse society (Wells, Duran, & White, 2008).  The researchers concluded that graduates of 
racially mixed schools felt they were more accepting and comfortable with people of other racial 
backgrounds. Second, they felt such schooling prepared them for a global economy and society. 
Third, and interestingly, most adult graduates of mixed schools felt they would have grown up in 
racial isolation but for their experience in mixed schools.  
A major theme in education theory has been support for integrated schools based not only 
on empirical evidence but also notions of equity, justice, and the intrinsic value of mixed-race 
classrooms. Wells, Duran, & White (2008) cite the goal of eradicating structural inequality. This 
theme is founded on the notion that there exists a legacy of racism and racial inequality in the 
nation’s schools. Second, inherent in the goal of integrated schooling is the theory that students 
benefit from being in diverse classrooms. Not only is this supported by empirical research, as 
just discussed (see Wells, Duran, & White, 2008), but in multicultural education theories as well.  
Multicultural education theory supports the implementation of racially mixed schools and 
classrooms on two fundamental levels. While multicultural education and its goals is not a major 
focus of this study, it is beneficial to survey basic tenants within multicultural education as they 
provide further support for the benefits, both empirical and theoretical, of racially integrated 
schooling.  First, the multicultural literature connects equal opportunity to racial integration. 
Second, multicultural literature emphasizes the need to end institutionalized racism evident in 
schools and to promote diversity as a democratic principle. A basic tenant in multicultural 
literature is equal educational opportunity for students of all races. Banks (1997) writes,  
Multicultural education incorporates the idea that all students- regardless of their 
general and social class and their ethnic, racial, or cultural characteristics- should 
have an equal opportunity to learn in school. (p.3) 
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Banks also emphasizes the idea that educators should envision schools as having a microculture 
similar to other social systems. Banks calls for interaction between students and teachers of 
different backgrounds:  
Almost all classrooms in the United States are multicultural because White 
students, as well as Black and Brown students, are socialized within diverse 
cultures….The school should be a cultural environment in which acculturation 
takes place; teachers and students should assimilate some of the views, 
perspectives, and ethos of each other as they interact. Teachers and students will 
be enriched by this process, and the academic achievement of students from 
diverse groups will be enhanced because their perspective will be legitimized in 
the school. Both teachers and students will be enriched by this process of cultural 
sharing and interaction. (Banks, 1997, p. 26).  
Here, Banks’ vision for teacher and student enrichment is based on the expectation that such 
classrooms are racially integrated. He is clear in his inclusion of “White students, as well as 
Black and Brown” (p.26) in classrooms across the country.   
 The second major theoretical focus in multicultural literature is the link between 
integration and basic principles of democracy. Multiculturalists often connect the ideas of 
multicultural education and democracy, asserting that democracy calls for an acknowledgement 
of diverse voices, including those of different races. Christine Bennett (1995) also makes a clear 
connection between multicultural education and democracy. She writes,  
Multicultural education is an approach to teaching and learning that is based upon 
democratic values and beliefs, and seeks to foster cultural pluralism within 
culturally diverse societies and an interdependent world.  (Bennett, 1999, p.13)  
Amy Gutman (2007) also discusses multicultural education within the ideals and goals of 
democracy. She is ultimately concerned with furthering civil equality through tolerating and 
recognizing difference. Gutman argues, “[t]oleration and recognition of cultural differences are 
both desirable parts of multicultural education” (Gutman, 2007, p. 27). Gutman’s arguments rest 
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on the fundamental premise that the nation’s democratic ideals are founded on the idea that 
‘individuals should be treated and treat one another as equal citizens, regardless of their gender, 
race, ethnicity, or religion’ (p. 71). Yet, she is most concerned with achieving civil equality for 
all children. Gutman characterizes a central reason why desegregation as a policy issue is subject 
to controversy: “[t]he issue that immediately arises is that citizens often reasonably disagree 
about what constitutes an education adequate to equal citizenship” (p. 74). The politics of 
education cannot go unnoticed for it exists and is recognizable in practices of schooling.  
Major themes in multicultural education literature also stress the importance of 
integration as means to combat broader negative issues in overall race relations. Both Sonia 
Nieto (2004) and Carl Grant (2006) consider institutional racism. Grant argues that there exist 
three main reasons why racial inequity persists.  He writes,  
The first reason is that a dual structure has historically existed and continues to 
exist, which causes and facilitates different treatment of America’s White and 
non-White people. The second reason is that Americans for the most part live in 
plural society, which can be defined as racially/ethnically segregated communities 
within cities and states….The third reasons is the marginalization of 
multiculturalism and race in society and multicultural education in schools as they 
are situated within a struggle between the democratic ideals of the country and the 
U.S. Constitution and the affirmation of these ideals (Grant, 2006, p. 158).  
Grant goes on to argue that racism is ‘resilient’ (p.158) in American institutions themselves.  
Sonia Nieto (2004) discusses race relations within the context of discrimination. She 
acknowledges the persistence of discrimination on an institutional level. As she points out, 
schools are often the sites of institutionalized racism historically in the form of de jure (by law) 
segregation and currently through de facto (in practice) segregation policies. Nieto defines 
institutional racism within the context of equity. She writes of institutional discrimination: 
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Too often prejudice and discrimination are viewed by many people as located in 
the negative perceptions of individuals towards members of other groups. 
Consequently, most definitions of racism and discrimination obscure the 
institutional nature of oppression….Institutional racism generally refers to how 
people are excluded or deprived of rights or opportunities as a result of the normal 
operations of the institution. (Nieto, 2004. p. 37) 
 
Through citing the current day situation of de facto segregation Nieto points out that most 
students in the nation's public schools are not likely to interact with those of different racial 
backgrounds. Because schools are often a reflection of larger society, it is no surprise racism has 
infiltrated into the classroom through overt discrimination and seemingly benign practices.  
Nieto (2004) is rigid in her belief that schools are a reflection of the larger society and in this 
way schools duplicate and perpetuate racism. She argues that discrimination in school practices 
and policies continue to discriminate against minority students. These embedded practices are 
reflected in the fact that minority students are disproportionately represented in lower ability 
groups and special education programs (Reglin, p.45). Although de jure desegregation is 
obsolete, de facto methods of separating students persist in forms such as tracking, curriculum 
variation, and teacher quality (Ibid). 
 Multicultural literature and theory also emphasizes the fundamental role of the 
law in integration. Critical race theorists emphasize racism as a fundamental in crafting in the 
law and how the law is interpreted. Delgado and Steffancic (2001) define the critical race 
movement as: 
a collection of activists and scholars interested in the relationship among race, 
racism, and power. The movement considers many of the same issues that 
conventional civil rights and ethnic studies discourses take up, but places them in 
a broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group-and self-
interest, and even feelings and the unconscious…Today, many in the field of 
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education consider themselves critical race theorists who use CRT’s ideas to 
understand issues of school discipline and hierarchy, tracking, controversies over 
curriculum and history, and IQ and achievement testing. (p.3) 
 
The authors stress the importance of recognizing the role of power in establishing educational 
institutions. Born out of critical legal studies, critical race theory seeks to examine, in part, the 
role of race in American discrimination and as such, in the law.  As Gloria Ladson-Billings 
(2006) writes,  
it is difficult to ‘get past race’ when it remains constitutive of what it means to be 
an American. Thus, CRT is becoming a mature and vibrant epistemological 
stance that scholars through the world can employ to understand persistent 
inequity, injustice, and oppression (xii).   
 
Critical race theory can be used to understand both social and schooling inequities. Ladson-
Billings & Tate (2006) propose three propositions from critical race theory to evaluate race as a 
critical factor in equity and argue that class-based or gender-based explanations are incomplete 
when considering inequity: 
1. Race continues to be a significant factor in determining inequity in the 
U.S.  
2. U.S. Society is based on property rights.  
3. The intersection of race and property creates an analytic tool through 
which we can understand social (and, consequently, school) inequity. 
(p.12) 
 
For many, Brown paved the way for the multicultural education movement (Gay, 2004). As 
Chapman (2008) explains,  
As people of color demanded that the promise of Brown, equal and equity 
education for all citizens, be fulfilled, the multicultural education movement 
gained momentum and became intrinsically linked with the promotion of issues of 
access and equity in educational reform (Chapman, 2008, 44). 
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However, several critical race theorists point out that the original goals of the Brown decision 
have yet to be realized. First and foremost, many cite the institutionalization of racism in schools, 
the resegregation of the public schools, and experiences of minority students to illustrate how the 
goals of Brown have failed to come to fruition. CRT argues institutional racism is furthered by 
the current state of the law. Saddler (2005) argues that racism in schools is “institutionalized, 
systematic, and cumulative” (p.53).   
 Literature in education supports several important reasons underlining discrimination 
both empirically and theoretically. As discussed, current literature links integration with higher 
student achievement for minority students. The theory-based literature reflects underlining 
themes of social justice, combating institutionalized racism, and a need for realizing democratic 
ideals all as strong reasons to pursue desegregation in the nation’s public schools. Important to 
note is while multicultural theory is an important part of why my research is relevant to the field 
of education, and thus,  important to briefly review here, it is not the focus of my research nor 
central to my specific research questions in law and constitutional interpretation.  
 
 
III. Literature Evaluating Desegregation Legislation and Policy  
Legislative and political contexts within which Supreme Court decisions are issued play 
an important part in evaluating the decisions themselves, especially in the highly-charged 
area of school desegregation. Current literature acknowledges the pivotal role Brown played 
in American history as well as within education. The literature also emphasizes that the 
Supreme Court alone is not the only driving force in school desegregation. The other 
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branches of government are charged with enforcement and legislation. As Epperson (2008) 
writes,  
 …the Executive branch has become a dominant force in shaping civil 
rights policy in education over the last four decades. This presidential power has 
grown in direct proportion to federal legislation granting the Executive Branch a 
more prominent role in the development of civil rights policy. President Johnson 
became known as one of the strongest civil rights advocates to ever serve in the 
White House (p.4) 
President Johnson oversaw education reform as part of his ‘Great Society’ agenda. Legislation 
such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 grew out of a push for 
equal educational opportunity (Vergon, 1990, p.5). The literature in education and law concludes 
the Civil Rights Act was a turning point for the implementation of Brown. In fact, several 
scholars call the Civil Rights Act the most important tool to help implement the decision. As 
Brown (2005) writes,  
Prior to the Act, it was difficult to secure plaintiffs in hundreds of racially 
segregated school for fear of reprisals by southern communities. To bring a suit 
against a southern school to desegregate, plaintiffs also needed to employ a local 
state attorney, which was difficult in most cases. The plaintiffs and the local 
attorney could suffer a loss of employment and suffer physical harm. The Acts 
granting the Attorney General the authority to being suits solved these problems 
for many school suits in small rural communities.” (Brown, 2005, p.182).  
 
 Literature in both law and education also acknowledge the short-comings of Brown due 
to lack of an implementation decree from the Court. Further, general themes across the literature 
acknowledge major turning points in how the Court has ruled on desegregation issues. 
Importantly, the literature views 1954-through the early 1990s to be a time of Supreme Court 
support of desegregation (Orfield and Lee, 2001; Caldas and Bankston, 2005). However, the 
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early 1990s stand in stark contrast to earlier legal leaps in support of desegregation. For example, 
Orfield and Lee (1996) consider the decisions ‘a triumph for the decades-long powerful, 
politicized attacks on school desegregation. The new policies reflected the victory of the 
conservative movement that altered the federal courts and turned the nation from the dream of 
Brown toward accepting a return to segregation.’ (p.1). Caldas & Bankston (2005) also view the 
early 1990s as a change in the way the Supreme Court ruled on desegregation issues. Lutz (2005) 
calls this the ‘resegregation’ (see also Orfield and Eaton 1996; Frankenberg, Lee and Orfield, 
2003) of American schools and identifies the early 1990s as a shift from integration to gradual, 
moderate increases in resegregation of schools and an increase in African-American dropout 
rates for schools outside the South as well as increases in African-American private school 
enrollment across the country.   
Current literature speaks widely on recent policy issues such as market-based reforms and 
the standards movement. The reauthorization of the ESEA in 1994 as the Improving America’s 
Schools Act, or IASA, drove the standards movement ahead by requiring all states to adopt a 
system of standards and accountability to measure achievement in order to qualify for federal 
funding (Ibid.). The Civil Rights Project argues that the goal of integrated schools is actually 
harmed by the standards movement:  
The effects of segregated education cannot be cured by merely enacting strong 
demands for achievement gains and changing nothing else in schools that are 
usually unequal in every major dimension relating to student achievement, 
including the quality of teachers, curriculum offered, and the level of competition 
(peer group). In fact, enforcing rigid standards without equalizing opportunity can 
exacerbate the inequalities by stigmatizing minority schools as failures, narrowing 
their curriculum to endless testing drills, and leading strong, experienced teachers 
to transfer to less pressured situations. The massive publicity given to test scores 
may also help destabilize residentially integrated communities, as realtors use test 
scores to steer White buyers to outlying White communities. Thus, the ironic 
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impact of ignoring the inequality of segregated schools in the name of standards is 
to worsen them (Frankenburg & Orfield, 2005, p.6).  
 In 2001, the ESEA was reissued again as the No Child Left Behind Act. Some argue that 
the Act, although it imposed demanding goals for equalizing achievement among all students, 
actually hurt minority schools and teachers because of the sanctions imposed on lower-
achieving, often minority schools (Sunderman, Kim & Orfield, 2005). Orfield, writing the 
introduction to the 2005 book, writes of his view on NCLB:  
I believe that the first phase of implementation of NCLB shows very limited 
capacity at the federal level to understand either the reality of schools or the basic 
traditions of federal-state and professional relationships in educational policy. 
Though the reforms are enormously demanding for state and local educators and 
the many provisions of the law seem contradictory and infeasible to many 
educators, we find that the states are making a serious effort to comply. 
Unfortunately the federal role has not been either constructive or adaptive—it has 
been rigid and often hectoring toward state and local officials raising serious 
issues. 
 
Market-based reforms are a relatively new area of education reform and current research 
is mixed on conclusions as to their success.  Orfield (2004) argues the market-based approach 
NCLB takes to education reform has been ineffective. Market-based education reforms are 
founded in the idea that schools have been overrun by bureaucracy and inefficiency and that 
bringing competitive market principles to schools will force schools to become more effective 
(Orfield, 2004, p.7). Mickelson, Bottia, &f Southworth (2008) characterize market-based reforms 
as applying competition, choice, deregulation, accountability, and individual pursuit of rational 
self-interest (p.3). Mickelson, Bottia, & Southworth (2008) consider theoretical outcomes of the 
market-based approach:  
Various choice options, along with efforts to privatize educational services and 
school management, reflect ideologies that seek to diminish the role of the state in 
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public and private domains, to reassess the distinctions between private and public 
realms, and to advance market forces in the provision of essential social services 
including education. In theory, school choice will empower parents to match the 
needs of their students with an array of educational options, thereby maximizing 
the quality of their child’s education. Deregulation and competition will foster 
innovation and reform among choice and non-choice schools, and market forces 
ultimately will eliminate school that do not provide the high quality education that 
parents demand. (p.3) 
 
The authors (2008) found that school- choice programs often result in student enrollment in 
schools which are more segregated than other schools in their local communities. Reasons for 
this include findings that many choice programs cater to selective populations such as gifted or 
special-needs students, informal and formal selection of students by the schools themselves, and 
a lack of choice options in metropolitan communities (Mickelson, Bottia, & Southworth, 2008).  
Two NCLB market-based provisions are first, the classification of schools as ‘in need of 
improvement’, thus giving students an option to transfer out of schools, and with them taking the 
per pupil funds each school receives for every student and second, provisions that mandate 
parents should be given school budget money to purchase supplemental services for their 
children (Orfield, 2004). The assumptions of these two policies was that loss of funding resulting 
from transfers and money to parents would spur schools to operate more effectively and 
successfully. Sunderman and Kim (2004) found that these market-based reforms were first, used 
only by a small number of families and second, that the options did not provide beneficial 
transfer options because transfer schools were often weaker than the original school (Sunderman 
& Kim, 2005). The study (2005) also points out that there existed no true accountability 
requirements for the market-based reforms.  
 McEwan (2002) evaluates current voucher programs, another market-based reform 
implemented since the 1990s. McEwan (2002) defines the voucher program as “government-
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funded tuition coupons, redeemable by parents at the public or private school of their choice” 
(p.102). There is no single voucher program as programs differ by state and district. The 
Supreme Court, in 2002, held school voucher programs constitutional (Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 [2002]). Again, the idea here is market-based, based on the assumption that 
schools will improve through implementation of a competitive system for funding. Some believe 
implementing market-based reforms do present a win-win situation for schools. McEwan (2002) 
asks the question: what happens to students left behind in under-performing, low-funded 
schools? Similarly, Levin and Belfield (2003) point out that ‘few markets are perfectly 
competitive’ (p. 192). When presented with market-based choice policies, parents’ choice will be 
the determining factor in school enrollment. Levin and Belfield (2003) warn that educational 
outcomes of this will likely hurt the primary goal of education. Schools will be forced to cater to 
specific desires of parents for their children’s schooling:  
That is, they [schools] will compete by matching their appeal to particular 
educational preferences of parents rather than trying to produce a standardized 
educational product. The problem is that serving well a wide variety of different 
values and preferences is likely to undermine the social goal of providing a 
unifying educational influence around societal institutions and values. 
Levin and Belfield (2003) found that while competition does have a positive effect on test scores, 
the effects are modest, with about three fifths of the programs studied finding no correlation 
between competition and test scores. Those that do show a correlation show only a modest 
positive relationship: the effect of competition is about 10 points on the verbal section of the 
SAT exam (p. 202). As Levin and Belfield (2003) discuss, true indications of the impact voucher 
systems will have on achievement have yet to be researched because there is a lack of market 
experience given these programs are relatively new and the limited number of policies in place. 
Second, the authors (2003) identify a type of ‘chicken and egg’ problem wherein more research 
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is needed before more policies are implemented but policies will not be implemented until more 
research shows voucher program success (p.212).  
In a 2008 study, Bifulco, Ladd, & Ross studied how public school choice affects 
integration. The study analyzed schools in the Durham, North Carolina school district where 
about 40 percent of students have opted out of schools in their attendance zones to enroll in other 
area schools. The researchers (2008) compared racial composition resulting from choice with the 
racial composition that would have resulted if students attended their neighborhood schools. 
Both racial and class segregation was higher with implementation of the choice plan (Ibid). 
Further research on choice includes a study by Cobb and Glass (2003). Cobb and Glass (2003) 
found that charter schools in Phoenix, Arizona enrolled more white students than did the nearby 
traditional public schools. Cobb and Glass (2003) argue that this is likely due to de facto 
segregation, self-selected segregation on the part of parents and students, and that selective 
admissions policies or targeting of a specific population by the charter schools should be 
reevaluated. One possible solution offered is to require charter school admissions to mirror the 
demographics of the communities from which students are drawn (Cobb & Glass, 2003).  
Magnet schools provide another form of school choice. Magnet schools emerged in the 
1970s as a way to combat school segregation. These schools are specialty schools that offer 
unique programs for students. Enrollment in these schools is voluntary rather than through a 
traditional neighborhood attendance zone. Magnet schools were formed in an attempt to compact 
desegregation and were explicitly established under this goal. These desegregation efforts are 
voluntary because student enrollment is based on parental choice and not mandatory assignment. 
Theoretically, students will be drawn outside of their normal attendance zones because of what 
the special programs have to offer thus increasing diversity.  
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Magnet schools began through legislative act in 1972 when President Nixon sponsored, 
and Congress passed, the Emergency School Aid Act. Following the Brown decision many white 
parents resisted desegregation efforts. The resistance increased when the Court outlawed 
freedom of choice plans (Green, 1968) and endorsed busing (Swann, 1971). Schools were in 
desperate need of funds to cope with the new desegregation mandates. The Emergency School 
Aid Act provided federal aid to assist schools districts conform to court-ordered desegregation. 
 Initially magnet schools were successful and many districts viewed magnet schools as a 
more viable alternative to busing plans. The Supreme Court implicitly approved the 
implementation of magnet schools by refusing to hear cases on the issue. (Frankenberg and Le, 
2008, p. 1048). Magnet schools were a political compromise between those who were opposed to 
forced busing and those who saw magnets as a way to achieve integration and promote school 
choice.  
 However, although magnet schools gained popularity in the early 1970s, the costs 
associated with opening such schools became a burden on school districts. In 1976 Congress 
amended the Emergency School Aid Act to provide specific aid for magnet school planning and 
operation. The Act also continued to provide grants to schools to help with compliance with 
desegregation mandates and voluntary integration plans. Through the 1970s into the early 1980s 
Emergency School Aid Act grants were the primary source for school districts opening magnet 
schools.  In 1976 fourteen schools applied for magnet school grants through the Emergency 
School Aid Act. By 1980 over one hundred schools had applied (Frankenberg & Le, 2008). 
However, in 1981 President Reagan drastically cut Emergency School Aid Act funding. Reagan, 
a proponent of school choice, reinstated funding for magnet schools in 1984 through the Magnet 
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Schools Assistance Program. The program funded the founding of magnet schools to promote 
voluntary integration. 
 Between 1976 and 1982 an average of 275 of the largest urban school districts had 
implemented 138 magnet schools. Less than half of the magnet schools were federally funded. 
As Frankenberg & Le (2008) report,  
Between 1982 and 1992, the number of magnet schools more than doubled to 
2,433, and the number of students they served in magnet programs more than 
tripled, to 1.2 million. By the turn of the century, there were more than three 
thousand magnet schools with explicit desegregation standards educating about 
2.5 million students (p. 1051). 
Despite the large increase in the number of magnet schools, the success of magnet schools is 
mediocre at best. In 1996, the U.S. Department of Education issued a report examining their 
success. The report found only 396 of 1068 schools in the 119 districts receiving grants for 
magnet school funding had explicit desegregation objectives. Overall, only 58% of federally 
funded magnet schools identified desegregation as part of its purpose in their mission statements.  
   In 2003 a subsequent Department of Education report concluded schools in receipt of 
federal funds for magnet schools made only modest progress in reducing minority group racial 
isolation. Just one out of six schools had a decrease in minority student isolation of more than 
5%, and a mere one in twenty successfully prevented or eliminated minority group isolation.  
 Frankenberg & Le (2008) argue there are several reasons magnet schools have failed to 
achieve their original goals of promoting desegregation and avoiding racial isolation. First, over 
the evolution of forms of federal aid and federal standards for magnet schools, schools were 
required to conform to other education objectives. At the passage of the Emergency School Aid 
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Act the objectives as set forth by the federal government for magnet schools were clear. Magnet 
schools were to reduce, eliminate, or prevent racial isolation, and promote equity (Frankenberg 
& Le, 2008, p. 1056). With each change to the federal magnet school program, new objectives 
were added to the original goals to include goals relating to knowledge of academic subjects and 
the strengthening of vocational skills. The insertion of these goals came, for example, 
immediately after the Nation at Risk report publicized the stark state of American schools. 
Further, reauthorization of the Magnet School Assistance Program in 1994 as the Improving 
America’s School Act articulated further objectives for magnet schools including ones relating to 
magnet school roles in promoting district reform and developing new educational methods and 
practices. With a growing number of objections, magnet schools grew further away from the 
original goals of promoting voluntary desegregation efforts. Most recently, No Child Left Behind 
included objectives for magnet school to expand the capacity of school districts so that the 
schools would be able to continue to operate after federal funding ends and to make sure magnet 
school students were ready for college or productive employment. While all these added 
objectives over the years are undoubtedly all worthy and important goals, with the increasing 
burden of meeting new goals, it is possible the original goals of magnet schools were lost as 
federal objectives changed. Additionally, magnet schools are the flagship of the nation’s school 
choice options, a movement that has grown with the increasing number of charter schools, 
voucher programs, and other market-based school choice programs. Frankenberg & Le (2008) 
argue there is now no discernible distinction between magnet schools and other special school 
choice programs and schools (p. 1063). 
 Second, with the changing landscape of desegregation and student enrollment, magnet 
schools, simply because of the way they are formed, cannot keep up with the changing issues 
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within the school segregation as a whole. Frankenberg & Le (2008) argue dynamics of school 
segregation have changed in conjunction with an evolution in the barriers to integration (p. 
1059). The significance of attendance zones and shifting district demographics has contributed to 
a shift from segregation within each school district to segregation between school districts. Intra-
district (within school district) magnet schools are ill-equipped to address segregation that exists 
between school districts on a whole because there is little federal incentive for school districts to 
pursue inter-district (between district) magnet school implementation. With regard to issues 
outside of integration such as student achievement, magnet schools have been found to increase 
achievement. Studies confirm average test scores of students in magnet schools are higher than 
scores for students attending non-magnets (Guerrero & Gretchen, 1999).  
 The fate of magnet schools post-Parents is another important consideration given the 
fundamental relationship between the original purpose of magnet schools and desegregation. 
Frankenberg & Le (2008) offer six ways in which magnet schools can pursue their original goal 
with the support of the federal government and local school districts post-Parents in legally 
permissible ways. First, the authors suggest that because a majority of Justices in Parents 
recognized diversity at the K-12 level to be a compelling interest, Congress should restore and 
reaffirm the original mission of charter schools by reenacting the Magnet School Assistance 
Program. The Program should articulate the specific goal of desegregation as the Program’s 
highest objective (p. 1064). The other goals that have been added to the original goals should be 
kept in order to attract students to magnet schools, and schools should develop new programs to 
distinguish magnets from traditional public schools within the district. Second, magnet schools 
should expand their boundaries to include students from surrounding districts. Federal programs 
should provide funding for intra-district cooperation. Along these same lines Congress should 
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integrate magnet programs with programs promoting housing integration (p. 1066) to further 
address the link between school and residential segregation. Lastly, because funding for magnet 
schools has remained constant and not adjusted for inflation or rising costs associated with 
beginning new schools, Congress should increase funding for magnet school programs 
specifically as entities separate from school choice programs. Magnet schools should be 
distinguished from other school choice programs to keep focus squarely on their desegregation 
goals. As Frankenberg and Le (2008) argue, this distinction would  
have the effect of reintroducing parental choice not as an end in and of itself but 
as a means to an end: to achieve integration and reduce racial isolation. Indeed, 
Congress could go further to influence school authorities by withholding or 
simply eliminating funding for those grantees who operate choice plans at the cost 
of further racial and economic stratification, not just among MSAP funding 
recipients but for grantees of any of the DOE's other relevant programs. The 
DOE, too, can play a role in this redefinition: rather than putting magnet schools 
under the umbrella of school choice, the DOE should turn the relationship on its 
head, placing school choice, in the form of magnet schools, under the umbrella of 
integration and equity (p. 1069). 
These methods are ways magnet schools can progress towards their original goal post-Parents 
given their potential to improve racial integration in the nation’s public schools.  
Finally, the literature highlights the current intersection of desegregation, demography, 
and achievement.  Important to note, again, is that there has occurred a demographic shift in the 
United States in recent years wherein the West has become the country’s first area experiencing 
predominantly minority public school enrollment. Orfield and Lee (2004) argue further that,  
most recent initiatives in assessment, accountability, and choice purport to solve 
the problems of minority children while ignoring or even intensifying segregation. 
Achievement gaps have grown. (Orfield and Lee, 2004, pp.4-5).  
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Student achievement has been influenced by both the resegregation of schools and the 
standards-based and market-based reforms of recent years as well the evolution of magnet 
schools since their inception in the 1970s.  
IV. Literature on Shifts in Judicial Interpretation of the 14th amendment 
The main focus of this research study is tracing the ways in which the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the 14
th
 amendment with regard to the desegregation cases. However, while current 
literature does address the overall issues surrounding Court interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment 
(Chemerinsky, 1991; Berger, 1977), there remains an area rife for inquiry specifically in the area 
of judicial interpretation and desegregation Supreme Court cases post-Brown to 2007.  
The Supreme Court is the supreme and most powerful interpreter of the Constitution. In 
fact, as Chief Justice Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison, “It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”  5 U.S. 137 (1803). As Wolcher 
(2005) observes,    
Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitution have enjoyed a  
  very high level of immunity from revision by legislation and executive action…it  
  is widely accepted as a matter of custom and legal culture that only the   
  cumbersome and lengthy amendment processes specified in Article IV of the  
  Constitution can overturn a Supreme Court decision that renders a specific and  
  unqualified Constitutional interpretation” (p. 244).   
Specific methods of Constitutional interpretation are clearly defined and accepted in both law 
and education literature.  As such, ways in which the Court has interpreted the 14
th
 amendment 
can be characterized by method of interpretation. Often, members of the Court are defined by the 
ways in which he or she is known to interpret the Constitution in order to reach a conclusion on 
issues before the Court.  
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The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed on June 13, 1866 and ratified by the states on 
July 9, 1868. Plessy v. Ferguson, heard in 1899, held constitutional the separate but equal 
doctrine that would remain in place and be applied to public schools for more than half a century. 
The Supreme Court did not enforce equal protection violations until Brown. As a result, the 
Court began to hear more cases in which alleged violations of the equal protection clause had 
taken place.  
Specific methods of interpretation have been thoroughly addressed and defined by 
literature in the field of law and will be further discussed in regard to methodology in Chapter 3. 
In addition to examining the affect of specific methods of interpretation I also examine the case 
law to determine if shifts in interpretation existed. There are three main recognized methods of 
judicial decision-making: textual, originalism, and non-originalism/constructivist. (Wolcher, 
2005).  While there is some overlap between the methods of interpretation, each is 
distinguishable (see chapter 3). Further, in addition to considering shifts as framed by specific 
methods of interpretation, I also consider how general interpretation methods of the equal 
protection clause have evolved over time. That is, I move beyond considerations of specific 
modes such as constructivist or originalist to consider general phases of interpretation as defined 
by the Court’s attitude towards equal protection as evidenced through Court majority opinions.    
The ways in which the Supreme Court has historically interpreted the 14
th
 amendment 
and specifically the equal interpretation clause has been studied in legal literature but more so in 
a broad sense, not specifically in regard to desegregation case law. Chemerinsky (1991) 
recognizes the 14
th
 amendment as one of the most important changes to the Constitution. 
However, he argues, the Supreme Court has made mistakes in interpreting the amendment and 
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specifically the equal protection clause to the extent that the original promise of the amendment 
has not been realized. Chemerinsky (1991) points to what he calls missteps in Supreme Court 
interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment. While he does recognize great victories such as Brown, he 
believes the outcome of cases is a direct result of “who is on the Court, what they believe, and 
how they are influenced by current events” (p. 1155).   
Shaman (2000) considers the 14
th
 amendment with regard to education cases but does not 
focus on desegregation cases. Shaman (2000) defines the primary focus of the equal protection 
clause as the classification of individuals and unjust discrimination (p.237). He argues the 
framers of the Constitution envisioned the central purpose of the Clause was to eliminate racial 
discrimination against newly freed slaves. In 1944 the Court declared racial classifications are 
suspect and subject to the highest level of scrutiny (see Chapter 3). The equal protection clause 
has been the main way to challenge desegregation cases. However, the clause has also been 
applied to education cases challenging inequitable funding in public schools as well. Shaman 
(2000) considers the important role of the equal protection clause in school funding cases. In 
Rodriguez, the plaintiffs brought suit against a Texas school district arguing the school funding 
system based on local property taxes violated the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause 
because there was great disparity in funding between poor and wealthier school districts. The 
Court ruled the plaintiffs were not a suspect class because the tax system was not a race-based or 
other suspect classification and therefore the tax system called for only minimal constitutional 
scrutiny. Shaman (2009) comments,  
By ruling that even gross disparities in school funding do not violate the 
Constitution, the Court allowed the continuation of public school systems that are 
riddled with inequality. On the poor side of those systems, untold numbers of 
students throughout the nation are denied an education that by any genuine 
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standard could be called adequate. As far as the Court was concerned, if it was not 
in the Constitution, it is not fundamental. The Court simply became unwilling to 
further expand the concept of fundamental rights. Those fundamental rights 
already recognized under the equal protection clause would retain their 
Constitutional protection, but no longer would they be extended beyond their own 
reach; new fundamental rights certainly would not be ordained by the Supreme 
Court (p. 247).  
 
While the field of education has not focused on the issues of judicial interpretation and its 
affects on education to the extent necessary to address fully the research questions in this study, 
the literature in education does provide a solid foundation regarding factors the Court has 
historically considered when interpreting the 14
th
 amendment in the series of desegregation 
cases.   The literature points to the Court’s consideration of scientific evidence on desegregation 
issues beginning in the Brown decision (Russo, Harris & Rosetta, 1994). It was this evidence that 
led the Court to overturn the separate but equal doctrine from Plessy and consider that 
segregation in schools did violate the 14
th
 amendment’s equal protection clause.  
While clear phases of interpretation are not widely accepted in law literature (this is part 
of what makes my research important and necessary) law scholars do consider civil rights and 
constitutional interpretation as implemented by the Court. Shaw (2001) argues the beginning of 
the Court’s separate but equal rule in Plessy is ‘promotion’ of racial segregation and mark’s the 
Court’s endorsement of unequal treatment even when measured against the words of the equal 
protection clause. Similarly, Shaw (2001) argues a shift occurred in the Court’s interpretation of 
equal protection when it decided the pre-Brown higher education cases because the Court began 
to move away from ‘separate but equal’ to a focus on protecting individual rights. Shaw (2001) 
calls the ‘modern Civil Rights Era’ as beginning with the Brown case and broadened the 
applicability of the equal protection clause to include public K-12 education. Shaw (2001) points 
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out an important point: the equal protection clause does not require all people must be treated 
equally at all times. For example, constitutional discrimination occurs when people under the age 
of 18 are prohibited from voting. The key question for the Court, then, is when discrimination 
violates the equal protection clause.  
Similarly, Nelson (1993) argues Brown marked a time of progress but the Court has 
shown a shift in recent years towards what he calls the concept of ‘decontextualization’ (p.682). 
This Court, Nelson (1993) argues the Court, whereas it had been considering the realities of 
American life, has now moved towards ignoring facts of American life such as gross disparities 
in educational opportunity for minority students. He argues the Court has created an 
‘independent jurisprudential reality’ (p.683) by taking the reality of race relations out of current 
and historical settings. This phase, he believes, began in the early 1990s with Dowell wherein the 
Court ruled unitary status can be granted even if the result is resegregation. Others agree the 
Court has failed to consider the current realities of racism in their current methods of 
interpretation (Lively, 1992). Although he argues Brown ‘rechartered’ (p.650) and redefined use 
of the equal protection clause because of the deep racial discrimination of the time,  he 
recognizes a shift in interpretation not even two decades later in the Milliken case (desegregation 
across district lines was unconstitutional). This case ushered in a new phase of ‘restrictive’ 
(p.660) interpretation. Lively (1992) points out, however, the decisions and subsequent cases 
wherein the Court implemented a more restrictive use of the equal protection clause, did not 
vacate the desegregation principle. The cases did mark a new phase of interpretation, however, 
where the Court began to restrict support of specific segregation remedies.  
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Foate (2007) argues the recent Court opinion in 2007 suggests a new shift in 
interpretation of the Constitution with regard to the definition of ‘compelling interest’ under the 
14
th
 amendment. If racial balancing is not seen as constitutionally permissible, then the Court 
must recognize another compelling interest regarding race in schools. With the current make-up 
of the Court, Foate (2007) speculates this type of judicial interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment is 
unlikely. Thro and Russ (2009) also conclude that this kind of judicial constitutional 
interpretation limits the pursuit of diversity. The authors write,  
In refusing to allow racial preferences in order to achieve racial balances, the 
Court rejected racial balancing in K-12 education as a compelling interest, limited 
the pursuit of diversity in higher education, demanded that racial classifications 
actually work, and directed educational officials to consider nonracial alternatives 
in student assignment. In this way, the Court made it more difficult for 
governmental agencies to pursue racial balancing” (p.536). 
Literature in law outlines changes and trends in judicial interpretation while literature in 
education explores the pivotal role has played in school desegregation, but neither addresses how 
shifts in interpretation of the equal protection clause specifically correlate with broader changes 
in school enrollment. This study will address this gap and broaden understanding of these issues.  
 
V. The Color-Blind Constitution  
Important to note are the ways judicial interpretation is considered with respect to the 
‘color-blind’ notion of the Constitution as it was this interpretation that the majority relied on in 
the Parents opinion. The color-blind view of the Constitution was first articulated by Justice 
Harlan in the dissenting opinion in Plessy. He stated, “Our Constitution is color-blind and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S., 537, 1896, p. 559).  
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Wells and Frankenberg (2007) argue the color-blind interpretation of the Constitution has 
recently become a method by which to justify the opinion put forth by the majority in Parents: a 
color-blind Constitution means race cannot be used in student assignment policies. To do so 
would be to interpret the Constitution in a way that recognizes the race of a student. The authors 
(2007) argue that 
The color-blind ideology has been a work in progress by conservative judges 
since the 1970s, when the courts became less willing to consider the broader 
effects of historical and societal discrimination on students of color who were 
applying to universities or trying to gain access to more integrated public schools. 
(p.184).  
 
Similarly, Keith Sealing (1998) advocates that courts should not read the Constitution as color-
blind. He argues the framers never intended for the use of color-blind readings of the 
Constitution because constitutional interpretation cannot take place outside the context of 
society. Sealing (1998) believes Courts “should not use the myth of a color-blind Constitution to 
perpetuate the racial problems of a society that itself has failed to reach color blind status” 
(p.159). Further, he argues that trying to fight a color-conscious society with a color-blind 
interpretation of the Constitution is a misaligned solution to problems of racism (p. 198).  
Sealing (1998) parallels the sentiment Anderson (2007) discussing the term ‘color-blind’ in 
Constitutional interpretation. Anderson (2007) argues against a color-blind interpretation given 
the historical context of the fourteenth amendment. Anderson consults the historical context in 
which the fourteenth amendment was negotiated in Congress before it was ultimately 
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immortalized in the Constitution. He concludes the writers purposely left out direct reference to 
race but never intended to imply decisions of government should be irrespective of race.  
Anderson (2007) argues the Congressmen involved in the drafting purposely omitted 
reference to race in an act of political strategy. Reconstruction was a time when federalism was a 
constant political issue: states’ rights and state politics were a constant consideration. 
Consequently, cognizant of the fact that many states would bar ratification of the Amendment if 
not given the freedom to consider race in individual state affairs, the writers intentionally 
excluded race. However, as Anderson argues, the framers of the fourteenth amendment 
intentionally used race-neutral language to achieve a specific purpose. The purpose was to leave 
a legacy of neutrality for the future and a door open to governmental interpretation of the 
language. Concluding the writers of the Amendment intended it to be ‘color-blind’ is incorrect. 
Indeed, interpretation is essential to the Amendment’s application in the current day. Therefore, 
Anderson warns against present-day interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment ignoring 
historical context. He writes,   
  [w]e may argue for or against the use of racial classifications to pursue  
   issues of school desegregation and affirmative action, but we should not  
   pretend that we are constrained by a color-blind Constitution created by  
   the Reconstruction Congress (Anderson, 2007, p. 248).  
 
Further, the notion of a ‘color-blind’ constitution is often viewed as being prohibitive to 
achieving true equality. Scutari (2009) argues the changing ways in which the Court has 
interpreted the equal protection clause pivot on a changing definition of ‘equality’. Indeed, the 
Court in Parents clearly states that the Court in Brown would support the 2007 decision citing 
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the phrase, “the fourteenth amendment prevents states form according differential treatment to 
American children on the basis of their color or race” (Parents, 2767). Scutari (2009) argues the 
way the Court in Parents interpreted the fourteenth amendment to be ‘color-blind’ makes it 
impossible to apply the notion of equality as a judicial principle. Further, he argues the ‘color-
blind’ interpretation may actually perpetuate inequality because a true idea of equality cannot 
function without consideration of current social context. Literature in both law and education 
provide insight as to what the words ‘color-blind’ actually mean within the context of Supreme 
Court decisions and how the meaning has changed over time.  
   
VI. Literature Post-Parents   
After the 2007 Supreme Court decision striking down student assignment plans in 
Kentucky and Washington, many scholars reacted to the decision by evaluating where 
integration efforts would go given the Court’s ruling that a student’s race cannot be used as the 
deciding factor in student assignment policies nation-wide.  I offer here a brief introduction to 
the issue with which I will deal with more deeply in Chapter IV in response to my third research 
question.   
Broadly speaking, however, the central literature in the education and law literature post-
Parents is clear: many scholars consider the decision a set back in the road to true integration. 
Brown (2009) considers the 2007 Court decision and believes it will prompt a move back to 
neighborhood schools as schools begin to eliminate their student assignment plans. He argues 
that this will mean more single-raced schools and neighborhoods (p.526). Thro & Russo (2009) 
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note that discussion of educational opportunity and access to it was absent from the opinion in 
Parents. In fact, the Court, as the authors point out, explicitly states that the end goal of 
integration has never been the priority of the Court.  Rather, the Court’s goal is to prohibit 
segregation and as Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion writes, mere racial imbalance is not 
segregation (p. 54). The authors (2009) speculate that when the problem of education inequality 
is solved, it will be solved without using race as a factor by which to address problems given the 
decision in Parents. First, an increased consideration of school finance issues and how districts 
raise revenue will result. Second, schools will focus more on student socioeconomic status. The 
authors point out that assignment plans based on socio-economic status do not result in 
constitutionality problems as plans based on race will face.  Similarly, McNeal (2009) concludes 
that integration will be slow because of the limits placed on assignment plans. 
 The confusing nature of the opinion in Parents is widely recognized and speculated upon 
in law and education literature. Wells and Frankenberg (2007), writing just months after the 
decision state,  
The irony and thus confusing reality for school districts after the Parents decision 
is that although five justices agreed that there is a compelling interest in having 
racially integrated schools, a different set of five justices declared unconstitutional 
the means that Seattle and Louisville used to accomplish that goal, which 
included the racial classification of students and guidelines for racially balancing 
each school. (p. 185).   
 Literature in education concludes the implications of the decision will be expansive, 
reaching beyond K-12 education.  Orfield and Lee (2007) also acknowledge the potential 
confusion created by a decision wherein “a majority of a divided Court told the nation both that 
the goal of integrated schools remained of compelling importance but that most of the means 
now used voluntarily by school districts are unconstitutional” (p. 3). Much of the literature 
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focusing on the Parents case argues the Supreme Court has opened the door to resegregation in 
the nation’s schools (Orfield & Lee, 2007).  Many believe the barriers to integration have been 
strengthened given the new restrictions on the use of race in assignment policies.  
However, a prevalent theme in the literature post-Parents urges schools to continue to 
seek diversity, pointing out the Supreme Court has not completely barred such goals (Pitre, 
2009). Pitre (2009) also points out the Supreme Court was clear in its assertion that integration is 
indeed important, but also that integration must be achieved through means that they believe are 
Constitutionally permissible. Major themes in the literature focus on integration plans through 
socioeconomic-based assignment plans such as those in Wisconsin and North Carolina (McLean, 
2009; Goodwin, Leland, Baxter, & Southworth, 2006; Mickelson & Southworth, 2005). 
Increasing focus on magnet schools is also projected (McLean, 2009).  
 Similarly, Wells and Frankenberg (2007) urge educators, policy makers, lawyers, and 
research to work together to help achieve integration within the bounds of the law now carved by 
the Court. They acknowledge there is not ‘one path’ (p. 185) through which integration can be 
achieved. One approach is using what they define as ‘multiple characteristics that coincide with 
race’ (p. 185) such as the neighborhood in which a student lives, native language, or parental 
education level to structure student assignment plans. Another path is identified as school choice 
options as is targeted recruitment for diversity   
It is important to note that Brown and Parents were decided in two very different 
historical and social contexts.  As Brown and Hunter (2009) acknowledge,  
Brown came about in the 1950s in a much different environment; America was 
less diverse racially and ethnically, and economic competition on a global scale 
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was less than in today’s economy. Today, America’s future is closely rues to the 
large pool of minority children enrolled in its public schools. (Brown and Hunter, 
2009, p.560) 
Further, Wells and Frankenberg (2007) point out that now over 40% of school-aged students 
are minority children while Orfield and Lee (2007) cite a major decline in the number of white 
students over the last decade. Regardless of historical context within which the decision was 
made, many believe Parents has begun a time of resegregation in the nation’s schools. Because 
school integration issues so closely mirror race issues in society, many view the Parents decision 
as a sign of a regression in the struggle for equal civil rights. As Dorsey (2008) writes,  
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court decided that the school districts’ race-
conscious policies to encourage racial integration and to prevent school 
resegregation were determined to be unconstitutional in Parents. Thus, legalized 
school segregation will likely re-appear on all education levels, kindergarten to 
12
th
 grade and higher education. Unfortunately, the struggle for equity and equal 
opportunities for Black people and other racial minorities is coming full circle. 
(Dorsey, 2008, p.17).  
Others consider the large legal implication of the decision given the continued inequities in 
education. The Civil Rights Project (2008) calls the decision in Parents a ‘threat to equitable 
educational opportunity’ because the Court outlawed the use of race as a deciding factor in 
student assignment policies. 
 
Chapter III: Research Methods 
I. Overview  
In this study, I implement a qualitative analysis asking the question of how the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 14th amendment changed over the last 60 years in cases 
affecting school desegregation in the K-12 educational system. I include court cases addressing 
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racial segregation in institutions of higher education when the case affects issues within K-12 
education. In conjunction with this first research question, I also analyze the associated general 
racial make-up of student enrollment in the public educational system during the period 1954-
2007. Third, I establish guidance for public school leaders about how to integrate schools in light 
of the Parents decision in 2007 which disallowed the use of race as a primary motivation for 
desegregation. I also examine the widespread effects of the Parents decision on institutions 
outside K-12 education such as higher education.  
Research methodology used to conduct this study is centered on legal analysis of 
Supreme Court opinions but draws on relevant social science and policy literature to make an 
argument for how they are intertwined intellectually and practically. This study is an exercise in 
Constitutional Law, an analysis of judicial shifts, and examination of what was occurring on the 
ground in schools due to these judicial shifts during the time period 1954-2007.    
II. Legal Analysis  
Legal analysis for this study is guided by the work of Wren & Wren (1986). The purpose 
of legal research “is to ascertain the legal consequences of a specific set of actual or potential 
facts. It is always the facts of any given situation that suggest, indeed, dictate the issues of law 
that need to be researched” (Wren & Wren, 1986, p.29). Analysis of Supreme Court 
desegregation case law occurs through five steps: (1) gather of facts, (2) analyze the facts, (3) 
identify the legal issues raised by the facts, (4) arrange the legal issues in a logical order for 
research (Wren & Wren, 1986).  
Beyond the ways in which the Court has applied the 14
th
 amendment rest the legal 
meaning and significance of the decisions. By analyzing the case law as a whole, this study will 
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develop a picture of the evolution of interpretation since 1954.  To identify and organize the 
legal meaning of the decisions, I use Wolcher’s framework (2005). The formula, according to 
Wolcher (2005, p. 246), for devising meaning from court decisions is:  
 
Wolcher (2005) explains that  
In the United States, primarily because of the general acceptance of judicial 
supremacy on matters of Constitutional interpretation, the subject of judges’ 
interpretive practices in construing the Constitution looms large both in political 
discourse and legal theory. (p.246).  
Good faith judicial work refers to the outcome based methods Wolcher (2005) argues judges 
apply to judicial interpretation. This is the consideration of the totality of circumstances. These 
circumstances, in this case, the state of desegregation in schools, inform decision-making and 
impose legal meaning to judicial interpretation. After all, each case before the Supreme Court 
stems from a situation wherein a plaintiff sues a particular defendant on Constitutional grounds, 
therefore interpretation cannot be viewed in a vacuum but rather, as part of the whole of ‘judicial 
work.’ 
 To each individual case I apply the five steps articulated by Wren and Wren (1986) to 
understand the specific situation of each piece of case law. In each case analysis I include a 
background and statement of facts as well as an examination of the ways in which the Court 
employed the fourteenth amendment and equal protection clause in reaching the holding of the 
case.  Next, I will categorize each case by the method of judicial interpretation specifically with 
Legal Text
Method of 
Interpretation
Good Faith 
Judicial Work
Legal Meaning=++
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regard to the Court’s interpretation of the 14th amendment (Wolcher, 2005). I conduct this 
analysis within the context of the whole series of cases so that the legal meaning can be defined 
and analyzed over time.  After these first two steps of examination I align each case or set of 
cases with its impact on desegregation in schools using secondary sources that chronicle of the 
path of desegregation in schools during the time period.  
 To answer my second research question secondary resources are used to determine the 
current state of law and the impact of Parents on both K-12 education and institutions beyond K-
12 education such as institutions of higher education and the workplace. Secondary sources will 
be obtained in both the education and law literature.  
III. Categorizing by Constitutional Interpretation  
A. Methods of Interpretation  
Several well-defined methods of Constitutional interpretation are recognized in academic 
work. In addition to specific methods I also consider shifts in judicial interpretation. I analyze 
each case according to a general method of interpretation: originalist, constructivist, or strict 
textualist. Second, each case will be evaluated as to whether the equal protection clause was 
directly or indirectly employed as part of the Court’s reasoning. Meaning, whether or not the 
Court discusses the fourteenth amendment directly in its opinion, citing phrases or words, or 
simply mentions the basic tenants of the amendment as opposed to indirect interpretation. In 
such cases where the Court does not explicitly cite or discuss the fourteenth amendment I 
categorize the interpretation as indirect. Strict textualist, originalist, and constructivist are three 
ways in which I group the cases. In addition to considering specific methods of interpretations I 
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examine shifts in the ways the Court has interpreted the 14th amendment. Guided by the legal 
literature I reviewed in Chapter II, I consider each case within the overall set of cases to discover 
trends or shifts in interpretation.  
 The way in which the Court interprets the equal protection clause and fourteenth 
amendment is crucial in understanding the evolution of desegregation litigation and its 
subsequent impact on racial make-up of student enrollment, and ultimately, the current state of 
desegregation law as defined by the Court. Wolcher (2005) argues that legislative and executive 
officials have accepted the Supreme Court’s decisions as authoritative, as if they are extensions 
of the Constitution itself (p. 246). It is clear the way in which the Court interprets the law is 
essential in understanding its decisions and therefore the impact on society. There exist three 
main methods of interpretation.  Strict textualism is a method of interpretation that posits there 
should be little interpretation of the words of the Constitution. Judges who adhere to this method 
of interpretation believe there is no occasion to interpret Constitutional language. As Wolcher 
(2005) describes,  
“the words of the Constitution mean exactly what they ‘tell’ the strict textualist they 
mean…it follows the explicit words written down by the framers of the Constitution 
rather than attempting to the alter the meaning of those words by an act of interpretation 
that by definition supplements the language of the Constitution with language written by 
unelected judges.” (p.248).   
 
Originalism is a combination of two basic criteria for interpretation: the literal text of the 
Constitution and second, the specific intent of those who drafted and ratified the text.  
For the originalist the surest guide to authorial intent is to read the words of the 
Constitution for the norms that they state or clearly imply and in this respect the 
most strict originalists are also strict textualists. However, as for those provisions 
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of the Constitution that are vague or ambiguous, the strict originalist looks solely 
at the written historical record of the context in which the text in question was 
proposed and ratified in order to determine what the framers must have had in 
mind as its specific purpose” (Wolcher, 2006, p.248) 
Originalists believe the only way appropriate way to interpret the Constitution is through the 
process of formal amendment to the document itself.   
 In direct contrast to textualism and originalism is non-originalism (or constructivism). 
Non-originalists believe it is impossible to know the intent the framers meant to establish when 
ratifying the Constitution. Judges who adhere to this method of interpretation search for a fair 
outcome within the bounds of the law. This interpretation is outcome-based rather than textual 
based. Lastly, constructivist methods of interpretation posit that the Constitution gains meaning 
not only from its text but from the current context within which it must be interpreted. Non-
originalists (constructivists) believe the Constitution is a living document, capable of changing 
over time in response to new conditions (Wolcher, 2005). Dworkin (1986) describes the process 
of constructive interpretation as a recognition of law as a social practice on a general level that 
should consider precedent and external factors relevant to the relevant legal issues (p.87).Various 
consideration such as the morals of current society, democratic processes and results that are 
generally thought to be ‘good’ come into play under a constructivist interpretation. Dworkin 
(1986) believes interpretation should weigh social factors, not simply the text of the constitution, 
and that these social factors should be developed into a coherent overall purpose (1973, p.511).   
Constructivists respond to criticism that that this method leaves too much to judicial discretion 
by citing the common law method whereby judges must rely on earlier precedent thereby putting 
constraints on discretion (Dworkin, 1973, p.511). Constructivist interpretation does not equate to 
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relativism because the purpose or objective of the law in unfaltering and objective (Dworkin, 
1973, p.513). Dworkin writes,  
The constructive model insists on consistency with conviction as an independent 
requirement, flowing not from the assumption that these convictions are accurate 
reports, but from the different assumption that it is unfair for officials to act 
except on the basis of a general public theory that will constrain them to 
consistency, provide a public standard for testing or debating or predicting what 
they do, and not allow appeals to unique intuitions that might mask prejudice or 
self-interest in particular cases. The constructive model requires coherence, then, 
for independent reasons of political morality. (p.513).   
As previously discussed, the ways in which the Court interprets the Constitution, 
specifically its interpretation and application of the 14
th
 amendments’ equal protection clause, is 
important in analyzing the evolution of desegregation case law. Cases will be analyzed further 
according to levels of, and ways in which Constitutional scrutiny is applied by the Court. In 
general, the Court has applied strict scrutiny in recent years in order to reach decisions on school 
desegregation.  
B. Strict Scrutiny Test 
 ‘Strict scrutiny’ is a legal test that may be applied in determining the 
Constitutionality of a federal law under the equal protection clause of the 14
th
 amendment. A 
hierarchy of scrutiny tests is applied when determining legality; the strict scrutiny test is the most 
stringent test to determine Constitutional validity.  
The three-tiered hierarchy begins with a rational basis review, the lowest form of judicial 
scrutiny, and the middle is intermediate scrutiny. In order for a law to pass the rational basis 
review, the court must determine if the law is rationally related to a reasonable governmental 
interest. (McCulloch v. Maryland, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 [1938]). 
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The rational basis test, then, is the less strict of the levels of scrutiny used to evaluate the 
Constitutionality of a federal law. Classifications invoking use of the rational basis test are age, 
disability, political preference, political affiliation, or sexual orientation.  
 The intermediate scrutiny test is the next level of scrutiny and requires a law to first, not 
only be related to a reasonable government interest, but to also further an important government 
interest. Second, not only does it require a law to be rationally related to this interest, but even 
further, to be substantially related to the interest. Classifications by gender require use of the 
intermediate scrutiny test. The test was set forth by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Craig v. Boren 
and applies to laws concerning gender discrimination. (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 [1976]) The 
Court reasoned, "classifications” by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 [1976])   In the case, an Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 
but did allow for females over the age of just 18 to purchase the beer.  The Court ruled that the 
law did not meet the ‘important government’ interest standard nor that was the law substantially 
related to any potential interest.  
 Lastly, the strict scrutiny test is used when laws relating to ‘suspect’ classification 
Constitutional rights are being challenged.  
The Supreme Court has identified the right to vote, the right to travel, and the 
right to privacy as fundamental rights worthy of protection by strict scrutiny. In 
addition, laws and policies that discriminate on the basis of race are categorized as 
suspect classifications that are presumptively impermissible and subject to strict 
scrutiny (Valetta, 1998).   
Strict scrutiny requires a law to be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The 
Court applied the strict scrutiny test in Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 [1973]), in which it held that 
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even though the Texas law outlawing abortion involved a legitimate state interest,  it was not a 
compelling one. The Court held that a state may outlaw abortion after the point of viability but 
that the Texas law prohibiting all abortion was unconstitutional based on its failure to be 
narrowly tailored to the objective.  Method of interpretation coupled with level of scrutiny will 
provide the broad categories within which I analyze each piece of case law.  
IV. Data Collection  
The information for this study consists of Supreme Court case law directly affecting K-12 
school desegregation in the form of its majority and dissenting opinions. Such cases include 
decisions on desegregation plans and, where appropriate, case law on affirmative action in higher 
education.  Next, secondary sources are used to consider how the Court’s Constitutional 
interpretation aligns with what is occurring in schools and communities. Secondary sources 
include current and past scholarship evaluating the evolution of desegregation issues during the 
specified time period. Sources include appropriate articles in legal treatises, law review articles, 
and education journals, or books (Wren & Wren, 41). Cohen (1985) identifies secondary sources 
as a major component of legal research (p.4). Research on how integration programs were 
implemented, and evaluation of these programs’ successes and failures is already established in 
the field of education. The work of Clotfelter (2004) offers the most comprehensive evaluation 
of desegregation and student enrollment.  I build upon this research by analyzing how integration 
in schools paralleled judicial interpretation used by the Court in order to evaluate how 
interpretation correlates with actual student enrollment in schools.  
The decisions of the Supreme Court are published in the United State Reports and can be 
found in most law libraries around the country. The United States Reports started in 1790 and is 
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the official publication of United States Supreme Court decisions (Cohen, 1985, p.13).  These 
reports are published annually and contain all majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions from 
the Court.  This source will be used to obtain the desegregation case law that will be the subject 
of legal analysis. Occasionally I will refer to the Supreme Court Reporter, Lawyer’s Edition as it 
contains summaries of the arguments of counsel and thus, may offer a better understanding and 
some level of interpretation of the Court’s decision (Cohen, 1985, p.20).  
 By far the fastest and most commonly used method of case law research is computerized 
legal research (Wren & Wren, 133). The two leading research services are Lexis and Westlaw. In 
both services, Supreme Court cases are grouped into ‘general federal library.’ A library is made 
up of a related set of authorities. For example, Wren & Wren (1986) describe ‘general federal 
library’ as containing sub-libraries of Supreme Court decisions, U.S. Court of Appeals decisions, 
and U.S Claims Court decision. Wren & Wren (1986) recognize that computerized searching in 
both Lexis and Westlaw allows for highly specialized searches that would not be possible 
without electronic databases. For example, a legal researcher can search only specific dates or all 
opinions of a particular judge or set of judges. For my research, I use the search term function. 
This function allows general searches within Supreme Court law containing specific terms. My 
search terms include: education, desegregation, race, segregation, integration, and bussing. Case 
selection is guided by those cases widely acknowledged as being among those dealing directly 
with desegregation issues in K-12 education. These cases are established in law and education 
literature as it is already a topic of much research. In addition, the digests of the West Publishing 
group provide the most comprehensive compilation of Supreme Court case law (Cohen, 1985, 
p.2). I will be using the descriptive word method to identify case law to reaffirm those already 
identified as influential in desegregation issues. As Cohen writes,  
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The most efficient procedure for case finding in the digest relies on the use of 
specific factual catch words derived from an analysis of the problem in question. 
This approach allows common words rather than more difficult legal concepts to 
be used as access points. There are six relevant search word topics: parties, places 
and things, basis of action, defense, and relief sought. With this analysis the 
researcher can look up the most specific words and phrases in the descriptive 
word index and thereby locate relevant key numbers and cases covering the 
problem” (1985, p.76).   
To address the second research question, I will consider the current state of federal 
desegregation law and how schools can structure integration plans within such legal framework. 
Based on analysis of the case law as a whole I will draw conclusions on what exactly the current 
legal bounds are as set by the Supreme Court. The body of case law as it has evolved post Brown 
through Parents will provide an understanding and examination of what the Court has set as the 
legal parameters for integration plans and methods.   
V. Definitions  
Because this study is situated foremost in the field of education, it is important to clarify 
potentially unfamiliar legal terms used in and relating to this study.  Terms used in this study are:  
Affirmative action: A set of actions designed to eliminate existing and continuing discrimination, 
to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to 
prevent future discrimination. (Black’s Law, 2006)  
Case Law: The collection of reported cases that form the body of law within a given jurisdiction. 
(Black’s Law, 2006)  
De Facto Segregation: Segregation by virtue of reality of behavior incorporated into everyday 
life. Results without purposeful action by government officials. Real or actual segregation which 
occurs concurrent to social and psychological conditions as they exist. (Barron’s Law, 1996).  
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De Jure Segregation: Refers to segregation directly intended and sanctioned by law or otherwise 
issuing for an official racial classification. (Barron’s Law Dictionary, 1996) 
Executive Order:  An order issued by the head of a government, such as the President of the 
United States or a governor of a state, and which has the force of law. An executive order must 
find support in the Constitution, either in a clause granting the President specific power, or by 
delegation of power to the President. (Barron’s Law Dictionary, 1996)  
Holding: Any ruling or decision of a court.  
Judicial Review:  A court’s power to review the actions of other branches or levels of 
government. The court’s power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being 
unconstitutional. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2006)  
Opinion: A court’s written statement explaining its decisions in a given case. (Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 2006).  
Remand: To send back. An appeals court may remand a case to a trial court in order to conduct 
further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s ruling.  
Respondent: A term used instead of defendant of appellee to identify the party who is sued and 
must respond to the petitioner’s complaint.  
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Chapter IV: Findings  
 
I. Introduction  
 
While a brief overview of the series of cases in school desegregation litigation was 
provided as an introduction in Chapter I, the findings presented here are the result of detailed 
textual analysis of the opinions and oral arguments themselves. Given the topic has been the 
subject of much literature, the important and milestone cases are routinely acknowledged 
(Clotfelter, 2004). I also use the Court opinions themselves as indicator of which cases, perhaps 
less well-known, should be included as part of the analysis. Often times the Court will refer to 
previous cases for precedent or legal reasoning. I found twenty five cases to be relevant to K-12 
school segregation issues. These twenty five cases are comprehensive of those cases directly 
dealing with the issue including several higher education cases that have impacted K-12 school 
segregation.  My comprehensive textual analysis allows for the examination of how the Court 
interpreted the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment over the last 60 years. Each 
case is divided into the framework provided by Wren & Wren (1986) discussed in Chapter 3. A 
background and statement of the facts for each case is presented. Following presentation of this 
data, I offer a comprehensive analysis of judicial interpretation.  Further conclusions such as how 
the interpretation builds on past application of the equal protection clause by the Court are drawn 
when possible.  
 The cases are arranged in a logical order for research- chronological order, given the 
lengthy time span of school segregation litigation cases. Additionally, given the Court is 
obligated to follow precedent, chronological ordering of the cases is most logical to facilitate a 
coherent analysis of the issues. The analysis of judicial interpretation for each case is guided by 
Wolcher (2005) as discussed in Chapter 3. Where appropriate, analysis of method of 
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interpretation is grouped together by companion cases or series of closely related cases. Textual 
analysis allowed determination of a method of interpretation decision tree (see Figure 1a). This 
method of interpretation was classified as either direct or indirect and either constructivist or 
originalist. From these broader categories further analysis was conducted on the specifics of how 
the fourteenth amendment was interpreted within these four categories to determine shifts or era 
of interpretation. Major and pivotal cases were presented in further detail based on their status as 
being a milestone in the series of cases. Given the amount of research evaluating and discussing 
the 50
th
 anniversary of the Brown decision, monumental cases have been routinely acknowledged 
in education and law literature (Orfield, 2001; Clotfelter, 2004).  Less pivotal or milestone cases 
are not presented in great detail. Analysis of the legal meaning of the case occurred within the 
context of overall Court judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment based on an overall 
assessment of how judicial interpretation has evolved (Wolcher, 2005), thus addressing the main 
research question. The second and third research questions of the study are addressed using 
secondary sources.  
 
II. Summary of Findings  
 I determined Supreme Court judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment has 
impacted racial make-up of student enrollment during the time period studied. Further, I found 
Parents greatly impacts school desegregation remedies and also impacts areas outside K-12 
education.   I found four shifts in judicial interpretation occurring at four different times during 
the time period studied. While I did not find a direct relationship between mode of interpretation 
and racial make-up of school enrollment, I determine four distinct phases of interpretation that 
impacted school enrollment. The Court has interpreted the equal protection clause in the school 
82 
 
desegregation cases studied here in four distinct phases: endorsing segregation, holding 
segregation unconstitutional in higher education, expanding interpretation of the equal protection 
clause to support K-12 integration, and finally, a plateau wherein the Court stopped the 
expansion of what constituted segregative practices in K-12 schools. Figure 1 provides a short 
reference guide for the series of cases and the Court’s holding. I do not find a relationship 
between mode of interpretation when categorized as constructivist or originalist and direct or 
indirect. I do find a relationship between shifts in interpretation and racial make- up of schools 
which is the most significant finding of my research.  
 
 
Figure 1a: 
  
 
Supreme 
Court Opinion
Considers social 
context in 
interpretation of 
14th amendment?
Explicit reliance 
on 14th
amendment?
Yes
No
Yes
No
Constructivist
Originalist
Direct
Indirect
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Figure 1 
Case Year Fourteenth Amendment Issue and Holding 
Plessy 1899 Does state law requiring segregated railway cars violate the 
equal protection clause? No.   
Cumming 1899 Can a school district shut down a black high school due to 
funding constraints when the white high school remained 
open? Yes.  
Gong Lum 1927 Does the segregation of Chinese K-12 students violate the 
equal protection clause? No.  
Missouri ex rel 
Gaines 
1938 Does the equal protection clause require a state to provide a 
state-funded education to both black and white residents? Yes  
Sipuel 1948 Must a state provide for the legal education of a black student 
when no black law school exists? Yes.  
 
 
Sweatt 1950 Even if a state maintains law schools for blacks and whites, is 
it a violation of the equal protection clause when the 
education at the black law school unequal to that at white law 
school? Yes.  
 
McLaurin 1950 Do state policies mandating a black student be segregated 
from his peers in a School of Education violate the equal 
protection clause? Yes.  
Brown 1954 Does de jure segregation in K-12 public education violate the 
equal protection clause? Yes.  
Brown II 1955 Does the equal protection clause call for the desegregation of 
school to occur with all deliberate speed? Yes 
Cooper 1964 Is it a violation of the equal protection clause to ignore 
desegregation mandates and prohibit black students from 
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attending integrated schools? Yes.  
Griffin 1964 Does closing public schools in Prince Edwards County 
violate the equal protection clause? Yes.  
Green 1968 Do ‘freedom of choice’ plans violate the equal protection 
clause? Yes  
Alexander 1969 Does the continual operation of segregated schools violate 
the ‘all deliberate speed’ mandate of Brown II? Yes.  
Montgomery 
School Board 
1969 Does the equal protection clause mandate the racial 
integration of faculty in K-12 public schools? Yes.  
Swann 1971 Is bussing constitutional? Yes. Are schools responsible for 
racial balancing reflecting demographic racial make-up? No.  
Keyes 1973 Even if no de jure segregation exists, do intentional acts on 
the part of school boards to discriminate and maintain 
segregation violate the equal protection clause? Yes.  
Milliken 1974 Is it constitutional to mandate inter-district bussing? No.  
 
Pasadena 1976 Is a return to neighborhood schools due to factors other than 
de jure segregation a violation of the equal protection clause? 
No 
Bakke 1978 Is use of a racial quota a violation of the equal protection 
clause? Yes  
Dowell 1990 Should a school district be granted unitary status if its student 
reassignment plan will result in increased segregation? Yes  
 
Freeman 1992 Is the equal protection violated when changing residential 
patterns, not governmental actions are the cause of school 
segregation? No  
Jenkins 1995 Must a state provide remedial education classes and increased 
salaries to correct de facto segregation? No  
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Grutter 2003 Is affirmative action absent a racial quota constitutional under 
the equal protection clause? Yes.  
Gratz 2003 Is affirmative action under a point system constitutional? No. 
Parents 2007 Do student assignment policies using race as a deciding 
factor violate the equal protection clause? Yes 
 
From Plessy through Gong Lum the Court interprets the equal protection clause in a 
manner allowing de jure segregation in public schools to be constitutional. Further, during this 
phase, the Court makes no distinction between unequal educational opportunity and segregated 
schooling. Making its intention clear in Plessy and Gong Lum, the Court does not equate separate 
with unequal. Further, the Court found no constitutional violation when black schools were shut 
down while white schools remained open (Cumming) showing the Court’s unwillingness to 
equate unequal opportunity with segregated schooling. This first phase of interpretation is 
categorized by the Court’s endorsement of segregation and holding the equal protection clause 
did not require either equal or desegregated educational facilities.  
 The second phase is categorized by a shift of interpretation in four higher 
education cases showing the Court’s willingness to consider segregation as violation of the equal 
protection clause. The Court took smaller steps in the cases Missouri and Sipuel leading up to 
Sweatt and McLaurin. In the beginning cases the Court edged towards the ultimate conclusions 
and holdings of the latter two cases. Missouri and Sipuel held a state must provide a legal 
education to both black and white students even if no black law school existed. Sweatt and 
McLaurin take these holdings a step further by holding a state must provide an equal education 
to both blacks and whites in addition to maintaining that even if a school of higher education is 
integrated itself, individual classrooms must be integrated as well. The Court begins to consider 
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the idea of inequality as associated with segregation at the higher education level in this phase of 
interpretation.  
A third phase of integration is categorized by the Court’s interpretation of the equal 
protection clause as prohibitive of segregation in K-12 education. In this phase the Court 
expands its interpretation to not only rule segregation is unconstitutional but then to include 
specific modes of integration as permitted by the equal protection clause while simultaneously 
holding inequality and delay to integration in violation of the clause. From 1954 in Brown I to 
Keyes  in 1973 the Court’s interpretation of the equal protection clause supported first, a basic 
holding that segregation was unequal and unconstitutional and further, expanded its 
interpretation to hold several segregative methods used by school boards during the time period 
as unconstitutional. Brown I and II spoke clearly on the Court’s intention and marked a new 
phase of interpretation for the Court. No longer was separate and equal constitutionally 
permissible. The Court clearly interpreted the equal protection clause to rule separate schooling 
was inherently unequal in theory and practice and schools should integrate with all deliberate 
speed. These two first cases mark a clear shift from the first two phases of interpretation. While 
the Court stayed silent on the issue for the next nearly 10 years, the next seven cases the Court 
heard on K-12 segregation issues were a clear continuation of the foundation for new 
interpretation laid out in the Brown cases.  
First, Cooper, Griffin, and Green were clear signs to states and districts ignoring 
desegregation mandates that the Court intended to be active in its continued support of 
integration and in its assertion of itself as the Highest Court of the nation. The Court interpreted 
the equal protection clause to hold states ignoring desegregation mandates by prohibiting black 
students from attending white schools or closing all public schools were acting 
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unconstitutionally. Next in Green the Court’s interpretation of the equal protection clause 
holding freedom of choice plans unconstitutional was further sign the Court would continue its 
third phase of interpretation when ruling on specific segregative policies which may not have 
been outwardly discriminatory. The holding in Alexander expanded the interpretation of the 
equal protection clause to hold schools accountable for proving their practices were 
nondiscriminatory. In further expansion of what practices constitute violations of the equal 
protection clause, the Court held schools maintaining segregated faculty were also acting 
unconstitutionally. Keyes expanded the definition of de jure segregation to include intentional 
discriminatory acts on the part of the school board even if no clear law or segregative policies 
overtly existed.  
However, beginning in 1974 under Milliken, the Court enters its fourth and current phase 
of interpretation marking a clear departure from its initial support of integration. While the Court 
did not retract its expansion of what practices and policies were in violation of the equal 
protection clause, it did refuse to expand further. The Court, since and including Milliken, has 
plateaued in its interpretation of the equal protection clause resulting first in prohibiting inter-
district remedies for segregation (Milliken) and second, in a refusal to hold schools accountable 
for remedying school segregation caused by residential segregation (Pasadena).  
Several cases in this series of cases are illustrative of the color-blind interpretation of the 
equal protection clause. For example, the holding in Bakke ruling the use of racial quotas in 
higher education as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause was based on Justice 
Powell’s assertion that interpretation of the equal protection clause should be color-blind. This 
method of interpretation would reappear again in Parents. Subsequent to Bakke the Court 
remained silent on racial issues in both higher education and K-12 schools for over twelve years 
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until the series of early 1990s cases where the Court released schools from segregation mandates 
by making it easier for school to achieve unitary status. In Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins the 
Court endorsed the granting of unitary status even when a school’s proposed policies will result 
in increased segregation. Similarly in Freeman and Jenkins the Court interpreted the equal 
protection clause to release schools from any duty either to employ integrative practices in the 
face of school segregation caused by residential segregation or hold states should provide 
funding to schools for the purpose of remedying de facto segregation.  
In this phase of continued plateau of interpretation the Court heard Grutter and Gratz and 
spoke to issues of affirmative action in higher education. The Court, while holding affirmative 
action permissible under the equal protection clause (Grutter), did not approve racial quotas as 
such under the clause (Gratz). Tying over this line of interpretation to K-12 education in Parents 
the Court held using race as the deciding factor in student assignment policies in order to combat 
racial segregation unconstitutional. This case marks the most recent case in the series of Court 
cases relating directly to or influencing K-12 education. The Court entered a fourth phase of 
interpretation in 1974 that has lasted over 30 years and is marked by the Court’s reluctance to 
expand interpretation of the equal protection clause to further segregation in schools. Although 
the Court did not retract its previous holdings from the second or third phase of interpretation, it 
certainly reached a plateau wherein support for integrative methods declined.  
Desegregation as shown in racial make-up of public school enrollment for black students 
paralleled the phases of interpretation employed by the Court. Figure 2 shows lack of 
relationship between indirect or direct interpretation and constructivist or originalist 
interpretation.  Figure 3 shows a relationship between shifts of interpretation and racial make-up 
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of schools. Figure 3 also illustrates how segregation declined during the third phase (the 
expansion phase).  
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Red line indicates percentage of Black students in 90-100% nonwhite schools. Data prior to 1968 is hard to 
analyze and compare to data subsequent to 1968 as the Office of Civil Rights began to collect consistent 
data on national school enrollment in 1968.  
 
 
 
III. Data: Supreme Court School Desegregation Litigation  
A. The Cases  
The following is the data used to examine and analyze the ways in which methods of 
judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment have changed over time. While the time 
period primarily studied begins in 1954 it is important to consider cases prior to this date in order 
to examine the history of the equal protection clause and the Court’s interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment. This is because the Court’s initial approval of school segregation was 
based on precedent laid out in the early cases pre-1954.  
 
30
40
50
60
70
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
9
1
9
0
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
9
1
9
3
9
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
9
Figure 3: Percentage of Black Students in 90-100 
Percent Nonwhite and Majority Nonwhite Public Schools
1
8
9
9
 –
P
le
s
s
y
, 
C
u
m
m
in
g
1
9
2
7
 –
G
o
n
g
 L
u
m
1
9
3
8
 –
M
is
s
o
u
ri
 e
x
 r
e
l
G
a
in
e
s
1
9
4
8
 -
S
ip
u
e
l
1
9
5
0
 –
S
w
e
a
tt
, 
M
c
L
a
u
ri
n
1
9
5
4
 -
B
ro
w
n
1
9
5
5
 –
B
ro
w
n
 I
I
1
9
6
4
 –
C
o
o
p
e
r,
 G
ri
ff
in
1
9
6
8
 -
G
re
e
n
1
9
7
1
 -
S
w
a
n
n
1
9
7
3
 -
K
e
y
e
s
1
9
7
4
 -
M
ill
ik
e
n
1
9
7
8
 -
B
a
k
k
e
1
9
7
6
 -
P
a
s
a
d
e
n
a
1
9
9
0
 -
D
o
w
e
ll
1
9
9
2
 -
F
re
e
m
a
n
1
9
9
5
 -
J
e
n
k
in
s
2
0
0
3
 -
G
ra
tz
2
0
0
7
 -
P
a
re
n
ts
Endorsement Higher-Ed Expansion Plateau
Source: Clotfelter, 2004; Orfield, 2009
1
9
6
9
 –
A
le
x
a
n
d
e
r,
 M
o
n
tg
o
m
e
ry
91 
 
 
 
i. Phase I: Endorsement of Segregation  
Plessy v. Ferguson  
Background and Statement of Facts 
This case is widely accepted as being the beginning of Supreme Court approved 
segregation plans is Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1899). The majority of the Court held 
constitutional a law providing for separate railway carriages for the ‘white and colored’ races. 
(p.538 ). The opinion of the Court considers the law in light of the facts of the case: Plessy was a 
passenger between two stations within Louisiana who insisted on riding the passenger car not 
assigned to his race.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Court considered the 1890 Louisiana law under both the thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendment. Interestingly, the Court itself articulates how it views the purposes of the two 
amendments:  
The constitutionality of this act is attached upon the ground that it conflicts with 
both the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the 
Fourteenth amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part 
of the States.” (p.542).  
 
While the intent of Congress in ratifying the 14
th
 amendment is not specifically discussed in the 
opinion, the Court does rely on legislative action requiring racial separation in schools in the 
District of Columbia and the then current social context of segregation. The Court considers the 
reasonableness of the Louisiana legislature and clearly considers both school segregation and 
social norms:   
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In determining the question of reasonableness, it [the Louisiana legislature] is at 
liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of 
the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation 
of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard we cannot say that a 
law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public 
conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment 
than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the 
District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been 
questions, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures (p.551)  
 
Because the Court considers the intent of the amendment and relies on Court sanctioned 
segregation of schools as precedent for the ruling, the social context of the law in question is a 
foundation for the decision upholding segregation on railway cars. Both the intent of the 
amendment and the current context provide strong justification for the ruling as the Court saw fit.  
  The equal protection clause, while not directly discussed at length in the opinion, is also a 
part of the Court’s decision in Plessy.  The Court reasons the clause was meant to enforce the 
‘absolute equality’ (p.544) of the two races before the law, but that the clause could not be 
viewed as calling for the abolishment of distinctions based on color. The Court is clear in making 
a distinction between ‘social’ equality and ‘political’ equality (p.544).  
 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan opposes the majority based on readings of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. He argues that the amendments, if read according to their 
‘true intent and meaning will protect the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship’ 
(p.555). Harlan also considers the social context but comes to an opposite conclusion from the 
majority’s consideration of the distinction between political and social equality. For Justice 
Harlan, there is no distinction and further, there is no constitutional basis for such a distinction. 
He asks,  
If a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not 
travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use 
of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one 
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side of a street and black citizens to keep on another? Why may it not, upon like 
grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in streetcars or in open 
vehicles on a public road or street? (p.557).  
 
Justice Harlan dismisses the majority’s consideration of the ‘reasonableness’ of the Louisiana 
law. He argues the question of reasonableness should be left to the legislature and the question of 
Constitutionality to the courts.  
 The essence of Harlan’s dissent centers not only on constitutionality but also on morality. 
He predicts the majority decision will stimulate aggression upon the rights of blacks and will 
encourage the belief that states can defeat the purposes of the recently passed thirteenth and 
fourteenth amendments. He writes, that the ‘real meaning’ (p.560) of the Louisiana law is the 
distrust between the races and the belief that ‘colored citizens are so inferior and degraded’ 
(p.560) that they are forbidden by law to sit in the same trains cars as whites. This is the social 
context Harlan chooses to consider rather than the social context justifying segregation upon 
which the majority relies upon.  
 
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 
Background and Statement of Facts 
 In the same year, the Court in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 175 
U.S. 528 (1899) applied similar reasoning to public education. The Court in this case sanctioned 
de jure segregation in K-12 public education in the nation’s school- a decision that would stay in 
effect until more than fifty years later in Brown I. The facts of the case stipulated the plaintiffs, 
Cumming, Haper, and Ladeveze, were ‘persons of color’ (p. 175) suing on behalf of themselves 
and others of their race against not only the Board of Education of Richmond County, Georgia 
but the county tax collector. The plaintiffs were all residents, property owners, and tax payers of 
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the county and the defendant school board regulated public education and also had the power to 
levy taxes as it deemed necessary for public school purposes.  
 The plaintiffs took no issue with the tax structure but with the issue that the levied taxes 
went to support an all-white high school system. What seems particularly egregious was the fact 
that the County had previously operated a segregated school system but on July 19, 1897 denied 
the minority students participation in any high school. The School Board asserted it had made the 
decision to close the minority high school based on their belief that the County did not have 
enough funds to educate all of the minority elementary school-aged children (about 300) in 
addition to the 60 minority students of high school age. The Board then made a choice between 
educating 300 children or 60 high school aged children. The decision to close the minority high 
school, the Board, alleged, was one based on a reasonable conclusion that it was better to provide 
basic education to 300 children rather than high school level education to 60 students.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Supreme Court agreed:  
We are not permitted by the evidence in the record to regard that decision as 
having been made with any desire or purpose on the part of the board to 
discriminate against any of the colored school children of the county on account 
of their race. But if it be assumed that the board erred in supposing that its duty 
was to provide education facilities for the 300 colored children who were without 
an opportunity in the primary schools to lean the alphabet and to read and write, 
rather than to maintain a school for the benefit of the 60 colored children who 
wished to attend a high school, that was no an error which a court of equity 
should attempt to remedy by an injunction that would compel the board to without 
all assistance from the high school maintained for white children….Under the 
circumstances disclosed, we cannot say that this action was, within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the state to the plaintiffs and to those 
associated with them of the equal protection of the law or of any privileges 
belonging to them as citizens of the United States.   (p.176) 
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 The Court ultimately concluded that the decision to collect taxes from everyone but 
educate only white students was constitutional because it was not based in a desire to 
discriminate. The Court sanctioned use not only of de jure segregation in schools, but also the 
unequal education provided to the races. To operate a high school for whites and no such equal 
facility for African-Americans was constitutional and would remain so for decades after the 
decision. Not only were separate educational facilities in K-12 schools legal under the fourteenth 
amendment, but unequal education was as well.  
 
Gong Lum v. Rice 
Background and Statement of Facts  
 In 1927 segregated schooling was again sanctioned by the Court in Gong Lum v. Rice 275 
U.S. 78 (1927). This case does not deal directly with the constitutional issues of segregated 
schooling, but rather, with whether or not a student of Chinese ancestry could be denied 
education at an all-white school under the fourteenth amendment. The Court held such denial did 
not violate the fourteenth amendment and illustrates the Court’s support for de jure segregation 
in K-12 schools.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
 Chief Justice Taft delivered the majority opinion of the Court. The essence of the Court’s 
constitutional test is again based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court chooses to interpret the constitutional language in favor of the school board and not 
the Chinese student seeking education at the all-white schools. The Court reasons,   
“…she is not denied, under the existing school system, the right to attend and 
enjoy the privileges of a common school education in a colored school. Had the 
petition alleged specifically that there was no colored school in Martha Lum’s 
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neighborhood to which should conveniently go, a different question would have 
been presented. The case then reduces itself to the question whether a state can be 
said to afford to a child of Chinese ancestry, born in this country and a citizen of 
the Unites States, the equal protection of the law by giving her the opportunity for 
a common school education in a school which received only colored children of 
the brown, yellow, or black races. (p.273).  
 
The Court goes on to cite both Plessy and Cumming as justification for its holding and reasons 
that even though most of the cases before it arose from the establishment of a separate school for 
blacks and whites, that they ‘cannot think that question is any different where the issue is as 
between white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races’ (p.275).  
ii. Higher Education Cases  
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada 
Background and Statement of Facts 
 As previously discussed, the Constitutionality of segregation in education was 
first challenged at the higher education level. In a series of three High Court cases in the decade 
leading up to Brown I, segregation in higher education, primarily in state law schools and one 
state school of education, was struck down. Using the equal protection clause as the 
constitutional basis for striking down segregated education, the Court foreshadowed the eventual 
use of the 14
th
 amendment in public, K-12 education as well. In all three cases the Court 
reasoned the segregated system violated the equal protection clause because either no legal 
education was available for black students or that the legal education provided was not indeed 
equal.  
 Equal education facilities in higher, not K-12 education, was the subject of subsequent 
Court decisions into the early 1900s. Higher education was the platform under which much of 
the progress that would be seen later in K-12 education was gained. The beginnings of which can 
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be seen forty years after Cummings  in 1938 when the Court heard and decided Missouri ex rel 
Gaines v. Canada 305 U.S. 337 (1938) wherein Gaines, an African-American, was refused 
admission to the Law School at the State University of Missouri. Gaines challenged the refusal 
under the 14
th
 amendment and in particular, the equal protection clause.   
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
 The Court’s opinion turned on consideration of the equal protection clause and the refusal 
of admission as a violation of the clause. The Court considers Gaines’ right to admission a 
personal right, and as an individual he was entitled to equal protection of the laws. Further, the 
State of Missouri was bound to provide legal education ‘substantially equal’ (p.351) to those 
afforded whites even if no other African-Americans desired admission to the Missouri law 
school. However, important to note is the Court does not address the issue of segregated law 
schools in the state, simply whether or not it was constitutional for the State of Missouri to 
operate a whites-only law school with no substantially equal opportunity for African-Americans. 
The last line of the opinion emphasizes this distinction:  
We are of the opinion…that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law 
school of the State University in the absence of other and proper provision for his 
legal training within the State. (p.353) 
 
The Court does not go so far as to overturn the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy but rather 
reasons that the State must either open a black law school or admit him to the white law school. 
Whether or not the decision would have remained if Gaines had challenged a segregated system 
versus the lack of means by which he could attend law school remains unclear given the Court 
ruled only on the issue before it. 
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 Justice McReynolds issued a brief separate opinion disagreeing with the majority 
conclusion. Neither the fourteenth amendment nor the equal protection clause is discussed in the 
dissenting opinion. Justice Reynolds relied on the fact that no other African-American had 
sought admission to the law school and the fact that Missouri did provide assistance to Gaines 
should he want to attend a minority law school out of state. Justice Reynolds believes through 
this, the State had upheld its duty and that by requiring Gaines’ admission to the law school, the 
only ever African-American applicant, the state was being unduly burdened.   
  
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma  
Background and Statement of Facts 
Ten years later, the Court heard Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma 
332 U.S. 631 (1948). The facts of the case stipulate that in January 1946 Sipuel applied to law 
school at the University of Oklahoma, at the time an all-white law school, but was denied 
admission due to her race.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Court opinion is brief, all Justices joined in the majority opinion and the Court 
reasoned Sipuel was entitled to a legal education and concluded,  
The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution. 
To this time, it has been denied her although during the same period many white 
applicants have been afforded legal education by the State, The State must 
provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. 
(p.332).  
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The Court goes on to reason that segregating black students, no matter how ‘equal’ the separate 
education may be, is a violation of the equal protection clause. The opinion is very brief and was 
decided just four days after oral arguments concluded in January 8, 1948.   
Sweatt v. Painter 
Background and Statement of Fact   
Similar both in fact and Court reasoning to Sipuel, the Court tackled segregation in higher 
education in Sweatt v. Painter (339 U.S. 629) decided in 1950. Based on the equal protection 
clause, the Court struck down a segregated law school system in Texas. Sweatt, an African 
American was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School for the February 1946 
term. He was denied admission solely based on his race. In response to lower court decisions, the 
University of Texas opened a black law school and the issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was 
the issue of whether or not the segregated system violated the fourteenth amendment’s equal 
protection clause.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Court considers at length the quality of legal education at the separate law schools. 
The Court writes,  
…we cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered 
white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of the number of the faculty, 
variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of student body, scope 
of the library, availability for law review and similar activities, the University of 
Texas law school superior…It is difficult to believe that one who had a free 
choice between these law schools would consider the question close (p.634).  
 
Ultimately the Court concludes the difference in quality of education as illustrated in several of 
ways violated Sweatt’s rights under the fourteenth amendment and compels admission to the law 
school.  
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McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents 
Background and Statement of Facts 
Sweatt and the next case McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) was decided by the Court on the 
same day of its summer 1950 term and echoed the Court’s reasoning that segregated education 
violates the equal protection clause because of the unequal education offered to minority 
students. The facts of the case center on McLaurin, an African-American who had been admitted 
to the Doctorate in Education at the University of Oklahoma. Because Oklahoma had no such 
program for African-Americans, McLaurin was admitted to the program. However, he was 
forced to endure differential treatment such as a separate lunch table and a classroom chair just 
outside the classroom.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Court concluded that,  
The result is the appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate 
instruction. Such restrictions impair or inhibit his ability to study, engage in 
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his 
profession (p.641).  
 
Ultimately the Court concluded the conditions under which McLaurin was made to receive his 
education deprived him of his personal and ‘present right to the equal protection of the 
laws’(p.642). The Court further held that the fourteenth amendment prohibits differences in 
treatments by state based on race and that McLaurin was entitled to receive the same treatment in 
the State’s education facilities as students of other races.   
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iii. Expansion of Interpretation  
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I) 
Background and Statement of Facts 
 Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education the Court declared de jure segregation in 
public schools unconstitutional based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  This case overruled the Court’s previous ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson where it was 
previously held that separation of physical facilities for blacks and whites was constitutional if 
the facilities were equal.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
Here with Brown begins the Court’s administration of the equal protection clause to 
education despite its acknowledgement that the Amendment is inconclusive as to its application 
to education.  This point is of great importance as nowhere in the Constitution is there a 
protected right to an education. To apply the 14
th
 amendment to the facts in the Brown  case was 
an important fundamental acknowledgement that although equal education is not an 
constitutionally protected right the 14
th
 amendment could and would be used by the Court to 
justify its holding that segregated schools violates the 14
th
 amendment.  
The facts in the Brown case heard by the Court actually came from five separate cases 
litigated contemporaneously in front of the Court because of the common theme: the issue of 
desegregation by race in public schools. Parents and community members in Clarendon Country, 
South Carolina commenced a suit to demand equality of treatment and were joined with four 
other suits from Prince Edward Country, Virginia, Topeka, Kansas, Delaware, and the District of 
Columbia. Justices on the Court who heard the original argument in 1952 were Chief Justice 
Vinson, Justice Black, Justice Reed, Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas, Justice Jackson, Justice 
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Burton, Justice Clark, and Justice Minton. Subsequent to Justice Vinson’s retirement, oral 
arguments in 1953 were heard additionally by Justice Warren. Additionally, subsequent to 
Justice Jackson’s retirement, Justice Harlan heard the 1953 oral arguments.  
The first oral argument was heard in 1952 under Chief Justice Vinson who was known to 
be in opposition to integration (Friedman, 2004, xi). The Court was divided on the issue of 
integration after the 1952 argument and when reargument was heard a year later, 1953, the Court 
was headed by Chief Justice Warren.  
This marked a clear change in direction for the Court but the application of the 
constructivist method of judicial interpretation continued.  This approach, rather than an 
originalist approach, is quite evident in the opinion itself,  
….we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or 
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in 
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws” (p. 
492-493). 
 
Key to the Court’s interpretation is its recognition of education as a right which must be 
available to all students regardless of race. Basic to its interpretation is the fact that ‘segregation 
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group 
of equal educational opportunities’ (p.493). Important to note is the Court’s acknowledgement 
that it chooses to view the facts of the case “in the light of the full development of public 
education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation” (p. 492-493).  This 
decision was decided unanimously by the Court. There are no dissenting or concurring opinions.  
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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown II)  
Background and Statement of Facts  
Given the reaction to the first Brown decision as previously discussed, it was necessary 
for the Court to provide further detail about the timeline for desegregation. In 1955, a year after 
the initial Brown decision the Court considered the issue of relief in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), also known as Brown II. The defendant school 
districts were required to make a ‘prompt and reasonable start’ to compliance (p.349). The 
Brown I case had left several constitutional questions unanswered and the Court requested 
further argument on the issues surrounding implementation of the original integration decree in 
Brown I.  
The Court reasoned that because the original cases were a combination of several cases, 
each from different localities around the nation, it should enlist the help of federal officials,   
 
 Because these cases arose under different local conditions and their disposition  
  will involve a variety of local problems, we requested further argument on the  
  question of relief.
 
 In view of the nationwide importance of the decision, we  
  invited the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of all  
  states requiring or permitting racial discrimination in public education to present  
  their views on that question. The parties, the United States, and the States of  
  Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas filed briefs  
  and participated in the oral argument (p.299).  
 
The Court found substantial progress towards desegregation had been made in the 
District of Columbia, Kansas, and Delaware school districts (parties to the original case) but that 
South Carolina and Virginia had been delaying efforts. Given the tension between the national 
issue of desegregation and local control over school districts, the Court reasoned it needed to find 
a solution that would be applicable across the nation. The Court was careful to leave judgment to 
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local courts to decide, whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith  
implementation “because of their proximity to local conditions and  the possible need for further 
hearings, the court which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal” 
(p.299). 
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The specific holding by the Court is that the defendant school districts made a ‘prompt 
and reasonable’ start towards full compliance with Brown I and from there local courts should 
rule on what additional time was necessary in carrying out full compliance. 
Important to note is the absence of any discussion of equal protection or fourteenth 
amendment issues in Brown II. The only mention of the amendment is in a footnote to the 
opinion acknowledging the Court’s decision in Brown I and its declaration that segregation in 
public schools does violate the equal protection clause. Further, reasoning for the ‘prompt and 
reasonable’ start towards ‘good faith compliance’ is not based on equal protection principles in 
the case of Brown II, or at least no such basis is found in the words of the Court’s opinion, but 
more so on a necessary reaction to massive school district rebellion against the decision. In fact, 
the Court does not base its holding in Brown II on any constitutional principles (as can be seen in 
the words of the brief opinion). 
 
Cooper v. Aaron 
Background and Statement of Facts 
Three years later the Court faced the issue of resistance directly in Cooper v. Aaron 358 
U.S. 1 (1958). The case was argued on September 11, 1958 and decided just a day later, the 
product of a unanimous decision by the Court. The facts of the case are as follows: The public 
105 
 
schools of Little Rock, Arkansas were ordered to admit African-American students at the 
beginning of the 1957-1958 school year. However, both the State Legislature and Governor of 
Arkansas were opposed to integration and due to threats of mob violence, nine new African-
American students were unable to attend the school until federal troops were sent to protect the 
students.  
The School Board petitioned to the District Court that desegregation be suspended for 
two and a half years. The District Court granted the request but the Court of Appeals reversed 
and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals decision and ordered the Board’s plan for desegregation begin again immediately.  
Interesting to note is that the Court could have simply denied certiorari to the case 
thereby letting the Court of Appeals decision stand given the Court simply approved the holding 
again. However, because the Governor and State of Arkansas publically condemned the Court 
decisions in Brown I and Brown II the Court felt compelled to address the Governor’s contention 
that desegregation should be suspended until its holdings in the Brown cases had been further 
challenged and tested in the Court system (p.11). The Court squarely rejected the contention that 
desegregation should be suspended until further judicial conclusions were reached (p.11).  
Further, the actions of the State Legislature were directly opposed to the Court’s Brown holdings. 
The Court recalls the actions of the Legislature despite School Board preparation for 
desegregation,  
While the School Board was thus going forward with its preparation for 
desegregating the Little Rock school system, other state authorities, in contrast, 
were actively pursuing a program designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system 
of racial segregation which this Court had held violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. First came, in November, 1956, an amendment to the State 
Constitution flatly commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose "in 
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every Constitutional manner the Unconstitutional segregation decisions of May 
17, 1954, and May 31, 1955, of the United States Supreme Court," (p.11).  
Despite the change to state law, the School Board continued with plans to desegregate. The day 
before the African-American students were to enter Little Rock’s Central High School, the 
Governor dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the new students from 
entering the school. Over the next several days, violence, protest, and unrest surrounded the High 
School and on September 25, 1957 President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to Little 
Rock while at the same time federalizing the Arkansas National Guard thus, taking those troops 
out of the Arkansas Governor’s control. The federal troops remained at the school until the end 
of the school year. However, the School Board sought a petition to postpone desegregation due 
to the ‘extreme public hostility’ (p.13) on the part of the Governor, State Legislature, and locals. 
Again, the District Court granted the petition while the Court of Appeals reversed.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
Ultimately the Court relied on the essence of the equal protection clause and fourteenth 
amendment to reach its holding that desegregation in Little Rock should continue immediately 
despite the opposition of State officials and even in the face of violence and unrest. The Court 
acknowledges that education, primarily a state responsibility, is still bound by the equal 
protection clause
5
,  
It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the 
concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state 
activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they 
                                                          
5
 Bolling v. Sharpe The Court’s opinion references Bolling,  a prior decision wherein the Court ruled segregation in 
the District of Columbia schools unconstitutional (1954). Because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states, 
the Court’s decision was based on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
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apply to state action. The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice 
under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal. State 
support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property 
cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no State shall deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The right of a student not to be 
segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and 
pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law. The principles 
announced in that decision and the obedience of the States to them, according to the 
command of the Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms 
guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of equal 
justice under law is thus made a living truth. (p.20) 
Further, the Court exerts its own power by stating, “the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution" and further that an "interpretation of [the Constitution] 
enunciated by the Court ... is the supreme law of the land." (p.18) 
 
Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County 
Background and Statement of Facts  
 Ten years after the Brown I decision the Court addressed ongoing resistance from schools 
across the country against desegregation. The case, Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward 
County 377 U.S. 218 (1964), addressed the massive resistance to desegregation in the Prince 
Edwards County schools. The facts of the case are as follows:  in 1959, faced with an order to 
desegregate, the County Board of Supervisors closed the public schools in the County while a 
private foundation operated schools for white students only. A year later the law was amended so 
the private foundation could receive county and state funds. In 1961 the federal District Court 
prohibited the County from paying grants to the private foundation as long as public schools 
remained closed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and the case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court. Oral arguments began in May 1964.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
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 The Court reaffirmed the District Court’s ruling. The Court reasoned,  
closing the Prince Edward County schools while public schools in all the other 
counties of Virginia were being maintained denied the petitioners and the class of 
Negro students they represent the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment (p. 226). 
 
The Court considers the equal protection clause in further depth in relation to the question of 
whether or not the issue of Prince Edward County closing their public schools while other 
schools in Virginia remained open was a violation of the equal protection clause. The Court ruled 
this inconsistency by itself was not a violation of the equal protection clause, arguing equal 
protection under the law applies to applicability of the law between persons, not between 
geographic areas. Further, the Court argues different people being treated differently as an act in 
of itself is not a violation of the equal protection clause but rather, a show of unequal treatment 
must be shown. The Court does find that Virginia had ‘unquestionably’ (p.23) treated the school 
children of Prince Edward County different from the way it treated school children in other 
Virginia counties. While the Court does acknowledge states are afforded wide discretion in 
deciding their own laws, and are employed even with the ability to decide whether some laws 
should operate statewide or only in certain counties, the Court does not equate the actions 
regarding the school closure as falling within state discretion. The Court reasons,  
the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward's public 
schools were closed, and private schools operated in their place with state and 
county assistance, for one reason and one reason only: to ensure, through 
measures taken by the county and the State, that white and colored children in 
Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same 
school. Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to 
abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of 
race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional (p.231).  
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The Court also holds on the issue of relief for the students, that the case be remanded to the 
District Court to decide how the students will be afforded an education that does not deny them 
of their constitutional rights and to provide them with an education equal to the one given to the 
other public students in Virginia.   
  
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County 
Background and Statement of Facts 
The Court next confronted desegregation issues in 1968 in Green v. County School Board 
of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). When determining the constitutionality of the 
‘freedom of choice’ plans primarily by evaluating their ‘effectiveness’ (p.437). The case stems 
from a plan in New Kent County, Virginia beginning in 1965 wherein the students are permitted 
to choose annually between one of the County’s two schools. During the plan’s three years of 
operation not a single white student had chosen to attend the all-black school and although 15% 
of black students had opted to attend the white school, most were continuing schooling in the 
segregated school (391 U.S. 430).  
 
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Court, in deciding the case, once again considered the ‘end’ outcome of the plan in 
light of the Brown II decision. Further, the Court reasoned that if a freedom of choice plan 
offered a ‘real’ promise of an integrated system that there would presumably be no 
constitutionality issues. However, whereas the current system was not effective, choice plans 
were not constitutional. The Court also noted that the School Board had burdened students and 
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their parents with the ‘responsibility’ placed on them through the Brown II with all deliberate 
speed instruction (p.431).  
The Court’s attention to the outcome of the plan is evident in the opinion as its reliance 
on the intention of both Brown cases:  
“The pattern of separate ‘white’ and ‘Negro’ schools in the New Kent County 
school system established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the pattern 
of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II were particularly addressed, and 
which Brown I declared unconstitutionally denied Negro school children equal 
protection of the laws.” (391 U.S. 430, p.432).  
 
The Court goes onto reason that the current freedom of choice plan must be considered in light 
of the ‘background’ (p.437) of the two previous cases. The consideration of the ‘end’ outcome of 
the plan is a main focus of the Court’s reasoning. In fact, the Court argues that the freedom of 
choice plan is ‘not an end in itself’ (p.440) although the plan in and of itself may not be 
unconstitutional. Rather, it is the outcome of the plan, one that results in continued segregation in 
the County that is the true indicator of the plan’s unconstitutionally, and its violation of the 
decrees based on the 14
th
 amendment set forth in Brown I and II. The Court relies on the facts of 
the case, as stated, that most black students remain in the all black school. This outcome does not 
adhere to the goals of Brown. The Court calls for the use of plans that work, plans that begin to 
work immediately, thus again showing its concern with the outcome of the issue. The Court 
considered the freedom of choice plan to simply be another form of state-imposed segregation 
because of segregated outcome, even after three years, on the New Kent County school system.  
 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education 
Background and Statement of Facts 
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In 1969 the Court issued an opinion addressing the issue of noncompliant school districts. 
The case, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education 396 U.S. 1218 (1969) shifted the 
burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the school board for showing school district compliancy 
with the previous desegregation decrees handed down in the prior desegregation cases. Even 
though Brown II had issued the directive of ‘all deliberate speed’ schools were taking the 
advantage of the vagueness of the language to delay desegregation.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court reasoned the schools in Mississippi were 
engaged in the practice of delaying desegregation along with many other schools across the 
nation. The decision is brief and is clear in its holding:  
Continued operation of racially segregated schools under the standard of "all 
deliberate speed" is no longer constitutionally permissible. School districts must 
immediately terminate dual school systems based on race at once and operate only 
unitary school systems. (p.1218).  
 
The opinion was so brief not many facts of the case are included in the opinion itself. The 
schools of Mississippi were still operating under a segregated school system, and the litigation 
came to the Court on appeal from the Court of Appeals for the 5
th
 circuit.  
 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education 
Background and Statement of Facts 
 The same year the Court addressed the issue of desegregation of faculty and staff of 
public schools. The Court heard United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 
U.S. 225 (1969) wherein the Court held desegregation among the faculty and staff of 
Montgomery County be integrated in accordance in Brown I, Brown II, and Green. The facts of 
112 
 
the case are as follows:  In May 1964 black students and parents sued the Montgomery County 
School system for operating a dual system. While both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals confirmed the schools had been operating an unconstitutional dual system. However, the 
Court of Appeals reversed a District Court holding that the teachers are assigned to schools 
according to race in order to achieve faculty desegregation. The District Court found that,  
the teachers are assigned according to race; Negro teachers are assigned only to 
schools attended by Negro students and white teachers are assigned only to school 
attended by white students (p. 229).  
 
 
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
 The Court voiced its intention that the approval of the District Court ruling will ‘carry 
Alabama a long distance on its way toward obedience of the law’ (p. 237).  
 
 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
Background and Statement of Fact 
Two years later the Court confronted the constitutionality of specific methods of 
integration in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The 
Court further illustrated its support for integration by articulating the objective of the decision 
was to ‘eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of ‘state-imposed’ segregation that was 
held in violation of the 14
th
 amendment’s equal protection clause by Brown I. The Court’s 
opinion illustrates the case’s important role in defining the ways in which implementation of 
integrating schooling would occur (p.6) and acknowledge the ‘trial and error’ process school 
desegregation had taken since Brown I (p.6).  
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The facts of the case are as follows: the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district was the 
43
rd
 largest school system in the nation comprised of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina and 
the surrounding Mecklenburg County. The area spans 550 square miles and in the 1968-1969 
school year served more than 84,000 students in 107 schools. 71% of the students were white 
and 29% black. 21,000 of the 24,000 black students attended schools within the city lines of 
Charlotte. About 14,000 of those black students attended schools where the student population 
was more than 99% black. Both the plaintiffs and the school district agreed that in the 1969 
school year the school did not operate a unitary system as was mandated by the Court under 
Green.  
The federal District Court found that the racial segregation found in the school system 
resulted from both residential patterns and also in part from discriminatory school board action. 
For example, the District Court found the school district fixed the size of the school to result in a 
segregated school system. Upon appeal to the federal Court of Appeals this finding was affirmed. 
In 1969 the District Court ordered the school board to propose a plan for both faculty and student 
desegregation. However, by December 1969 the District Court found no acceptable plan had 
been submitted and appointed Dr. John Finger, an expert education administrator, to prepare an 
appropriate desegregation plan. Three months later in February 1970 the school board presented 
the District Court with two plans: the board plan and the “Finger plan”. Under the board plan 
seven schools would be closed and their student reassigned. School attendance zones would be 
restructured, the bus system would be integrated and a free-transfer plan (majority to minority) 
would be implemented. The Finger plan differed from the board plan in a major way: the fate of 
the school system’s 76 elementary schools. Rather than geographic and residential school zones, 
the plan proposed a combination of zoning techniques that would result in student bodies in the 
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elementary schools ranging from 9%-38% black. The District Court adopted the board plan for 
the middle and high schools and accepted the Finger plan for the elementary schools.  
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein the Court of Appeals vacated the 
District Court ruling to implement the Finger plan in the school system’s elementary schools. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral arguments were heard in October 1970.  
 
 
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Justice Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The basis of the Court’s 
holding begins with an affirmation that de jure school segregation violates the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment because it denied black student equal protection of the laws 
under the constitution (p.11). Further, the Court goes back to the holding in Brown II that the 
school authorities have the responsibility of dismantling segregated school systems and the court 
system will judge whether school actions constitute a good faith implementation towards 
integration. The Court goes onto acknowledge the current state of school segregation to be 
critical.  Over the 16 years since Brown II, many difficulties were encountered in implementation 
of the basic constitutional requirement that the State not discriminate between public school 
children on the basis of their race: 
Nothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone for dealing with 
changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity encountered since 
then. Deliberate resistance of some to the Court's mandates has impeded the good 
faith efforts of others to bring school systems into compliance. The detail and 
nature of these dilatory tactics have been noted frequently by this Court and other 
courts. 
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By the time the Court considered Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, in 1968, 
very little progress had been made in many areas where dual school systems had historically 
been maintained by operation of state laws (p. 13). The Court goes onto use the equal protection 
clause as the constitutional justification for defining the responsibilities of school boards in 
working towards dismantling the dual system (p. 18). In fact the Court reasons the equal 
protection clause ‘must’ be by way of the fourteenth amendment (p.18). The Court tackles 
specific methods of desegregation included in the Charlotte plans and identifies four separate 
issues to consider and on which to issue its holding: 
(1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas may be used as an implement in 
a remedial order to correct a previously segregated system; (2) whether every all-
Negro and all-white school must be eliminated as an indispensable part of a 
remedial process of desegregation;(3) what the limits are, if any, on the 
rearrangement of school districts and attendance zones, as a remedial measure; 
and(4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transportation facilities to correct 
state-enforced racial school segregation (p.22).  
 
 
The Court ruled the limited use of racial quotas was constitutional because the school 
system plan used ratios as ‘no more’ (p.25) than a starting point in shaping a remedy to address 
segregation rather than impose an inflexible quota requirement. Second, the Court recognizes 
that the complete dissolution of single-race schools may, in some circumstances, be unavoidable 
so that the existence of a small number of one-race or mostly one-race schools is not by itself a 
symptom of de jure practices. The Court charges lower local courts with the duty to scrutinize 
local school districts to be sure the existence of one-race schools is not the result of 
discriminatory action. With respect to the school system’s majority-to-minority transfer policy, 
the Court approved the plan, and further stipulated that transportation and space must be made 
available to students desiring to use the transfer policy. The third issue in Swann ruled on by the 
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Court was the existence of school attendance lines through the use of pairing or grouping as 
under the Finger plan for the elementary schools. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
attendance zone strategies under the Finger plan but acknowledged ‘conditions in different 
localities will vary widely that no rigid rules can be laid down to govern all situations’ (p. 29). 
The Court reasons,  
 School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and  
  implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order  
  to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a  
  prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the  
  district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad   
  discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional  
  violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court(p.10).  
 
Finally, the transportation of students has become the most well-known outcome of the 
Court’s holding in Swann. The Court acknowledged that the transportation of students to remedy 
segregation had not been yet addressed and that the transportation of students varies so widely by 
district and school system that no one hard and fast strategy can be applied in every one. 
However, the Court does address the issue of bus transportation. As discussed in Chapter I the 
Court acknowledges busing as primary mode for transportation of students was the most 
important factor in consolidating school systems. The Court summarizes its basic finding quite 
simply by reasoning, ‘desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school’ (p.30). The 
Court points out that in the specific case of the Charlotte schools, the time students spent on 
average before the implementation of the attendance zone plans was actually greater than the 
estimates given should the plan be implemented. Here, the Court steps away from using the 
equal protection clause as direct constitutional basis for justification of its decision. However, the 
Court, as discussed, does build the foundation of the opinion on fourteenth amendment grounds 
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and the reasoning in Brown I. It is on this foundation that the holdings in Swann were handed 
down.  
 
Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Background and Statement of Facts 
Highlighting segregation in northern districts was the Court’s hearing of Keyes v. School 
District No. 1 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The facts of the case are as follows: The Denver, Colorado 
school system had never been under a court-order to segregation. The plaintiffs in the case, 
parents of students in the Denver school system, alleged that by various race-neutral polices, the 
school district had created a racially segregated school district through intentional policies. In the 
1969 school year the school district ran 119 schools enrolling a total of 96, 580 students. For that 
school year the School Board adopted three new resolutions implemented to desegregate an area 
of the city called Park Hill. After a School Board election the resolutions were repealed and 
replaced with a voluntary student transfer program. Plaintiffs filed suit, requesting an injunction 
against rescission of the resolutions and an order directing the Board to desegregate and provide 
equal educational opportunity to all district students.  
The federal District Court found the school had, through race-neutral measures such as 
gerrymandering of school attendance zones, engaged in the unconstitutional policy of 
deliberately continuing and fostering racial segregation in the Park Hill schools. The District 
Court ordered the resolutions to be reinstated. Segregation in the Denver schools was not limited 
to the Park Hill area and the District Court ruled that because deliberate segregation had been 
found to be implemented in Park Hill, the Board did not necessary employ this practice in the 
surrounding areas. Further, the District Court ruled the plaintiffs bore the legal burden of proving 
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that de jure segregation was occurring in each area of the city where they sought integration. 
Therefore, the District Court ruled that it was the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide evidence 
the School Board had employed intentionally discriminatory practices. The case was appealed 
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s decision that de jure 
segregation existed in the Park Hill schools but reversed the holding that the other school 
systems were not subject to an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation. The 
school board appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted with oral arguments 
beginning in October 1972.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The fundamental question presented to the Court was the standard to which the school 
board should be held in a determining if the board engaged in the ‘unconstitutional policy of 
deliberate segregation in the core city schools’ (p.198). The school board asserted the burden of 
proving intentional discriminatory practices fell on the plaintiffs but the Court ruled as follows,  
we hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a 
meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that 
other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in 
other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of 
school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other 
segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally 
segregative actions (p.208)  
 
The Court here affirms the plaintiff’s argument that the school board bears the burden of proving 
the segregation resulted from factors other than intentional acts on the part of the school board.  
If a school board is found to engage in discriminatory practices resulting in segregation in one 
school, a presumption can be made for all schools within the district.  
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 The Keyes case thus expanded the definition of de jure segregation to include school 
systems across the entire United States, provided it could be proven that "school authorities have 
carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, 
schools, teachers, and facilities with the school system” (p.201) 
 Important to note is the lack of direct judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment 
but again, a reliance on the basic premise that the equal protection clause has been violated in 
this case. Interpretation of the fourteenth amendment does not directly occur in Keyes but the 
Court does rely on the fundamental notion that segregated schooling does violate the equal 
protection of minority students. From this the Court reasons schools bear the burden of proving 
their acts are nondiscriminatory and further, in the case of a district where deliberate 
discriminatory action has been shown in one school, discriminatory action will be assumed for 
all schools within the district shows how far the Court had stretched application of the equal 
protection clause to the series in desegregation litigation.  
iv. Plateau of Interpretation  
Milliken v. Bradley 
Background and Statement of Facts 
In 1974 the Court heard Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), a case questioning the 
constitutionality of cross-district busing. The facts of the case were as follows: plaintiffs were 
residents of Detroit and brought an action against the state and city officials alleging the Detroit 
public school system was racially segregated as a result of the official policies and actions of the 
state and its officials. The plaintiffs sought to eliminate the segregation and implement a unitary 
nonracial school system. The case was admitted on appeal from federal District Court. The 
District Court had found the Detroit Board of Education had created and perpetuated school 
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segregation in Detroit. The Court ordered the Board to submit desegregation plans including a 
Detroit-only plan as well as a plan including the three-county metropolitan area comprised of 85 
school districts. The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the District Court had included 
these three counties and 85 districts despite lack of finding that any of the schools had been 
found in violation of the constitution, nor were they parties to the suit (p.717). The District Court 
ruled the Detroit-only plan submitted by the Board was insufficient to remedy segregation and 
that the cross-district plan was more appropriate. As the Supreme Court noted, the District Court 
required use the cross-district plan even though there was no evidence the suburban school 
districts implemented de jure segregation plans. The District Court ordered a plan encompassing 
53 of the 85 suburban school districts as well as the City of Detroit school system and ordered 
the Detroit City School districts to acquire at least 295 school buses to provide transportation for 
the 1972-1973 school year.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the District Court erred in its judgment and ruled 
that District Court could not  
impose a multidistrict, area wide remedy for single-district de jure school 
segregation violations where there is no finding that the other included school 
districts have failed to operate unitary school systems or have committed acts that 
effected segregation with the other districts, there is no claim or finding that the 
school district boundary lines were established with the purpose of fostering racial 
segregation, and there is no meaningful opportunity for the included neighboring 
school districts to present evidence or be heard on the property of a multidistrict 
remedy or on the question of the constitutional violations by those districts 
(p.737).  
 
The majority did not mention the fourteenth amendment or equal protection clause in its opinion. 
However, the Court does point to the standard set forth in Brown in which of course the Court 
relied heavily on the fourteenth amendment. In addition, Justice Stewart in his concurring 
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opinion does consider the equal protection clause thus, echoing the majority’s reasoning that the 
mere existence of racial segregation in the suburban districts does not constitute a violation of 
the clause because it does not necessarily show racial segregation in the school systems was 
“imposed, fostered, or encouraged by the state” (p.756).  
 The dissenting opinions do rely on the equal protection clause and assert the majority 
erred in its holding because the Court had articulated in Keyes there is no difference between de 
jure and de facto segregation. The dissenting opinion also goes on to chastise the majority 
opinion arguing the City of Detroit school district had been allowed to usurp its fourteenth 
amendment duties because the majority did not want to burden the surrounding school districts. 
The dissent writes,  
The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their 
consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or 
unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, 
but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court considers to be 
undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of 
Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has 
successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation 
remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local school 
districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case in most States (p.763).  
 
The dissent argues the equal protection clause warrants the inclusion of the suburban districts in 
the desegregation plans because as the District Court concluded, desegregation could not occur 
within the City of Detroit district alone.  
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Pasadena Board v. Spangler  
Background and Statement of Fact 
In 1976 the Court heard and decided Pasadena City Board v. Spangler (427 U.S. 424 
1976) and can be viewed as an indication of the Court’s gradual movement away from 
endorsement of integrative methods. This was the first desegregation case heard after the passage 
of the 1974 Civil Rights Act, specifically section 902 which provides the United States is entitled 
to the same relief as the plaintiff in the case. This section is significant if only because the 
original plaintiffs in the case had graduated from the Pasadena schools and the defendants 
alleged were therefore no longer entitled to have standing in the case.  
Fourteenth amendment issues stemmed from the desegregation plan endorsed by the 
school district.  Pasadena Schools submitted a plan for desegregation that included a stipulation 
that in the 1970-1971 school year no school would have a ‘majority of any minority students’. 
This plan was commonly called the Pasadena Plan. In the 1970-1971 school year no school 
within the district violated this plan. However, in the years following, several schools were in 
violation of the provision. The change was not caused by any deliberate action by the school 
board but was instead a result of racial population shifts in the district.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The issue before the Court, then, became whether or not the Board could, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment terminate the ‘no majority minority’ stipulation. The Court held the 
Board could not hold schools accountable under the stipulation if changes were the result of 
population shifts rather than a school’s deliberate action. The Court declared, "[t]here are limits 
beyond which a court may not go in seeking to dismantle a dual school system." (p.424). 
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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
Background and Statement of Fact 
The importance of three higher education cases was discussed in Chapter I of this study. 
Here specific attention will be given to the Court’s judicial interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment as these methods of interpretation are relied on by the Court in subsequent K-12 
cases.  
The first of these cases was heard and decided during the Court’s 1978 term. Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) resulted in both majority and plurality 
opinions. The Medical School of the University of California at Davis was designed to insure a 
specified number of students from certain minority groups. There existed two admissions 
systems. Under the regular admissions system a candidate could submit an application in the July 
of the year proceeding the academic year for which admission was sought. About one of every 
six applicants was invited for an interview and each was then rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by the 
interviewer and four other members of the admissions teams. This rating took into consideration 
the applicant’s grade point average, score on the standardized Medical College Admissions Test, 
recommendations, and other biographical data. The second admissions process operated with a 
separate committee and oversaw the applications of mostly minority applicants. The ratings 
process was similar and about one in every five minority applicants was given an interview in 
during the 1973-1974 academic year. The second special admissions process did not rate or 
compare candidates with applicants from the regular admissions process. The special committee 
then recommended special applicants until the maximum number, as agreed upon by faculty, was 
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reached. In a class of 100, 16 was the maximum number of admissions from the second special 
application process. 
Bakke was a white male who applied to the Medical School in both 1973 and 1974.  
Bakke’s application was considered under the primary admissions program and he was offered 
an interview. The interviewer concluded Bakke was a ‘desirable’ (p.438) applicant. Despite an 
overall high rating, he was rejected from the medical school. After his second denial from 
admission, Bakke initiated litigation against the Medical School arguing the special admission 
program operated to exclude him from admission in violation of his rights under the fourteenth 
amendment’s equal protection clause.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Justice Powell’s opinion is based on interpretation of the equal protection clause. The 
Court reasons while racial diversity is a compelling interest, the secondary special admissions 
policy is not narrowly tailored enough to justify its use by the Medical School. Powell writes that 
racial diversity,  
is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education…Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified 
medical student with a particular background may bring to a professional school 
of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student 
body and better equip its graduated to render with understanding their vital 
service to humanity (p.316).  
Further, the majority recognizes African-American physicians could be better suited to address 
the medical needs of a diverse patient population (p.314).  
 Ultimately, however, the Court found, after an application of the strict scrutiny test when 
applied to the admissions procedures of the medical school, the admissions policies were not the 
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least restrictive means to achieve the worthy goal of racial diversity both in higher education as a 
whole and specifically in the Davis Medical School.   
The plurality comprised of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun ruled race 
could be used a factor when admissions policies were used for the purpose of remedying 
underrepresentation of minorities in medicine. Justices Berger, Steward, Rehnquist, and Stevens 
argued the issue in the case was not one calling for interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
but rather was an issue under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act because Bakke was excluded from 
admission because of his race given had he been a minority applicant, he would have scored high 
enough to be admitted. Title VI prohibits racial discrimination in any institution receiving federal 
funding and using a strict interpretation of the text, the plurality favored Bakke. Because none of 
the plurality decision materially differed from Justice’s Powell opinion, his reasoning stood. 
Further, five of the four Justices agreed the admissions program was unconstitutional; the 
ultimate legal conclusion was that the Medical School must admit Bakke. The plurality differed 
in reasoning on other secondary issues but Powell’s opinion resulted in the presiding law on this 
main issue.     
Similar issues were the subject of litigation fifteen years later in Grutter and Gratz which 
will be discussed after the K-12 cases Dowell, Pitts, and Jenkins.   
 
Board of Education v. Dowell 
Background and Statement of Facts 
The series of cases in the early 1990s often referred to as the beginning of the Court’s 
lack of support for integration (Orfield, 2001) began with Board of Education v. Dowell 498 U.S. 
237 (1990).  The facts before the Court centered on the issues of court-ordered desegregation and 
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the granting of unitary status. The facts of the case stipulate that the Board of Education of 
Oklahoma had originally been under court-ordered desegregation but was granted unitary status 
in 1977. In 1984 the school board adopted what it deemed a “Student Reassignment Plan” (SRP) 
under which a number of previously integrated schools would return to one-race status, 
neighborhood schools due to residential segregation patterns.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 The majority opinion discussed the specifics of the Student Reassignment Plan under 
which 11 of the district’s 64 elementary schools would be greater than 90% black, 22 would be 
greater than 90% white and 31 would be racially mixed. The Court acknowledges the series of 
cases beginning almost 30 years ago when in 1961 black students and their parents sued the 
Board under the 14
th
 amendment, asserting the Board was in violation of the constitution because 
of the segregated nature of the District’s schools. The District Court ordered the Board to adopt a 
plan wherein bussing would be used as method to integrate the district’s schools. After 
complying with the decision for 5 years, the Board moved to conclude the court-ordered 
desegregation and the District Court agreed to grant the district unitary status. The Supreme 
Court quotes the District Court’s reasoning,   
the Court does not foresee that the termination of its jurisdiction will result in the 
dismantlement of the plan or any affirmative action by the Board to undermine 
the unitary system so slowly and painfully accomplished…the Board is entitled to 
pursue in good faith its legitimate policies without the continuing constitutional 
supervision of this Court (p.242).  
 
In 1984 the district demographics had changed so that black children were being bussed for 
longer amounts of time in order to maintain the unitary system. The Student Reassignment Plan 
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was in response to this change and the parents of the black students appealed to the Supreme 
Court to have unitary status revoked and a court-ordered desegregation plan to be reinstated.  
 The first constitutional issue the Court tackles is the concept of unitary status. The Court 
points out the term is not found in the constitution but rather is based on protected rights under 
the fourteenth amendment. The Court summarizes the meaning of the term unitary to describe a 
school system which has been brought into compliance with the 14
th
 amendment that had 
previously been in violation of the 14
th
 amendment by maintaining a dual, segregated system. 
Ultimately the Court ruled the case should be sent back to the District Court to determine 
whether or not the Board had met all necessary requirements to be granted continued unitary 
status. In essence, the Supreme Court directed the District Court to decide whether or not unitary 
status was appropriate when it was granted. If so, the Court gave the District Court authority to 
evaluate the Student Reassignment Plans only under the 14
th
 amendment, and not the mandates 
of court-ordered desegregation. Essentially, if a school district is under court-ordered 
segregation, a plan must be followed under the supervision of a district court. When unitary 
status is granted, the school is then allowed to pursue integration on its own, bound not by the 
court-ordered plan but solely by the 14
th
 amendment, as are all school systems in the nation.  
Because the Supreme Court remanded the decision to the District Court to decide 
whether or not unitary status had been properly granted, the Court failed to mandate a more 
stringent test, one that would require districts to stay under court ordered segregation orders 
when patterns of residential segregation led to segregation in the school system because bussing 
would no longer be required. In a sense, the Court was waving its hands at the issue rather than 
issuing an affirmative decree that the School Board’s Student Reassignment Plan was in 
violation of the 14
th
 amendment and that unitary status should not have been granted.  
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 The dissenting opinion characterizes the issue in the case under a whole different set of 
considerations. Whereas the majority remanded to the District Court, the dissenting Justices 
argue the question before the Court is whether or not,  
13 years after injunction was imposed, the same School Board should have been 
allowed to return many of its elementary schools to their former one-race status. 
The majority today suggested that 13 years of desegregation was enough (p.252).  
 
The dissent points to the de jure segregation implemented by the School Board and the history of 
racism in Oklahoma City as evidence that if unitary status is granted, the Board would be more 
likely to implement a return to a dual system in practice. The dissent points to the intention of 
Brown and the Court’s history of maintaining school districts must have worked to extinguish all 
vestiges of school segregation. Because the School Board’s Student Reassignment Plan would 
mean a return to many segregated schools, the dissent argues the majority ignores the intention 
of Brown. The dissent refers to the ‘milder standard’ (p.261) articulated by the majority because 
the majority remands to the District Court the issues at hand and reasons the school board is 
unlikely to return to its former ways. The dissent advocates for the continuance of court-ordered 
desegregation in the district. Again relying on the intention of Brown, the dissent writes,  
Consistent with the mandate of Brown I, our cases have imposed on school 
districts an unconditional duty to eliminate any condition that perpetuates the 
message of racial inferiority inherent in the policy of state-sponsored segregation. 
The racial identifiablilty of a district’s schools is such a condition. Whether this 
‘vestige’ of state sponsored segregation will persist cannot simply be ignored at 
the points where a district court is contemplating the dissolution of a 
desegregation decree. In a district with a history of state-sponsored school 
segregation, racial separation, in our view, remains inherently unequal’ (p.268).  
 
The dissent here, relies more so the spirit of Brown and the Court’s interpretation of the 14th 
amendment in the series of cases following Brown wherein the Court endorsed bussing and ruled 
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against freedom of choice plans. The majority, however, fails to issue a mandate enforcing the 
continued use of bussing in the school district even if failure to bus will result, as discussed 
above, in racial segregation in the schools.  
 
Freeman v. Pitts  
Background and Statement of Facts 
 A similar early 1990s case was Freeman v. Pitts (1992) wherein the Court ruled 
segregation in the City of Atlanta school district was due mostly to changing residential patterns 
and not local government action on the part of the school board. The Court ruled, in another step 
away from its continued support for integration, that because the segregation in the school 
system was not due to the type of segregation outlawed in Brown, the school district was not 
legally obligated to continue integration efforts. The majority ruled the court system cannot 
exceed its remedial power by enforcing court ordered desegregation when the segregation is 
caused by factors that do not constitute a constitutional violation.  
 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, there were no dissenting opinions.  
The facts of the case were as follows: DeKalb County School System (DCSS) is located in a 
major suburban area of Atlanta. At the time, DCSS served 73,000 students and was the 32
nd
 
largest school system in the country. As Justice Kennedy writes,  
DCSS's initial response to the mandate of Brown II was an all-too-familiar one. 
Interpreting "all deliberate speed" as giving latitude to delay steps to desegregate, 
DCSS took no positive action toward desegregation until the 1966-1967 school 
year, when it did nothing more than adopt a freedom of choice transfer plan. 
Some black students chose to attend former de jure white schools, but the plan 
had no significant effect on the former de jure black schools (p.472).  
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Freedom of choice plans were struck down in Green and two months after the Court’s opinion 
was issued, black students and their parents sued DCSS in the District Court. DCSS did begin to 
work with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to implement a plan for 
desegregation to be implemented in the 1969-1970 school year. The plan, approved by the 
District Court, included abolishment of the freedom of choice plan and implementation of a 
neighborhood school plan. Under the plan all former de jure black schools were closed and the 
students assigned to neighborhood schools. The District Court oversaw implementation of the 
program between 1969 and 1986 wherein the plaintiffs refrained from intervening in the DCSS 
plan. No request was made to change student attendance zones or student assignment policies.  
 DCSS had, since 1969, implemented a student transfer option called the Minority-to-
Majority student transfer program, allowing students who were in the majority race in their 
original school to transfer to a school where they would be in the minority. The District Court 
approved this policy. In 1986 DCSS filed to dismiss the litigation against it, asserting it had met 
its duty to eliminate the dual segregations system, and had achieved a unitary school district. The 
District Court evaluated their motion for dismissal under the criteria set forth in Green as well as 
an additional factor: “the quality of education being offered to the white and black student 
populations” (p.474). Based on its finding that DCSS was not unitary in every respect, the Court 
ruled the ‘vestiges of the dual system’ (p.474) remained in the areas of teacher and principal 
assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education. DCSS took the case to the Federal 
Court of Appeals and asserted that changes in the racial composition of the county, not direct 
discriminatory actions taken by DCSS, resulted in de facto segregation in DCSS. As the Court 
summarizes,  
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During the relevant period, the black population in the southern portion of the 
county experienced tremendous growth, while the white population did not, and 
the white population in the northern part of the county experienced tremendous 
growth, while the black population did not. (p.476).  
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Court of Appeals ruled 
DCSS had not achieved unitary status and that all the Green factors had not yet been met. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral arguments began in October, 1991.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 The Court reasoned it is the ‘duty and responsibility’ (p.485) of a school, once segregated 
by law, to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the dual, de jure, system. This is 
required under the law, according to the Court, because the principal wrong, the ‘injuries and 
stigma’ (p.485) under the de jure system should no longer be present. Ultimately the Court held 
the racial imbalance in the student enrollment and in the broader student attendance zones did 
not equate with noncompliance with desegregation decrees on the part of the school board. The 
Court held,  
Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the 
school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by 
demographic factors….the population changes which occurred in DeKalb County 
were not caused by the policies of the school district but rather by independent 
factors. It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing 
population change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure violation and 
the law need not proceed on that premise. As the de jure violation becomes more 
remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely 
that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure 
system (p.495).   
The Court’s holding is important because of the distinction it makes between residential housing 
segregation and school segregation. As the Court reasons, residential segregation, and thus 
school segregation in a neighborhood school system, is not subject to constitutional scrutiny.  
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 The second major issue upon which the Court ruled was continued judicial oversight of 
DCSS. The District had motioned to dismiss litigation based on the argument that the dual 
system had been dismantled, a unitary system had been achieved, and all vestiges of de jure 
segregation had been removed.   Going back to the language used in Brown II the Court reasoned 
a district showing good faith compliance with a desegregation plan should be considered when 
releasing a school from judicial control. The Court here reasons DCSS had in fact made a good 
faith effort to comply,  
throughout the period of judicial supervision, [the Court] has been impressed by 
the successes DCSS has achieved and its dedication to providing a quality of 
education for all students, and DCSS has travelled the often long road to unitary 
status almost to its end. With respect to areas where compliance has not been 
achieved, the Court does not find that DCSS acted in bad faith or engaged in 
further acts of discrimination since the desegregation plan went into effect. 
(p.499).  
 
Missouri v. Jenkins 
Background and Statement of Facts 
 Missouri v. Jenkins 515 U.S. 70 (1995) is often pooled with Dowell and Pitts because it is 
seen as further evidence the Supreme Court was less willing to take a hard stand promoting 
integration efforts in schools (Orfield, 2001). The issue here was whether or not it was 
constitutional to require the State of Missouri to correct de facto segregation by offering remedial 
“quality education” programs and increased funding to schools. The facts of the case are as 
follows:  In 1977 the Kansas City, Missouri School District and district students filed a 
complaint against the State of Missouri alleging the state and other school districts surrounding 
the school were operating a segregated school system. The District Court found the State was 
operating a segregated school system in violation of the constitution and ordered a remedy that 
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all vestiges of segregation as well as outlined the funding to implementation of a new unitary 
system. The total estimated cost of the remedy was estimated to be about 88 million over three 
years. The burden of paying for the efforts rested about $68 million with the State and about $20 
million with the School District itself. However, the District Court also found that because of 
local tax laws, the District would not be able to pay for all of the desegregation efforts. 
Therefore, the Court ordered the School District to submit to local voters a proposal for an 
increase in taxes sufficient to pay for the District share of the desegregation remedy. The case 
was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and while the holding regarding the 
District’s operating of a dual system was reaffirmed, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the 
District Court finding that the majority of the desegregation cost should be the State’s 
responsibility. The Court of Appeals ordered the costs to be shared equally between the State and 
the District. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral arguments began in 
October 1998.  
Judicial Interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment 
 The major constitutional issue before the Court turned on whether the tax increase 
imposed on the District Court violated the Tenth Amendment. The Court found the District 
Court did overstep constitutional limitations on reserved state powers under the Tenth 
Amendment. While the equal protection clause is never explicitly discussed, the Court does 
reason previous precedent does not hold schools and states accountable for segregation absent 
intentional discriminatory action.  
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Grutter v. Bollinger  
Background and Statement of Facts 
In 2003 the Court once again considered use of race as a factor in admissions processes at 
institutions of higher education in Grutter v. Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003).  The Law School at 
the University of Michigan implemented an admissions policy wherein each applicant’s 
academic record as well his or her diverse ‘background and experience’ was considered in 
admissions decisions. The Court in Grutter articulated that achieving racial diversity in public 
institutions of higher education was a compelling interest and that the Michigan policy was 
narrowly tailored to meet this interest. The case was heard along with a companion case, Gratz v. 
Bollinger 529 US 244 (2003) in which the Court struck down a University of Michigan 
undergraduate admission system it deemed to be a quota system.  
The facts of the case in Grutter were as follows. The University of Michigan Law School 
followed an admission policy adhering to the Court’s decision as handed down in Bakke, fifteen 
years earlier. By focusing on academic ability along with an applicant’s talents, experience, and 
potential as evidenced through personal information such as personal statement, 
recommendations, undergraduate GPA, and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. The 
policy did not define diversity solely in terms of racial or ethnic status but it does state the Law 
School’s commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, 
Hispanic, and Native-American students who might not otherwise be represented in the student 
body.  
Grutter was a white law school applicant with a 3.8 GPA, 161 (of 170) LSAT score, and 
was a resident of Michigan. Grutter was denied admission to the law school and filed suit against 
the University alleging her denial resulted in a violation of her rights under the fourteenth 
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amendment’s equal protection clause because she was denied admission because the Law School 
used race as a predominant factor in its admissions policies and because the University had no 
compelling interest to justify its use of race in its admissions policies.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Court’s opinion relied heavily on its past reasoning and precedent as set forth in 
Bakke. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas joined.  As previously discussed, Justice Powell’s opinion 
in Bakke represented the ruling of the Court wherein it reaffirmed that obtaining a diverse 
student body in institutions of higher education was a compelling interest under the strict 
scrutiny test mandated by the equal protection clause. The Court reasons Justice Powell’s 
decision has been the ‘touchstone for constitutional analysis of race conscious admissions 
policies’ (p. 310) and that countless admissions policies across the nation have based their 
admissions programs on his opinion. The Court in Grutter endorsed Powell’s view in that it 
recognized student body diversity as a compelling state interest. Further, the Court deferred to 
the Law School’s educational judgment that diversity is essential to its own educational 
missions. The policy requires the admissions officials ‘look beyond’ (p.311) test scores and 
consider achievement of its goal of diversity to enrich the law school class as a whole. The Court 
also points out the admissions policy does not restrict the types of diversity eligible to have 
weight in the admissions process even though it does make specific reference to the inclusion of 
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. The Court relies on testimony offered by 
the Director of Admissions at the Law school wherein he affirms he did not direct his staff to 
admit a particular percentage or number of minority students but rather to consider race along 
with other factors. The Director of Admissions also testified he monitored daily the number of 
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admitted applicants according to race but he continued to stress the admissions team did not seek 
to admit any particular number or percentage of minority students. Rather, the goal was to 
achieve a meaningful number of minority students which to the admissions team means the 
number of underrepresented minority students would encourage such students to participate in 
the classroom and not feel isolated.  
The Court goes on to provide a brief history of its use of the strict scrutiny test to evaluate 
racial classifications as directed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court explicitly writes that 
“context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause” (p.311) because  
Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny 
is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and 
the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision maker for the 
use of race in that particular context. (p.311) 
 
Here the Court indicates its clear and explicit use of constructivist interpretation of the equal 
protection clause. In its application of constructivist judicial interpretation, the Court upholds in 
the use of race in admissions policies in order to obtain the educational benefits resulting from a 
diverse student body in institutions of higher education. Yet, the Court acknowledges it must still 
consider whether or not the admissions plan is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest.  
 The Court again relies on the precedent set forth in Bakke and reasons a race-conscious 
admissions policy cannot use a quota system. Instead, a University must consider race or 
ethnicity as a plus factor. Race must be used in a ‘flexible, nonmechanical’ (p.310) way. The 
Court ultimately concludes the Law School admissions policy does not operate as a quota system 
because it does not reserve a certain amount of class seats to minority students. The Court also 
reasons the admissions policy of achieving a ‘meaningful’ number of underrepresented minority 
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students is not a quota because it does not articulate a certain and rigid number of students, but 
rather considers the overall composition of the class. However, the Court points out, the school 
must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in 
a way that makes the applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature in the admissions decision. 
Because the Law School,  
engages in a higher individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving 
serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse 
educational environment. The Law School affords this individualized 
consideration to applicants of all races. There is no policy, either de jure or de 
facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single soft variable 
(p.311)  
Additionally, there is no predetermined amount of a ‘bonus’ number of points awarded based on 
race or ethnicity (see discussion below of Gratz). The Court also points to the fact that the Law 
School admissions plan also gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race to show the 
plan does not equate to a quota system. The Court points out the Law School frequently accepted 
white students with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants who 
are rejected in an effort to increase diversity of background and experience, and not necessarily 
of race.  
 The narrowly tailored requirement of the strict scrutiny test also requires consideration of 
other race-neutral means to achieve the recognized compelling interest. The Court points out that 
narrow tailoring does not require an exhaustive consideration of every single race-neutral 
alternative but rather a serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives. 
The Court concluded the Law School did consider other alternatives such as the use of a lottery 
system or decreasing the importance of LSAT and GPA scores for all applicants. The Court 
agreed with the Law School that these alternatives would require a ‘dramatic sacrifice of 
diversity, the academic quality of admitted students, or both” (p.310). The lottery system, the 
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Court reasons, would not allow the admissions team to consider diversity beyond race in 
admissions decisions. Lowering of admissions standards would ‘sacrifice a vital component of 
its educational missions’ (p.312). The Court ultimately concludes it is satisfied that the Law 
School had adequately considered race-neutral alternatives. Important to note is the Court’s 
recognition of the importance of plans that are not infinite in duration but rather are implemented 
for a limited time. There must be a logical end point to racial classifications. The Court reasons 
this durational requirement can be met by ‘sunset’ provisions in admissions policies and periodic 
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary.  The Law School asserted it 
would terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as was ‘practicable’ and with 
this, has satisfied the equal protection clause’s durational requirement. The Court reasoned that it 
was entirely reasonable to assume that the use of racial preferences in admissions policies would 
no longer be necessary 25 years from its decisions in the case.  
 
Gratz v. Bollinger 
Background and Statement of Facts 
 The companion case Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) was decided also in the 
2003 term and further addressed affirmative action in higher education. The plaintiffs in the case, 
Gratz and Hamacher, both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’s College of 
Literature, Science, and the Arts. Both were residents of Michigan and were white applicants to 
the College in the fall of 1995. Both applicants were denied admission and were told that 
although they were well-qualified, they were either less competitive than other applicants or not 
at the level needed for admission. The Office of Undergraduate Admissions office oversaw the 
admissions process and issues admissions guidelines each year by which admissions decisions 
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are made. The Admissions office evaluated several factors throughout the admissions process 
including high school GPA, SAT scores, geography, alumni relationships, and high school 
quality. During the period wherein the plaintiffs sought admission, African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and Native Americans were considered unrepresented minorities and the University 
admitted during litigation that virtually every qualified applicant from these groups were 
admitted. The admissions process also included a point system wherein each application could 
score a maximum of 150 points. 20 points were awarded to an applicant based on his or her 
membership in one of the underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group. Guidelines also 
provided that qualified applicants from unrepresented groups be admitted as soon as possible due 
to the University’s belief such applicants may have been more likely to enroll if notified of their 
admission promptly. Because the University’s admissions process was rolling, a certain amount 
of ‘protected seats’ were reserved for applicants of specific groups who might have applied later 
in the year. These protected seats included athlete applicants, foreign students, ROTC candidates, 
and other underrepresented minorities group. If these spaces were not filled toward the end of the 
admissions season, seats were offered to qualified applicants remaining in the applicant pool or 
those applicants on the waitlist.  
 The plaintiffs in the case contended the admissions process and its use of race as a factor 
in admissions decisions violated the equal protection clause in part, due to the precedent set forth 
in Bakke. However, the University also relied on Bakke in claiming using race as a factor in 
admissions decisions serves the compelling government interest of remedying past and current 
discrimination against underrepresented minority applicants. The University also claimed the 
admissions process was narrowly tailored to serve the interest.  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Grutter and Gratz) 
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In considering the arguments in the case, the Court examined the admissions policy in 
light of Bakke and relied heavily on the holding in the decision. The Court references Powell’s 
opinion wherein he reasons using race or ethnic background as a plus factor in an admissions 
policy would be legally permissible. The Court further reasoned,  
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke emphasized the importance of considering each 
particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities that individual 
possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual's ability to contribute to the 
unique setting of higher education. The admissions program Justice Powell 
described, however, did not contemplate that any single characteristic 
automatically ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a university's 
diversity.  
 
Further, the Court relied on Bakke to point out each applicant will be viewed as an individual, 
and his or her race being a factor as part of the entire application. The Court ultimately 
concluded the admissions policy at the University of Michigan did not provide the individual 
consideration Powell promoted in Bakke because the admissions guidelines automatically 
awarded 20 points to every applicant from an underrepresented minority group. The University 
admitted the automatic award of 20 points to underrepresented minority applicants was outcome 
determinative; meaning in virtually all the cases of minority applicants, the award of the 20 
points was decisive in the admissions decision. Additionally, the Court found problematic the 
automatic award of the 20 points rather than an individualized consideration of each 
underrepresented minority application. Lastly, the University argued it was impractical for them 
to employ admissions guidelines as mandated in both Bakke and Grutter because of the volume 
of applicants the University received each year. The Court struck down this reasoning arguing 
this was not a legally permissible way to avoid the ‘narrowly tailored’ requirement under the 
strict scrutiny test. The Court concluded,  
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that because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy 
is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in 
diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
 
 
Parents  in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1  
Background and Statement of Facts 
 Finally, the most recent case involving K-12 desegregation heard by the Supreme Court 
is Parents  in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). This 
decision was viewed by many as yet another sign the Supreme Court has, and will continue to 
move away from explicit support of desegregation in public schools. Previously discussed in 
Chapter I were the facts of the case. Here, the Court’s reasoning specifically concerning 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment will be examined.  
 The Court’s 187 page decision mentions the equal protection clause numerous times and 
considers previous precedent, the words of the fourteenth amendment, and ultimately, what the 
plurality concluded was the intent of the framers of the amendment in reaching its ultimate 
conclusion that the Seattle and Louisville plans did violate the equal protection clause because 
each failed the strict scrutiny test. Historically, as previously discussed, the Court has recognized 
just two compelling governmental interests when evaluating the use of racial classifications in 
educational contexts.  Because this case is the most recent of the cases and a major focus of this 
study, this presentation of the case will be in greater detail and include discussion of the 
concurring and dissenting opinions.  
 Chief Justice Roberts along with Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito wrote the plurality 
decision. Plurality decisions are issued when no majority opinion (five or more of nine Justices 
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agreeing) can be reached. In this specific case, Justice Kennedy tipped the scaled in favor of the 
plaintiffs in his concurrence. In cases where no majority is reached a plurality decision is issued 
and a concurring Justice agrees in part, the parts of disagreement (what are called the ‘narrower’ 
holdings) are made law. In this case, Kennedy agreed with the plurality in most of the issues-
therefore making most of his plurality decision the actual law, but did disagree on the issue of 
what constitutes a compelling state interest. The dissent written by Justice Breyer and joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg (additional dissent written by Stevens) vehemently 
objects to the decision. The four dissenting justices accuse the plurality of disregarding precedent 
and abandoning the promises of Brown.  
  
Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In the plurality decision, Justices Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito found the student 
assignment policies of the Seattle School District and Jefferson County Schools to be 
unconstitutional. After recounting the specifics of the assignment policies in the two cases, the 
Justices acknowledge that strict scrutiny must be applied, as is the case with all race-based 
classifications. As stated in the plurality opinion, the Justices believed that the student-
assignment policies were not aimed at achieving racial diversity, but rather was a means of 
racially balancing the districts. Neither racial balancing in general nor racial diversity at the K-12 
level has been recognized as a compelling interest by the Court.  Thus racial balancing in high 
schools, as interpreted by the plurality, is not a recognized compelling state interest. According 
to Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality,  
…accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the 
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our 
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repeated recognition that ‘at the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal 
protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as 
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national 
class.’ Parents  in Community Schools vs. Seattle District No. 1 and Meredith v. 
Jefferson County (551 U.S. 701 [2007]) 
 
Further, Roberts also reasoned that the schools had not considered other means of 
achieving compelling state interests (remedying past discrimination, for example) and that 
because of this the use of race as a factor to assign students is not narrowly tailored to the end 
purpose. Because of these factors, the student assignment policies in both districts failed the 
strict scrutiny analysis.  
The plurality also justifies its dismissal of racial diversity in schools as a compelling state 
interest by referring to Grutter v. Bollinger. Grutter upheld an affirmative action law school 
policy because achieving a diverse student body was a compelling interest. The Court further 
held that the policy was narrowly tailored to the interest and thus, did pass the strict scrutiny test. 
The plurality in Parents argues the precedent set forth in Grutter does not apply because of the 
distinction between higher education and K-12 education and that racial diversity at the high 
school level has never been recognized as a compelling interest. Seattle contended the interests 
being served by their student assignment policies was first to decrease racial concentration in its 
schools, and second to assure access to the best schools for its nonwhite students, despite racially 
segregated residential patterns. Jefferson County contended that it had a compelling interest in 
providing an integrated learning environment for its students.  
 The foundational argument Roberts puts forward is based first on the idea that the 
holding in Brown forbids the use of the Seattle and Louisville plans and second, that the Court 
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must interpret the fourteenth amendment as color-blind. He asks, ‘What do the racial 
classifications at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on the basis of race?’ (p.40) 
and compares this viewpoint to the one put forward by the plaintiffs in the Brown case: that the 
state has no authority under the equal protection clause to use race as a factor in affording equal 
educational opportunity to its citizens (p.40).  
In addition to the plurality, Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which racial 
diversity does in fact have a positive effect on student achievement and educational outcomes. 
Thomas cites several studies in which results show black students can succeed in homogenous 
learning environments. Thomas writes that,  
The dissent asserts that racially balanced schools improve educational outcomes 
for black children. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain social 
science research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social 
scientists. In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any 
educational benefits; much less that integration is necessary to black achievement. 
Parents in Community Schools vs. Seattle District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson 
County (551 U.S. 701 [2007]) 
 
Further, not only does Thomas disagree with the dissenting opinion that the plurality is 
abandoning the promise Brown made to the nation that the Court would support integrated 
schools, he goes a step further in arguing that it is Brown itself that compels the Court to strike 
down the Seattle and Jefferson County policies. He writes, “[w]hat was wrong in 1954 cannot be 
right today…  In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to keep 
the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart.” Ibid.  
 Thomas zealously points out what he perceives to be the dissenting Justices’ 
inappropriate use of judicial power:  
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Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative effects of racial imbalance, 
will not defer to legislative majorities where the Constitution forbids it. It should 
escape no one that behind Justice Breyer’s veil of judicial modesty hides an 
inflated role for the Federal Judiciary. The dissent’s approach confers on judges 
the power to say what sorts of discrimination are benign and which are invidious. 
Having made that determination (based on no objective measure that I can detect), 
a judge following the dissent’s approach will set the level of scrutiny to achieve 
the desired result. Only then must the judge defer to a democratic majority. In my 
view, to defer to one’s preferred result is not to defer at all. Ibid.  
Ultimately, Thomas concurs with Roberts, disagreeing in no major way with the views of the 
plurality opinion and offers further rationale to support the holding.  
 Justice Kennedy, however, does disagree with the plurality opinion in important ways in 
his own concurring opinion. Kennedy argues that achieving racial diversity in public schools is a 
compelling interest not recognized by the plurality. He writes,  
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has 
in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race…A 
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school 
district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district 
may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. 
Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus 
special talents and needs, should also be considered. Ibid.  
 Yet, he does argue the policies in both district plans are not narrowly tailored to this 
interest. He believes the districts failed in using race as a deciding factor to achieve diversity 
when other factors such as a particular student’s special talents or interests. There are, he argues, 
other ways of achieving the compelling interest of diversity. It is here where the assignment 
policies fail the strict scrutiny test.   
  It is important that a major point of Kennedy’s division from the plurality is based 
on the precedent set forth in Grutter. He disagrees that the compelling interest of achieving racial 
diversity cannot be applied to the facets in Parents. Avoiding racial isolation, he argues, can 
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indeed be a compelling interest even in K-12 education. However, Kennedy believes the 
assignment policies fail because they are not narrowly tailored, as were the policies in Grutter. 
He writes, "In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader effort to 
achieve 'exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints;' race, for some 
students, is determinative standing alone." Ibid.  
 Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, zealously disagrees with the plurality. His opening 
words set the tone for the entire dissent, arguing the plurality has made several mistakes:  
It [the plurality] misapplies the relevant constitutional principles, it announces 
legal rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local governments to deal 
effectively with the growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to 
substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and it 
undermines Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary education that 
local communities have sought to make a reality. This cannot be justified in the 
name of the Equal Protection Clause. Ibid.  
Breyer’s belief that the plurality has ignored precedent rests in his comparison of the facts 
of the Parents case to other cases with similar facts such as. He then goes on to discuss the 
resegregation of schools since the 1980s and provides statistical support for his claim that school 
districts are within their rights to extend their integration efforts. Breyer suggests that Seattle and 
Louisville were simply setting forth integration plans in an effort to combat the resegregation of 
their schools.  
A major part of Breyer’s argument rests on the premise that the segregation occurring in 
the two school districts was similar to statistics seen pre-Brown and that therefore the assignment 
plans are appropriate and constitutional. Again using statistical analysis, he compares racial 
composition of both school districts from the Brown era to the segregation in the districts today. 
In 1954, the Seattle school district was comprised of only 3% minority students. However, the 
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minority elementary students attended schools that were 60%-80% black. Further, the central 
city high school was more than 80% black. Clearly, the schools did not reflect the racial 
composition of the city but instead showed a highly segregated school district. Breyer points out 
that in 1996, when the school began using the racial tie-breaker, the Central High School would 
have been 80% minority had the tie-breaker not been used- similar to the pre-Brown numbers.  
The situation was very similar in the Louisville district. In 1954 nineteen of the district’s 
forty-nine elementary schools were between 80% and 100% black. In the 1995-1996 school 
years, the year the school district began the new assignment plan, 30% of the student population 
was minority. The new assignment plan was designed to insure no school was more than 50% 
and no less than 15% minority.  
Justice Breyer goes onto attack the major premise put forth by the plurality that the 
school plans are not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and therefore do not 
pass the strict scrutiny test. Breyer points out the Court in Grutter approved racial balancing 
policies that were far less narrowly tailored to the goal of racial diversity than the plans in Seattle 
and Louisville. He writes,  
Here, race becomes a factor only in a fraction of students’ non-merit-based 
assignments- not in large numbers of students’ merit-based application. 
Moreover, the effect of applying race-conscious criteria here affects potentially 
disadvantaged students less severely, not more several than the criteria at issue in 
Grutter. Disappointed students are not rejected from a State’s flagship graduate 
program; they simply attend a different one of the district’s many public schools, 
which in aspiration and in fact are substantially equal. Ibid.  
Breyer goes onto argue that plans that are less explicitly race-based will not achieve racial 
diversity.  
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B. Analysis of Judicial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment  
Beginning with Plessy the Court initially, as early as the late 1800s, approved the 
separate but equal doctrine.  The Court in Plessy employs a constructivist interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment. The use of contextual analysis is quite clear in the Court’s consideration 
of ‘established usages, customs, and traditions of the people’ (p. 551). Given the Court considers 
the intent of the amendment as written, clearly it is not relying solely on the text of the equal 
protection clause. When the Court reasons the clause was meant to enforce equality and not 
necessarily distinctions based on color it considers the overall purpose of the law, a major factor 
in constructivist interpretation. Plessy, although employing a constructivist interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment, resulted in justification of segregated public facilities, including schools, 
across the nation and would not be reversed until Brown. Important is the Court’s employment of 
a supposed intent of the fourteenth amendment, one it would go onto challenge in Brown. This 
case is especially important not from a school enrollment and racial make-up perspective but 
instead from a historical legal perspective as it marked the basis on which the equal protection 
clause was to justify separate but equal as policy and law in the United States for decades to 
come.  
Again, as in Plessy the Court in Cumming employs a constructivist interpretation of the 
equal protection clause to justify segregated, and in this case, unequal educational facilities. The 
basic holding that segregation is not a violation of equal protection follows the general reasoning 
of Plessy but applies the interpretation to schooling. While Cumming signaled the Court 
supported racially segregated schooling, Plessy was the backbone on which the holding was 
justified.  While there were issues of fair taxation, the basic issues surround the constitutionality 
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of implementing a dual, racially-segregated system was the official beginning of court-
sanctioned segregated schooling.  
Interestingly, the Court does include discussion of the reasoning of the school board 
resulting in the segregated schooling. The Court does consider discriminatory intent and may 
hint that discriminatory intent would violate the equal protection clause. However, the Court 
does not explicitly state this was used as part of its reasoning and interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment but rather implies discriminatory intent may have made the school board’s actions 
unconstitutional. Instead, however, the Court relies on an outcome based interpretation. In 
agreeing with the board’s decisions that there would be no high school for black children, yet 
one for whites based on financial restraints the Court interprets the equal protection clause to 
allow for unequal, segregated education (in this case at the high school level) because of what 
the outcome would have been if the board had opted to run a black high school: namely the 
closing of the black elementary school. When the Court employs this method of interpretation, it 
is clearly applying a constructivist interpretation of the equal protection clause, one that would 
justify segregated schooling for over half a century until Brown. Similarly, In Gong Lum the 
Court again follows the precedent and methods of interpretation set forth in Plessy and Cumming 
by relying on reasoning that segregated school does not violate the equal protection clause. Here, 
the Court simply makes clear the inclusion of ‘yellow and brown’ races in segregated school 
systems.  
The series of four higher education cases, beginning with Missouri are important 
milestones in the pathway the Court paved to apply the equal protection clause to school 
segregation in the way it was eventually interpreted and applied in Brown. The case is of further 
importance because of the discussion surrounding the right to equal education. In this regard the 
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Court departs from its original conclusion in Cumming (that a school board failing to run a black 
high school violated the fourteenth amendment) although the circumstance is different here 
within the context of higher education rather than K-12 education. While it is important to note 
Court interpretation applied here, in a case when the lack of a separate law school provided 
evidence enough to prove unequal protection under the laws, it is unclear as to whether the Court 
would have considered unequal education facilities, should that have existed in Missouri at that 
time, also a violation of Gaines’ equal protection rights.  
 The Court here departs from a clear constructivist or originalist interpretation because it 
does not explicitly and clearly consider either only the words of the amendment or the intent of 
those who wrote neither the amendment nor the social context of the situation it. However, given 
the Court’s reasoning that no black law school constitutes a violation of Gaines’ personal rights 
as guaranteed under the equal protection clause would be more in line with a constructivist 
interpretation because the Court considers the educational context within which the state was 
operating its law school system.  
 Sipuel is similar to Missouri and once again reaffirmed the Court’s dedication to equal 
education opportunity at the higher education level for students of all races. Sipuel builds on the 
holding in Missouri by reasoning that a segregated law school is a violation of the equal 
protection clause. In contrast, Missouri held importantly, yet simply, that the inability for black 
students to receive a legal education within a State was a violation of the clause- there was no 
discussion, as mentioned, of segregated law schools. This case foreshadows the reasoning the 
Court will use in Brown by applying its holding to K-12 public schools.  In building upon the 
precedent set forth in Missouri, the Court, here, considers the social context of the law school 
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and interprets the fourteenth amendment based on this social context. The Court continues to 
apply a constructivist interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.  
However, Sweatt is to be importantly distinguished from Missouri (1938) because, as 
previously discussed, the Court in Missouri could rule simply on the issue of whether or not 
admission to a white law school was proper when no other law school for African-Americans 
existed. Further, the Court builds on its holding in Sipuel to take an explicit stand on segregated 
facilities. Neither in Missouri or Sipuel did the Court decide on an established dual system.  
Here, however, there existed a dual system. This dual system was not found to provide equal 
education at the minority law school as it did the white law school, and thus violated the equal 
protection clause. As in Sipuel, further foreshadowing of the Brown decision can be seen here in 
this case (see findings: Brown v. Board of Education). The Court again relies on an outcome-
based contextual analysis of the fourteenth amendment and continues its application of 
constructivist interpretation. 
McLaurin is the final of the High Court cases pre-Brown dealing with issues in higher 
education.  The Court reaches an apex in its application of the fourteenth amendment. Starting in 
Missouri through to Sweatt the Court gradually, in small steps, sets precedent to make the 
ultimate conclusion: even when integration has occurred, segregation cannot occur within an 
institution of higher education. Such segregation, the Court, concluded is a violation of the 
fourteenth amendment. The Court considers the context in which McLaurin was receiving his 
education- mainly, the differential treatment. Without question these series of higher education 
cases considers the current fundamental social context in which segregation was occurring. This 
consideration, not consideration of the original intent of the equal protection clause set the stage 
for the decision in Brown.  
152 
 
Important to note was the attention given to the intent of the 14
th
 amendment. Ultimately 
the Court concluded the history of the amendment was inconclusive as to its impact on the 
Brown case. Therefore, it reasons that a strict originalist interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment is impossible to apply to the facts of the case.  
The series of higher education cases paved the way for Brown to be decided by the Court 
being the same principles decided in the higher education cases were transferred to Brown. The 
obvious importance and impact of Brown cannot be overstated. With regard to judicial 
interpretation specifically this case is a milestone because the equal protection clause, once used 
to justify racially segregated schooling in Cumming was interpreted here to hold such schooling 
unconstitutional. The gradual progression from cases such as Gong Lum and Cumming to the 
higher education cases pre-Brown show a shift in judicial interpretation.  
  Importantly, the Court goes beyond the ‘tangible’ factors such as school facilities and 
teacher quality that may be considered equal to the actual educational opportunities experienced 
by students. The Court argues children of minority groups are deprived of equal educational 
opportunities because of the detrimental effect on the ‘colored’ children.  Clearly, the  
Court goes beyond looking at the actual words on the equal protection clause, but to its meaning, 
and ultimately considers the social context of the segregation laws. The Court in Brown relied 
heavily on a direct constructivist interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment. So much is evident in 
their reliance on the ‘affect’ of segregation on minority students and both the specific discussion 
of the fourteenth amendment as well as the reliance on the social context of de jure school 
segregation.  
 Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the fourteenth amendment or equal 
protection clause in Brown II, it is clear the Court relies on its initial application of both from 
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Brown I. This is the first case in the desegregation litigation to employ an indirect method of 
interpretation. Given the brevity of the decision and the lack of explanation from the Court, it can 
be inferred the Court was clearly and unanimously aligned in its decision, based more so on 
constructivist principles guiding their interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, rather than a 
lengthy consideration of whether or not the equal protection clause justified the decisions. This 
marks the beginning of a trend in several subsequent cases wherein indirect interpretation is 
employed as a method of interpretation (Green, Alexander, Montgomery School Board) and is 
arguably a sign the Court was becoming more comfortable in its application of the clause to the 
desegregation cases.  The Court was confident that the equal protection clause called for the end 
of de jure segregation in schools and thus continued application of the fourteenth amendment to 
education cases. 
 Next in Cooper the Court took an important stance on resistance on the part of school 
districts to intentionally delay integration. The Court does consider the intent of the amendment 
but does not mention the original intent of the framers. Rather, the Court considers the fourteenth 
amendment’s underlining theme of social justice, citing a constitutional ‘ideal’ (p.20) and an 
‘indispensible’ notion of justice. Further, this case employs a direct interpretation of the equal 
protection clause and in doing so addresses the massive resistance problem occurring in many 
schools. This is an important milestone in displaying how far the Court was willing to go to 
defend desegregation and reaffirm its power as a judicial body given the flagrant resistance to its 
prior decisions. This case solidified the Court’s willingness to exert its power. The Court took 
Marbury one step further by not only asserting its judicial authority as the High Court of the 
nation but also by enabling them to exceed any previous limits on its enforcement authority. This 
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was, most likely, not the original intent of the equal protection clause but the Court used it as 
means to reach the holding in this case (Fenton, 769). 
 Griffin is a classic example of how the Court continued to consider the current social 
context of education for black students. Because the Court reasons the refusal of the County to 
provide an education is a violation of the equal protection rights of the black students the Court 
applies a constructivist interpretation. Further, the Court looks to the intent of the County- in this 
case, an action with discriminatory intent. The Court discusses the fourteenth amendment and 
ultimately articulates a requirement that unequal treatment be present rather than simply 
differential treatment.    
 Green was an important case because the Court tackles the issue of the popular’ freedom 
of choice plans’ and is a continuation of the Court’s indirect interpretation begun in Brown II.   
Important to note is that the language of the 14
th
 amendment, further, even the 14
th
 amendment 
itself is not mentioned in the Green decision.  This may be further evidence the Court was 
growing comfortable with invoking the equal protection clause without lengthy discussion of the 
words, intent, or spirit of the clause or fourteenth amendment. This case begins a series of three 
cases where indirect interpretation is employed.   Yet, it is undeniable that the amendment’s 
influence is at the heart of the decision. The Court points to the spirit of the two previous Brown 
decisions and the insistence that a segregated system by law or in practice is unconstitutional. 
Therefore, the Green decision also relies on a constructivist interpretation of the 14
th
 amendment 
although the words of the amendment were not debated or included in the opinion. Because the 
Court considers the end outcome of the freedom of choice plans, there is clearly a constructivist 
interpretation.  
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 The brevity of the decision in Alexander signals the Court’s unanimous conclusion that 
the equal protection clause placed the burden of proof with the school board. Further, the Court 
took further the ‘all deliberate speed’ directive from Brown II by requiring schools to dismantle 
dual systems ‘at once’ (p.1218). The Court relies on indirect interpretation because neither the 
equal protection clause nor fourteenth amendment is discussed explicitly. The Court, as 
illustrated here, was becoming increasingly confident and comfortable in employing the equal 
protection clause without lengthy discussion or reasoning. In this case the Court provided no 
reasoning but rather simply held desegregation with ‘all deliberate speed’ to be unconstitutional.   
 With Montgomery the Court enters a new area of desegregation within schools beyond 
student enrollment. Still based on the foundation laid out in the previous cases, the Court 
reaffirms its dedication to desegregation, acknowledging faculty desegregation is an important 
part of the social context of integration. The Court employs an indirect constructivist method of 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.  
 Swann was undoubtedly a landmark case among those included in the series of 
desegregation Supreme Court litigation. The fourteenth amendment served as a backbone for this 
case as evident in Justice Burger’s reference to the equal protection clause and the reassertion 
that segregation denies black student equal protection of the laws. The Court notes the 
complexity of the issue and the vast number of previously unchartered legal questions school 
desegregation and its complications had created since Brown. Although Swann is often 
referenced in regard to its approval of bussing as means to desegregate schools, it was also the 
beginnings of legal exploration of the term ‘racial quotas’. This is important considering 
subsequent discussion of quotas in the higher education cases and ultimately in Parents as well. 
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This was also the first time transfer policies became subject to Supreme Court judicial 
evaluation.  
 While the case was a landmark case in that it shows the Court’s willingness to support 
bussing, it can be argued that Swann marks the beginning of a move away from holding schools 
100% accountable for desegregation. The Court acknowledges that schools cannot be held 
responsible for implementing policies that result in student enrollment racial ratios that are equal 
to the district as a whole. While the Court acknowledges schools are certainly within their 
constitutional rights to implement such policies, they are not bound, absent a constitutional 
violation to do so.  
 The Court in Keyes employs an indirect constructivist method of interpretation of the 
equal protection clause and fourteenth amendment. The Court continues to justify its holding 
based on the foundational conclusion that de jure segregation violates the equal protection of 
black students without including a discussion or direct explanation of how the clause justified its 
holding. The Court leaves with schools the responsibility of burden of proof (as in Alexander). 
Most importantly, the Court expands the definition of de jure segregation to include not only 
segregation by law but also that by discriminatory action on the part of school boards. By 
expanding this definition, the Court made it easier for challenges to segregative practices 
occurring not by law, but through other less obvious yet still discriminatory and direct acts of 
segregation. The Court makes an important distinction between de jure and de facto segregation 
in that de jure indicates intent to segregate. This new interpretation of de jure segregation and the 
Court’s ruling that such segregation violates the fourteenth amendment opened the door for the 
157 
 
Court’s ruling to affect schools who were employing intentional discriminatory methods but did 
not employ de jure segregation as it had been previously defined by the Court . 
 Milliken is a landmark case in the series of desegregation cases because it served as clear 
indication of the Court’s unwillingness to endorse intra-district desegregation remedies. As 
previously discussed, many believe this case indicates the Court’s intention to return power to 
the States and individual school districts even though segregation still existed (Orfield & Eaton, 
1996). Further, this case signaled the Court’s unwillingness to extend its definition of de jure 
segregation as newly defined in Keyes to situations in which residential segregation inevitably 
created school segregation. In doing so the Court indicated its intent to not address issues of 
residential segregation within the school segregation issue. While the Court did not directly 
interpret the equal protection clause but rather relied on indirect interpretation, the fourteenth 
amendment was clearly the foundation for the Court’s constructivist interpretation. The Court 
ultimately found school districts that have not been found to be acting with discriminatory intent 
outside of the city school district cannot bear the burden of desegregation remedies.  Important to 
note is that had the Court ruled otherwise in Milliken, it would have established a precedent 
allowing cross-district desegregation remedies such as inter district bussing. This in turn would 
have had a profound effect on how city schools look today. It is now apparent city schools 
experience severe racial segregation (Orfield, 2001). If Milliken has been decided in the reverse, 
the nation’s city schools could have experienced a very different student enrollment. Of course it 
is also possible the white flight resulting from the Milliken decision could have spread beyond 
suburbs thus changing the way residential segregation looks today as well. Whatever the possible 
repercussions of a reverse decision would and could have been, Milliken is undoubtedly one of 
the major turning points for the Court’s interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court’s 
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indirect constructivist interpretation relied on the spirit of Brown and also considered the current 
state of the Detroit school system. The Court also affirmed its support of district-level control of 
desegregation, not state-wide or regional wide control of desegregation efforts.  
In Pasadena the Court does not go into a lengthy and in depth discussion on its 
application of the fourteenth amendment, but it does directly interpret the amendment and 
considers the social context of the residential segregation within the school district. The Court 
continues its line of reasoning from Swann and can be considered a foreshadowing of the cases 
wherein the Court grants unitary status to schools that have made a good faith effort to comply 
with desegregation because it holds districts are not constitutionally required to make year-by-
year adjustments to account for the changing racial composition of student bodies once a duty to 
desegregate has been met.  
Bakke’s importance among the series of these desegregation cases is tremendous. 
Although the case centers on higher education this case greatly impacts K-12 desegregation 
issues. First, the Court first applied the use of the strict scrutiny test to education issues. Second, 
the compelling interest of diversity in higher education was identified. Being Justice Kennedy in 
Parents acknowledges this compelling interest may be applied to K-12 education (even though 
the Seattle and Louisville plans were not narrowly tailored enough to pass the strict scrutiny test 
even if such an interest would be recognized).  Third, the Court employs, for the first time, an 
originalist method of interpretation of the Constitution.  
 The use of strict scrutiny in school desegregation cases began with Bakke because the use 
of racial classification is a suspect class. This case set the foundation for racial classifications, 
even if their intent was to remediate past discrimination. While racial diversity in higher 
education is a compelling interest, racial balancing is identified as not so. This will become 
159 
 
important as the Court in Parents relies on this distinction. The originalist method of 
interpretation directly relies on the ‘color-blind’ constitution premise. The ‘color-blind’ 
constitution refers to, as discussed in Chapter II, the notion and method of interpretation 
promoting an originalist view of the fourteenth amendment: that the words of the equal 
protection clause should be taken literally and with regard to the intent of the writers of the 
amendment.   
 The early 1990s cases Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins are grouped together not only 
chronologically but also because they signify a series of cases signifying the Court’s increasing 
reluctance to endorse desegregation in the wake of residential segregation, its willingness to 
grant unitary status even when desegregation has not been fully achieved, and its lack of support 
for holding states accountable through forcing increased funding in an effort to achieve 
desegregation. While the Court had stayed silent on the issue of K-12 school desegregation 
through the 1980s, it is clear the 1990s serve as an indication of a shift in judicial interpretation 
of the equal protection clause that started as early as 1974 in Milliken. The Court, in deciding 
both Dowell and Freeman employ a direct constructivist interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment and equal protection clause. In Dowell the Court expands their previous use and 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment to justify and define the term ‘unitary’ status based, 
in part, on the social context of residential segregation. Similarly, the Court uses the fourteenth 
amendment to justify its holding in Freeman by arguing the equal protection clause does not 
hold schools accountable for segregation resulting from demographic change rather than from 
discriminatory action on the part of the school board. In both these cases the line of reasoning 
from Milliken is repeated. The Court in these two cases refrained from interpreting the equal 
protection clause in a way that expands the definition of de jure segregation as it did in Keyes, 
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thus making it extremely difficult for constitutional challenges to de facto segregation caused by 
residential segregation patterns to succeed. While the Court in Jenkins does directly interpret the 
fourteenth amendment, it continues the use of constructivist interpretation and its willingness to 
conclude certain instances of de facto segregation are not constitutional violations nor are worthy 
of remedial action. In this case, remedial actions including supplying more funding and resources 
to schools experiencing de facto segregation was not mandatory under the fourteenth 
amendment.    
 The Court did not address K-12 segregation again until over a decade later in Parents but 
did face affirmative action in higher education in the early 2000s in two companion cases, 
Grutter and Gratz. Grutter reaffirms the Court’s recognition of diversity in higher education as a 
compelling interest under the equal protection clause. The Court’s interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment is clearly direct constructivist because, as it reasons, “context matters” 
when evaluating a governmental action under the equal protection clause. The Court also 
foreshadows its future consideration of less-restrictive race-neutral means to achieve the 
compelling interest as part of the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test. In Parents the 
Court stressed one of the reasons the assignment plans did not pass the scrutiny test was because 
it did not feel the Districts considered an adequate number of other race-neutral alternatives. 
Similarly in Gratz, the Court stresses the narrowly tailored requirement of the strict scrutiny test.  
The point system used in Gratz did not meet the requirement and was not considered the least 
restrictive means to achieve the compelling governmental interest of diversity in higher 
education. Because the Court explicitly considers the fourteenth amendment as well as the 
context of the point system within higher education the Court employs a direct constructivist 
interpretation of the equal protection clause.  
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 Finally, the Court’s decision in Parents represents a return to the originalist interpretation 
the Court used in Bakke.  Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality does not consider a broad 
social context, and in fact, explicitly dismisses such consideration. He writes, allowing racial 
balancing as a compelling end in itself would ‘effectively assure that race will always be relevant 
tin American life, and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decision-
making such irrelevance as a human being’s race will never be achieved’ (p.718).  
IV. Data: General Desegregation Statistics 
The second research question addressed in this study analyzes the ways in which judicial 
interpretation actually impacted racial makeup in the nation’s public schools from the 1954 
Brown decision to the 2007 Parents decision. Data on racial make-up of schools was obtained 
through several secondary sources. While it would have been possible to use raw data on school 
enrollment statistics available from several databases such as the Office of Civil Rights, a 
statistical analysis would have been cumbersome and time consuming considering analysis can 
be found in secondary sources.  
An interesting first finding as I searched for studies offering a wide-spread longitudinal 
analysis of school segregation on a national-level was that such a comprehensive study or studies 
does not exist. While there are many studies focusing on a specific topic within school 
segregation (for example, segregation in urban schools from 2000-2006) there are no major 
general studies on school segregation at the national level as I had hoped. As Clotfelter (2004) 
acknowledges,  
It will quickly become clear that nothing like a complete accounting [of racial 
shifts over time] is possible, owing to a lack of enrollment data covering all 
schools over the entire period. The best that can be done is to describe the trends 
and patterns using available data (p. 44).   
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Therefore, while I am unable to draw a year-by-year link between judicial interpretation and 
school segregation from 1954-2010, I am able to make general conclusions on how the Court’s 
interpretation did affect school enrollment. This general analysis is crucial in understanding 
overall trends in school segregation and how they are linked to the Court’s application of the 
equal protection clause to the school segregation cases, the major research question of this study.  
An important prelude to a presentation of segregation and school enrollment data is a 
discussion of the ways in which segregation is typically measured. Two common ways of 
measuring segregation have emerged: the percentage of students in racially isolated schools and 
the amount of interracial exposure students experience (Massey & Denton, 1988). The former 
describes the percent of minority students in schools where 90% or more students are minority. 
The latter measure describes the percent of white students in the school that a ‘typical’ student of 
another race attends. For example, across the nation in 2005-2006, African-American student 
exposure to white students was 30% (Orfield & Lee, 2004, p.24).  This means the typical 
African-American student attended a school with 30% white students.  The exposure index is a 
weighted average of the percentage of other race students. It can also describe the reverse 
situation-the percentage of students of another race that white students are exposed to 
(Frankenberg & Le, 2008) 
Prior to Brown the general absence of school enrollment data results in the inability to 
make clear conclusions about segregation statistics pre-1950s (Clotfelter, 2004, p.17). However, 
prior to Brown high levels of racial segregation existed within individual school districts (Ibid). 
In the early days of desegregation efforts, then, most attention was paid to intra-district remedies 
(Frankenberg and Le, 2008, p. 1027). According to Clotfelter, documentation exists suggesting 
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Northern schools were extremely segregated in the years leading to Brown. Most of this was de 
facto segregation resulting from small, neighborhood schools following patterns of residential 
segregation (2004, p.17). An estimated 85 to 90 percent of blacks attended schools where at least 
90% of the school enrollment was black (p.19). At this time segregation is often reported and 
examined in terms of the level of segregation of black and white students. However, Hispanic 
and other minority students experiences severe segregation at this time as well. An estimated 
85% of Mexican American students in the Southwest attended school in segregated classrooms 
or schools (p.22).  
In the years immediately following Brown segregation did not decrease significantly. 
During the 1959 school year only 0.2 percent of the South’s black students were attending 
schools with white students (p.24). By the early 1960s and estimated nine percent of black public 
school students were attending schools with white students. The Office of Civil Rights reported 
segregation data for the 1963-1964 school year and concluded just more than nine percent of 
black students were attending schools with whites. The OCR also reported 92.4% of schools in 
border states (Delaware, DC, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia) were 
desegregated by some degree but only 19.7 of the  Southern schools (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia)  had begun desegregation . (Office of Civil Rights 1964 staff report submitted to the 
US Commission on Civil Rights.  
The first Coleman Report (1966) was the first widespread study on desegregation and the 
first study commissioned by Congress with the specific purpose of influencing federal 
government policy. Data was collected from students in the first, third, sixth, ninth, and twelfth 
grade. Racial data on these students was part of the administered survey. In 1966, according to 
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Coleman, almost 80 percent of all white students in first and twelfth grade attend schools that 
were more than 90% white. 97% attended schools that were over 50% white. Segregation was 
highest in the Southern states (Coleman, 1966). Coleman (1966) also found that more than 65% 
of black students in the first grade attended schools that were over 90% black. In the South most 
students attended schools that were single-race schools only.  
Between 1968 and 1972 the percentage of black students going to schools with 90-100 
percent minority enrollments fell from 78 to 25 percent in the South, by far the biggest change in 
any region (Orfield, 1983, p. 4). By 1972-1973, 91% of Southern schools were desegregated, 
meaning had some minority students. More accurately however, the large majority of black 
students, 62%, attended predominantly minority schools. In fact, 32.7% of blacks during that 
year attended schools that were 90% or more minority (Friedman, 2004, xiii).  
In 1975 Coleman released his second report. He reported his findings on trends in 
segregation and found by 1973 all de jure segregation had been eliminated. De facto segregation, 
however, remained. Evidence of this shown partly in the finding that racial segregation was also 
pronounced between city school districts and suburban school districts.  Coleman also found 
schools experienced loss of white students when integration efforts increased. In addition, loss of 
white students was most prominent in the year desegregation efforts began.  
Beginning in 1968, the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services maintained well-detailed records on school enrollment figures broken down 
by race and segregation indexes for a sample of the nation’s public schools districts. For every 
year between 1968 and 1976 the Office of Civil Rights compiled data to look at issues of school 
desegregation. Wilson (1985) looked at two different outcomes: 
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First, enrollment trends in districts that de- segregated and districts that did not 
desegregate were compared. Second, enrollment trends in desegregated districts before, 
during, and after the implementation of a desegregation program were compared.  
(p.151).  
 
Using this analysis, Wilson (1985) made four primary findings concerning white enrollment and 
desegregation between 1968-1976. First, the greatest declines in white enrollment occurred 
during the year in which implementation of desegregation occurred in schools. Further, districts 
in which black enrollment exceeded one third of total student population experienced twice the 
enrollment loss than in other districts. Wilson (1985) ultimately concludes that involvement of 
the court system in desegregation efforts ‘did not lead to greater white enrollment’ (p.152) over 
the time period in public elementary schools using National Center for Educational Statistics 
(NCES).    
Also using the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data, Logan, 
Oakley, and Stowell (2008) analyzed school desegregation using enrollment data for 1970, 1990, 
and 2000. They found segregation declined over the thirty year period. They argue by 1990 
districts were largely conforming to court mandates and federal desegregation policy. The study 
showed average levels of school segregation was 82.6 in 1970 for all metropolitan schools. By 
1990 the average was 64.2 and by 2000 the average was 65.7. In the 1968-1969 school year, 
although there were court orders in place and some districts were desegregating, no ‘overall 
impact’ (p. 1638) of court orders on levels of segregation were apparent. This was in contrast to 
levels of desegregation nationwide between 1990 and 2000. The authors argue further that while 
court orders were important, it is important to note the widespread resistance to desegregation 
during the two decades subsequent to Brown I. However, important to note is the slowed level of 
desegregation occurring between 1990 and 2000 when compared to between 1970 and 1990. 
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Logan (2002) argues there was a ‘rollback’ (p.2) after 1990 when compared to progress made 
prior to 1990. Logan (2002) writes,  
In many metropolitan regions, desegregation evident in the 1989-1990 school 
year has given way to substantial increases of black-white segregation. In most of 
these, Supreme Court action in 1991 that relaxed the criteria for rescinding 
desegregation orders has freed school officials to pull back their previous steps to 
achieve racial balance. New national data for 1999-2000 show that segregation 
from whites has edged upwards not only for black children, but also for Hispanic, 
and Asian children.” (p.2).  
 
Overall, school segregation has been on the rise in the last twenty years (Frankenberg and 
Le, 2008). Since data first began to be collected about Latino students in 1960s, segregation has 
continually risen for these students in the last 50 years. Today, Latino students are more racially 
segregated than their African-American peers (Orfield & Lee, 2008). While segregation for 
African-American students declined in the mid-to late-1960s, by 1970 these students were more 
desegregated than in any other region of the country.  
In 1988 about one-third of African-American and Latino students attended intensely 
segregated school and some experts argue the late 1980s saw the peak of desegregation for black 
students (Orfield, 2009, p.13).  During the 1988-89 school year just one-third of black students 
were in intensely segregated schools.  
Orfield and Lee (2007) found in the 2005-2006 school year, when there were more than 
ninety thousand public schools enrolling more than 48.6 million students, 57% of these students 
where white, 20% Latino, 17% Black, 5% Asian, 1% American Indians.  White students are the 
most racially isolated students of any racial group (Orfield & Lee, 2007). This is important for 
two reasons: first, not only does such isolation result in limited exposure for white students but 
also because it limits the exposure of students of other races to white students (Frankenberg, 
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2008). During the 2005-2006 school year 28.7% of all public schools were racially isolated white 
schools (Frankenberg, 2008).    
During the 2006-2007 school year, Latinos and African American students attended the 
most severely racially segregated schools.  About 40% of these students attended intensely 
segregated schools, where the population is 90-100% minority (Orfield, 2009, p. 12). Most 
recently, a study released by researchers at Northeastern University revealed  
 
V. Parents   
The final set of sub-questions of this study considers the current state of integration and 
how the Court’s decision in Parents has affected school integration efforts as they actually occur 
at the school and district level. While a brief introduction to the issue was provided in Chapter II, 
the issue will be comprehensively addressed here in response to this study’s third research 
question. While the major research question for this study focuses on new analysis of judicial 
interpretation, the primary goal in answering the third question is to present an overarching 
summary of current plans and effects of the Parents decision. There will be little new analysis 
but rather a presentation of the various important considerations of which schools should be 
aware as new plans are designed and second, an examination of the far-reaching implications of 
the decision.  
 First, alternatives schools are implementing in the wake of the Parents decision will be 
presented. Where appropriate how these plans may fare if legally challenged under the new 
federal law is addressed. Included here is an examination of the current state of the law post-
Parents including explicit rules of law found in the decision as well as small nuances that those 
structuring integration plans will want to consider. Second, commentary on how the decision will 
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affect future integration efforts will be presented and will include literature and commentary 
from scholars in both the legal and education literature. Third, this section will address how the 
decision in Parents may have profound effects on federal legislation such as NCLB and on 
current education reform movements such as charter schools. Finally, an examination of the 
other institutions (such as institutions of higher education) outside K-12 education that may be 
affected by the 2007 decision will be presented to illustrate the decision’s far-reaching 
implications. Included in this discussion is consideration of how the Court’s decision is likely to 
affect even the nature of broad social science research.  In all this section will address the second 
and third research questions: What is the current state of federal desegregation law and how can 
school structure legally permissible integration plans? What, if any, are the effects of the Parents 
decision both on schools and institutions outside of K-12 education?  
Now, more than three years after the 2007 decision, schools continue to restructure 
integration plans. However, given the confusion that arose after the decision as well as the 
hesitation on the part of many districts to implement assignment plans aimed at integration for 
fear of costly litigation, among other factors, many argue desegregation efforts will slow 
(Frankenberg, 2008). The immediate aftermath of the Parents decision in both Louisville and 
Seattle reflects the confusion felt after the decision was issued and foreshadows potential 
problems schools will face in attempting to craft legally permissible student assignment plans 
that will pass constitutional scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment.   
In order to assess the effect of the decision on schools and the future of integration in 
schools, it is beneficial to consider the immediate aftermath of the decision both in schools 
involved in the litigation as well as schools which may not have been the subject of litigation but 
who are affected by its holding nonetheless. This serves to show how Parents immediately and 
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drastically affected many schools nation-wide who were employing integration plans, even those 
not identical or even similar to the Seattle and Louisville plans.  
Along with all other schools employing integration plans, Louisville was forced to 
evaluate its assignment plan and eliminate all provisions not in line with the Court decision. 
Immediately following the decision, the case was remanded to federal Judge Heyburn in 
Louisville. School officials voiced an optimistic attitude, using Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to 
justify the continued use race as a factor in student assignment plans and affirming the holding 
that race can be used as a factor, however not the deciding factor, in student assignment policies. 
Therefore, the Louisville schools stopped using race in deciding whether to accept or deny 
entrance to schools but did continue to use other factors such as space, grades, attendance, and 
behavior as deciding factors in student assignment decisions.  The district began to develop a 
new student-assignment plan conforming to the Court’s holding for the 2009-2010 school year. 
However, the school district was forced to redraw its attendance zones for the 2008-2009 school 
year, in the months immediately following the decision because the school was administering 
different attendance zones for black and white students. Because these attendance zones were 
based solely on race the Parents decision was prohibitive to their continuance.  
School officials in Louisville proposed plans to fulfill diversity goals. These plans are 
based on redrawing attendance zones that are not solely dictated by race. These lines will take 
into consideration family income and family educational attainment level. Area A will be 
composed of students and families who fall below the county’s median education attainment 
level and median household income. Area A’s population would be composed of about 48 
percent minorities, a term which the District defines as encompassing all racial minority groups, 
not just black families. Area B would be compromised of families with higher than the median 
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educational attainment and household income. Schools would be obligated to enroll at least at 
last fifteen percent and no more than fifty percent of student from the low-income, low-education 
area. The Superintendent of schools believes this plan withstands constitutional scrutiny because 
it is based in geography. The new Louisville plan also included a definition of diversity beyond 
the simple black, white distinction.   However, projections show that under this plan students will 
remain de facto segregated in the Louisville schools (Wilson, 2009, p.223).  
Schools and other individual plans were greatly affected by the Court’s holding in 
Parents. I provide one example of another state not involved in the litigation to provide 
illustration of the wide array of plans, all across the country, that were affected by the 2007 
decision. For example, Wisconsin’s Chapter 220 is example off a student assignment program 
now prohibited under the holding in Parents. The program, which began in 1976, is a special-
transfer program allowing students to transfer to different school districts if the transfer will 
increase racial diversity in both school districts. The program classifies students according to 
race and its official goal was to promote school integration on a voluntary basis. The students in 
the program are classified as minority or nonminority. In order for a minority student to qualify 
for a transfer, the student must transfer from a school with greater than 30 percent minority 
student enrollment to one with less than 30 percent minority enrollment. Similarly, a 
nonminority student must transfer to school with greater than 30 percent minority enrollment to 
one with less than 30 percent minority enrollment. Minority students under the program are 
defined as students who are African-American, Hispanic, American Indian, Alaskan native, or 
Pacific Islander. Students not in these categories are considered nonminority. Under the program 
students are allowed to attend any public school in the state. School districts may reject students 
on account of space in the school overall or in specific classes or grades, and because of the 
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student’s disciplinary history. Greene (2008), writing for the Wisconsin Law Review addresses 
the issues surrounding racial balancing in the 220 program,  
A racial-balancing provision in the open-enrollment program contains a rejection clause 
that requires Chapter-220-eligible districts to reject transfers into or out of the district if 
the transfer increases racial imbalance in the district, and a priority clause that requires 
districts to accept or reject all Chapter 220 applications before accepting any open-
enrollment applications. Students who transfer through Chapter 220 have the right to 
finish their educations at their current schools as long the program is funded. Statewide, 
33,576 students participated in Chapter 220's intradistrict component in 2006-07.  The 
same year, only 125 student transfers, all in Madison, were rejected because their 
transfers would increase racial imbalance. 
 
(p. 1219) 
Through the Chapter 220 program, minority enrollment in suburban districts has more than 
doubled (Greene, 2008, p. 1221).  
 The Chapter 220 plan will not hold up to the decision in Parents even though it was legal 
when it was began in 1976. First, because the program was voluntary, it was not implemented to 
remedy past de jure segregation. Only schools administering voluntary plans, not schools who 
have not yet been granted unitary status and still under court-ordered desegregation plans, were 
affected by the Parents decision. Therefore, without an active court-ordered desegregation plan, 
the Wisconsin 220 plan will not be able to prove its goal is to remedy the past effects of 
discrimination. Additionally, because there exist only two categories for students: minority and 
nonminority, the Chapter 220 will not hold up the Court’s mandate that binary classifications, 
such as in Seattle’s student assignment plan, will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  
 Wisconsin can alter its program to adhere to the framework identified in Parents. First, 
the new program should explicitly state promotion of student diversity as its goal, thus keeping 
in line with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Race, then should be considered as one of several 
factors, and not the only factor in the new transfer plan. Next, the new transfer plan must exclude 
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the binary definition of minority (either minority or nonminority). Considerations for student 
transfers should not only include consideration of a student’s race as the one and only factor but 
should also include multiple factors to promote diversity. Greene (2009) eloquently summarizes 
the fundamental effect the Parents decision will have on the Wisconsin program,  
The effects of Parents on Chapter 220 and the school-integration movement in 
Milwaukee are devastating and tragic. The parts of the majority opinion joined by 
Kennedy will undermine relationships between MPS and the surrounding 
suburban school districts, resulting in either new waves of costly and acrimonious 
litigation, or new levels of complacency and resentment. While Kennedy's 
concurrence offers a small chance to save some shreds of Chapter 220's initial 
purpose of school integration, overall, desegregation efforts in Wisconsin will be 
hampered on the judicial, practical, and administrative levels. If there is a silver 
lining, Kennedy's concurrence in Parents gives Wisconsin lawmakers the chance 
to avoid joining the plurality's colorblind principles and keep school integration 
alive in Wisconsin, even if just by a thread. Without Kennedy's concurring 
opinion, Parents would have doomed Chapter 220 and undone fifty years of 
desegregation in Wisconsin schools with one stroke. (p. 1236)  
 These examples, one from Louisville, a school party to the litigation and one from 
Wisconsin provide illustration of the way in which two very different plans were affected 
immediately by the Parents decision. Having provided a small snap shot of how these two 
schools, in different parts of the nation, with two very different plans, a discussion of how 
schools can actually structure plans while still keeping cognizant of the Court’s decision follows 
here.   
A. Alternative Plans Promoting Integration   
i. Socio-economic status based plans  
Alternative plans considered by many schools are assignment policies wherein students 
are evaluated and assigned to schools not solely on account of their race but by the 
socioeconomic status of their families. Such plans have been subject of much attention because 
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in theory they provide a wonderful alternative to assignment plans based on race that will no 
longer pass constitutional scrutiny under current federal desegregation law as promulgated by the 
Court. Because socioeconomic status has not been identified by the Supreme Court as a suspect 
class under the levels of scrutiny review, schools implementing these plans will not be subject to 
strict scrutiny analysis. Such plans group students based on the socio-economic status of their 
families and assign students to schools within the district based on this student characteristic.  
The benefits of socioeconomic integration include combating negative outcomes 
associated with concentrations of low-income students as well as additional benefits above and 
beyond the previously discussed benefits of racial integration alone. A concentration of low-
income students in one school is associated with several negative affects income-level 
integration would address. For example, poor children often start school with an average two 
year disadvantage compared to their peers from higher income families. (Rosenello, 2009, p. 
551). When concentrations of low-income students are divided among several schools, the 
burden of implementing special programs to help these students, often with lower academic 
skills, is also divided among schools. Additionally, just as with racial integration, students who 
attend school with peers from higher income families show improvement in test scores 
(Rosenello, 2009, p. 553). Further, students in socioeconomically integrated schools are less 
likely to drop out, enroll in college prep classes and are more likely to attend college (Rosenello, 
2009, p.553). Additionally, integrating students by socioeconomic level yields better results than 
simply allocating more money to schools with high numbers of poor students. When school 
composition remains poor increases in school funding do not have as much effect on student 
achievement as when compared to the socioeconomic integration of student populations 
(Rosenello, 2009, p. 554).  
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Further benefits of socioeconomic based plans consider social context. On a broader 
societal level, some (Rosenella, 2009) argue increasing the amount of socioeconomic integration 
plans advances the societal goal of moving towards a post-racist society. While this may not be a 
realistic goal to meet immediately or in the near future given the deep seeded roots of racism in 
the nation, this is undoubtedly a worthy goal. As Rosenella (2009) writes,  
Using socioeconomic integration rather than racial integration would answer the 
concerns of both sides: those who are not comfortable continuing to use racial 
classifications and those who argue the work of integration is not done. (p.558).  
 
While socioeconomic integration often parallels racial integration because of the link 
between race and poverty, an added benefit of socioeconomic integration is its potential to 
include poor white students in integration efforts. Evidence shows poor white students are also in 
dire need of educational support and score lower on math and English standardized tests than 
their white peers from higher income backgrounds (O’Connell, 2007).  
An examination of schools implementing these plans shows varying success rates. In 
Cambridge, Massachusetts the school district has implemented a student assignment plan based 
on socioeconomic status. A previous plan using race in student assignment policies was 
eliminated in 2002. The goal of the Cambridge program was to implement a plan that would 
result in all district schools having similar proportions of students eligible for the free and 
reduced lunch program. The result of the program in its early years has been mixed. Student 
achievement for students in the Cambridge district is higher when compared to others across 
Massachusetts. However, the schools within the district are resegregating. Shortly after, the 
Cambridge School District Superintendent announced socioeconomic diversity was an 
insufficient goal for the school system.  
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The Minneapolis public schools implemented the Choice Is Yours program to increase 
socioeconomic integration in the city school district as well as the surrounding suburban schools. 
CIY is a voluntary program and from the 2001-2002 school year to the 2005-2006 school year, 
the number of participating students has gone from 558 to 1,680. In addition a report 
commissioned by the Minnesota Department of Education revealed gains in student achievement 
among those students participating in the CIY program. The majority of students in the program 
came from the most racially isolated areas in the city.  
Important to consider then, are potential problems with plans based on socioeconomic 
status. First, problems with any student assignment plans based on race or race-neutral factors 
always put the implementing school district at risk to experience ‘flight’ on the part of groups 
who see these plans as threatening to their education. Caldas and Bankston (2002) affirm this 
potential negative outcome of implementing student assignment plans, even race-neutral plans, 
which result in an increased number of blacks in traditionally white schools,  
[W]e now know that beyond a certain threshold percentage of African American 
(which statistics show translates to a high concentration of children from single-
parent, poor families) both whites and blacks with the financial means are likely 
to pull their children from such schools . . . the challenge will be to [integrate] . . . 
in a manner that does not surpass a threshold that will trigger white flight--and 
higher-SES black flight. (p.204).    
 
 
Many are skeptical socio-economic level based plans and neighborhood schools will 
result in the integration necessary to achieve true racial diversity or help raise achievement. 
Dickinson (2009) writing for the Minnesota Law Review argues while plans in the wake of 
Parents have been inventive and within the legal limits set by Parents, these plans ultimately 
‘insufficiently counter the dangerous rise in school segregation” (p.1410). Socio-economic plans 
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assign students to schools based on their families’ socio-economic status so that all schools have 
a balanced student population including students from low, middle, and high SES. Dickinson 
(2009) acknowledges this may prove an attractive solution to schools post Parents because plans 
of this nature have not been ruled in violation of the constitution.  
Again, important to note is level of scrutiny for classifications based on socio-economic 
status are not subject to the same strict scrutiny test wherein a law must be narrowly tailored to 
fit a compelling governmental interest. Rather, classifications based on amount of wealth or 
socio-economic statuses are subject to the lowest level of scrutiny, wherein the rational basis test 
is applied. As previously discussed the rational basis test requires a classification be rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest. Historically, this test has been easier to ‘pass’ than 
the strict scrutiny test. Dickinson (2009) urges the law not to force schools to choose between 
defending race-conscious policies through costly litigation or turn to other less successful student 
assignment policies. Again, it is important to note that despite early reactions of the media and 
scholars to the Parents decision, the Court did not ‘destroy’ (p.1436) all race based solutions to 
achieving the compelling interest of racial diversity in K-12 education. Indeed, it is a positive 
outcome of Parents that racial diversity in K-12 education became a compelling interest (as 
previously discussed the only two compelling interests historically recognized by the Court in 
relation to educational segregation was to remedy past discrimination and achieve racial diversity 
in higher education only). Dickinson (2009) urges schools to continue to use race as a factor 
among others in student assignment plans such as those based on socio-economic status.  
ii. Controlled Choice Plans  
Another option for schools dedicated to integration is the implementation of controlled-
choice plans. A controlled-choice student assignment plan relied on personal choice of the 
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student, potential to increase diversity, and potential for school improvement through the 
assignment (Wilson, 2009, p.220). The benefits of a controlled choice plan for students include 
striking a balance between student choice and creation of diversity. Students are freed from 
constraints contained in a neighborhood school model because they rank and select schools they 
want to attend within the district. Neighborhood schools, because of residential segregation, 
often constrain students to schools where their peers are often from the same race, 
socioeconomic status, and at a basic level, from their immediate residential neighborhood.  
The school improvement aspect to controlled-choice plans are arguably the most 
beneficial to the school system as a whole because it is focused on school improvement for all 
schools (Wilson, 2009, p.226). Struggling schools are identified by those schools least chosen by 
the students. Once the least chosen schools are identified, targeted efforts for school 
improvement begin. The means by which schools can be improved under controlled-choice plans 
is outside the scope of this study but such plans will at the very least expose less desirable 
schools and in their most positive outcome, result in a efforts to upgrade and improve these 
schools.  
 
iii. Plans based solely on family income 
 
Other options schools may consider in the wake of Parents are disadvantage-based 
student assignment policies. The connection between race and poverty, as previously discussed is 
clear and reflected in both median income data and education level. For example, in 2006 the 
median income of white families was $62, 712 where as black families’ median income was 
$38,385. Similarly, 18% of whites over the age of 25 have a college degree and 10.5% have a 
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graduate degree when compared to 11.2% and 5.7% for blacks. Low-income students now 
comprise 54% of the South’s school children (Shamblin, 2009, p.241). There are a few potential 
legal complications of disadvantage-based student assignment policies. While the Court in 
Parents did not speak directly to classifications based on socioeconomic status, future plans may 
fail if thought to be simply a ‘cover-up’ for plans really based on racial classification (Shamblin, 
2009, p.241). Writing for the Louisiana Law Review, Shamblin (2009) points out that because 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence became the holding in Parents, schools would be prudent to 
consider his current and past reasoning on racial classifications that disguise themselves as 
otherwise,  
In Grutter, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which argued that 
the law school's goal to enroll a "critical mass" of racial minorities was a "sham" 
to disguise racial balancing rather than an effort toward broad student body 
diversity.  Justice Kennedy's separate dissent called the school's plan "a delusion . 
. . to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to 
achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas."  Since Justice Kennedy's 
swing vote can determine the constitutionality of a district's assignment plan and 
he has shown suspicion of schools' methodologies, a district cannot confuse the 
integration benefits of a disadvantage-based plan with a singular purpose of 
allotting preferences to a specified number of African-American students. (p.243) 
 
The Court originally articulated its intolerance for classifications that simply masked their focus 
on race in the case Shaw v. Reno (1993).  The Court ruled plans that appear to be racially neutral 
but operate in practice as racial classification may also violate the equal protection clause. These 
cases did not deal with student assignment plans but rather voting districts. The standard 
articulated by the Court applies to all governmental classifications whether education-based or 
beyond.  However, this is cause to be optimistic these types of plans may pass constitutional 
scrutiny because Justice Kennedy did specifically mention factors such as level of family 
educational attainment level, income level, family structure, and parental contact with the 
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criminal justice system to be legally permissible factors to consider in student assignments. 
Additionally, because the disadvantage-based programs do not classify students by race on their 
face, challengers to the plans bear the added burden of proving these plans are merely a ‘sham’ 
to mask racial classifications. Even if more black students than white student qualify for 
assignment preferences under disadvantage-based plans, these plans may be shielded from 
successful legal challenges. 
iv. Grade Configuration Plans  
Glenn (2010) advocates for schools to consider grade reconfiguration as means for 
appropriate education for all grade level students within a school. Some, such as Glenn (2010) 
propose specific methods by which schools can formulate legally permissible integration plans. 
Glenn proposes plans based on grade level as a viable alternative to more racially explicit student 
assignment plans. Glenn describes the plans:  
Grade reconfiguration changes the composition of schools by reducing the 
number of grades offered at each school, thereby reducing the number of schools 
with competing grades. Grade reconfiguration operates on the assumption that the 
demographics of each grade level in a district typically vary on slightly from the 
demographics of the district as a whole. This fact explains why small school 
districts offering each grade in only one school tend to have low values of school 
segregation. In these districts, the attendance zone for each school (and 
consequently grade) aligns with the boundaries of the entire districts, eliminating 
the largest factor in intra-district segregation: residential segregation. Intra district 
school segregation can be all but eliminated if a district has one attendance zone 
that is coextensive with the boundaries of the district (p.1104).  
 
Glenn (2010) modeled grade reconfiguration in several Virginia school districts and concluded 
reconfiguration can eliminate segregation in small school districts and reduce segregation in 
larger districts. When the model was applied to the Falls Church, Virginia school district, a small 
suburban school district, school segregation declined dramatically and his study reflected the 
school district has virtually no school segregation.  
180 
 
 Grade reconfiguration has been attempted in several districts with mixed results. The 
Houston schools reconfiguration was unsuccessful but in part, Glenn (2009) argues, because 
Hispanic students were counted as White students. The Tampa Florida Hillsborough County 
schools applied a grade reconfiguration approach and while school segregation declined, parents 
complained about increased bussing times and students have to attend different schools each 
year. Eventually the Board dropped the plan and moved to a new desegregation plan favoring 
magnet schools (Glenn, 2009, p.1109).  
 Glenn acknowledges both the strengths and weaknesses of grade reconfiguration plans. 
Transportation issues such as bussing arise when a district moves from neighborhood schools to 
a reconfiguration plan. The plans also work better in elementary and middle schools rather than 
high schools because high schools often serve as important local community centers and resist 
efforts to consolidate with nearby schools. Further, districts that are racially homogenous as a 
whole do not benefit from grade configuration on the district level because of overall district 
racial isolation.  Overall, grade reconfiguration has the potential to pass constitutional scrutiny 
because districts do not have to consider race of each individual student in assignment plans.  
v. Neighborhood Schools and Site Selection  
Student assignment policies based on neighborhood schools employ plans that send 
students to the school nearest their home. These plans withstand constitutional scrutiny and avoid 
controversial busing issues. However, with the connection between residential segregation, 
achievement, and school segregation, these plans have little chance of promoting diversity in 
schools. The process of redistricting as part of neighborhood school student assignment policies 
may be a viable solution. Redistricting is a redrawing of school district boundaries to increase 
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racial diversity in the neighborhood school model. Two major problems with this method of 
student assignment plans is the potential to result in white flight and potential legal challenge.  
The neighborhood school model has proven unsuccessful in the area of raising student 
achievement. Because this model has historically resulted in increased school segregation and 
given the direct relationship between segregation and lower levels of student achievement, it may 
not be an attractive solution in the wake of Parents. In fact, districts such as Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, North Carolina, who returned to neighborhood schools after being granted unitary 
status rapidly showed declines in student achievement. Other metropolitan districts such as 
Denver and San Francisco report similar results as an outcome of a neighborhood school plan.  
Another approach for student assignment policies includes several race neutral factors. 
Further permissible integration plans could also include the strategic site selection of 
where districts choose to open new schools. Methods of new site selection could include locating 
new schools in areas designated as areas of growth or areas where school renovation can take 
place in an effort to improve the education of students in these locations which often coincide 
with low-performing schools (Hines, 2008, p.2212). 
vi. Other Policies to Promote Integration  
Beyond overhauling current assignment plans and school configuration, schools can also 
consider other ways to integrate through smaller school and district policies. The targeted 
allocation of resources for special programs can also increase diversity in segregated schools and 
districts. Districts can consider new magnet schools, Advanced Placement programs, or bilingual 
education program (Hines, 2009, p.2213). These programs could potentially attract minority 
students. The directed recruiting of students through open houses, disbursement of school 
information, door-to-door outreach, and mailings can also reach more minority students. Further, 
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other ways to integrate include multiple approaches. In 1999 the San Francisco school district 
implemented a student assignment policy where several factors contribute to an overall process 
of school placement for each student. These factors include socioeconomic status, geographic 
proximity to the school, and academic achievement among others. The results have not been 
successful given those schools who were rated highly diverse under the student assignment plan 
were also, unfortunately, found to be the least racially diverse schools within the San Francisco 
school district. Schools that had resegregated showed the lowest student achievement. Florida 
and Texas have implemented plans that reserve space in state university for students graduating 
in the top of their high school class.  
Further resources to promote integration efforts come from the federal government and 
leading civil rights organization. Contributing to federal support of integration efforts is 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s announcement that the Office of Civil Rights would 
become more active in investigating schools than it had been under the Bush administration. 
Further, the federal government has sponsored several grant opportunities providing support to 
school districts seeking to promote integrative practices. In July 2009 the Obama administration 
announced the availability of assistance in formulating assignment policies that are legally in-
line with the Parents decision. Eleven districts were awarded funding and are using the funds in 
several ways ranging from assistance to crafting integration policies after being granted unitary 
status to implementing new student assignment policies. Organizations such as the Civil Rights 
Project, housed at UCLA, provide practical assistance to schools looking to continue or begin 
legally permissible integration plans. The CRP’s manual, Still Looking to the Future promotes 
strategies for schools in promotion of integration and diversity. Other resources include The 
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Integration Report which issues monthly reports on racial diversity in the nation’s schools and 
highlights local, state, and federal desegregation issues. 
 
B. General Considerations for Future Integration Plans   
Future assignment plans before the Court will face the precedent set in Parents and 
schools should be aware of the legal questions future litigation may raise. First, schools should 
consider the compelling interest standard of the strict scrutiny test. Justice Kennedy and a 
majority of the Justices did recognize diversity at the K-12 level a compelling interest. This was 
a monumental recognition given historically there were only two compelling interests ever 
recognized by the Court relevant to race in education. However, there remains to be illumination 
on the issue of just what the term diversity means in the K-12 sense. There is litigation on 
diversity in higher education and the Court has spoken extensively on what diversity and racial 
balancing is in higher education (see Bakke, Grutter, Gratz). However, the Court has asserted 
that diversity has both racial and nonracial aspects as Justice Kennedy explained in Parents. 
These aspects include economic background, special talents and needs, as well as demographic 
factors.  
Dickinson (2009) points out the Court had three main problems with the two specific 
plans before them and if current and future assignment plans address these concerns, there is 
reason to believe these plans will pass constitutional scrutiny. The first ‘problem’ the Court 
identified with the two plans was the ‘binary concept of race’ (p. 25). As previously discussed, 
the racial make-up of today’s public school student is more racially diverse than it ever has been. 
The Court did not accept the racial classifications in both plans in part because it was a simple 
white/nonwhite or black/other classification.  Second, as Dickinson (2009) points out, both 
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Seattle and Louisville implemented the student assignment policies with the goal of representing 
the racial demographics of the districts as a whole. Being their stated goal was proportionality 
rather than racial diversity, the Court concluded the plans were not narrowly tailored enough to a 
goal. Dickinson (2009) acknowledges this is a problem easy to correct,  
school systems must abandon the use of strict district-wide percentages of 
minority enrollment that drove the invalidated plans at issue. In place of these 
arguably irrational percentages, the school board may cite any number of studies 
that support the proposition that students achieve greater academic gains in 
diverse educational settings (p.25).  
 
The last problem identified by Dickinson (2009) is the duration of racial classifications used in 
student assignment plans. The Court noted that the student assignment plans used by both 
districts had no timeline for the eventual phase-out of the racially based classifications. The 
Court also noted plans that developed periodic reviews of the student assignment plans could 
possibly survive constitutional scrutiny. Because both plans had the goal of meeting 
demographic proportions of race, there was no goal or end-point for when diversity was met but 
rather an infinite time period for which the plans must be used because demographics within the 
districts is constantly changing. The easy ‘fix’ to this is simply crafting an assignment policy 
with a definite duration. Further, period reviews of progress of the plans would limit the infinite 
duration problem as well as would articulate a certain goal for the plan such as a certain level of 
academic achievement within the district such as reading levels or test scores.  
From broad analysis of the decision to case-studies legal scholars consider Parents  to be 
the beginning of a new era marking a new shift in the way schools will be able to legally pursue 
integration. Smith (2010) also points out that the role of lawyers is important in the post-Parents 
era. Lawyers have an important role in educating school districts and aiding Board of Education 
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in crafting legally permissible plans, and should be cognizant that crafting policies that leave 
way for constitutional challenge have the ability to affect the whole nation if the subject of 
litigation, as in the Parents case.  
 Another important consideration when thinking of the future of integration plans and 
legal challenge is the now antiquated way in which integration issues often are discussed. The 
segregation issue in public schools has historically been discussed in terms of a biracial, black 
and white student context. However, the issue today is not solely a biracial one. Parents raises 
the important issue of the increasingly diverse student body enrollment in the nation’s public 
schools. In the future, schools must pay attention to multiracial issues when crafting plans. As 
the majority concluded in Parents,  
We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent 
communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, 
by individuals. Parents  551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
 
Here, the Court makes clear future assignment plans based solely on the biracial white, black 
distinction will not pass constitutional scrutiny. While the Court did not elaborate on acceptable 
classifications for racial categories or how many categories would be suitable for future 
assignment plans to be legally permissible, it is clear definitions of minority must include other 
racial groups. Because the Court can only rule on the issues before it  (in the Parents case, on the 
constitutionality of the student assignment plans) no guidelines were set for future plans. 
However, given the Court was not entirely silent on the issue, schools would be prudent to 
consider a definition of racial diversity as more than encompassing only the simple black and 
white distinction.  
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 Schools should also beware of using justification that student assignment plans bear 
benign rather than malicious motives as such reasoning will not stand up to future constitutional 
challenge. The Court articulated its belief that motive is irrelevant in a strict scrutiny analysis of 
racial classification. As Chief Justice Roberts explained,  
The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classifications are clear enough. 
The Court's emphasis on 'benign racial classifications' suggests confidence in its 
ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria. 
History should teach greater humility... 'Benign' carries with it no independent 
meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's conclusion that a 
politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, 
is reasonable. Parents  551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
 
Schools can avoid this issue by simply refraining from asserting plans are benign in nature and 
rather focus on the ways in which the plans do conform to strict scrutiny standards during future 
litigation.   
While it is clear the Court did limit integration plans, it is possible to consider the 
potentially beneficial outcome of the decision on future integration efforts. Le (2010) views the 
post-Parents climate to be one conducive to a renewed opportunity for federal support of 
integration. Le (2010) argues the federal government has abandoned integration for the last three 
decades but that now, given, the recent Court decision, the issue has once again been highlighted 
as one in dire need of clarification and support. Le (2010) believes governmental policy will be 
able to achieve more than judicial support of integration.  
Robinson (2010) echoes Le’s (2010)  sentiment in arguing courts will be little help, but 
that the executive branch and the Department of Education will be able to provide policy options 
for schools looking to promote racial balancing.  
Others, such as Holley-Walker (2010) believe Parents will have little effect on school 
integration because the Courts and schools abandoned desegregation as a priority decades ago. 
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Holley-Walker (2010) found since 2004, eighty-seven Southern districts have been granted 
unitary status, thereby increasing the number of schools mandated, under Parents, to abandon 
student assignment plans echoing those of Seattle’s and Louisville’s. Schools have begun to turn 
to policies highlighting socioeconomic status and attendance zones to further diversity (Holley-
Walker, 2010). 
C. Implications Affecting Charter Schools and NCLB provisions  
Charter school racial balancing plans also fall under constitutional scrutiny and in the 
wake of Parents must be aware of the legal guidelines along with their traditional public school 
counterparts. Today, forty states and the District of Columbia have charter schools. In April 
2009, there were 4253 charter schools in the country with a total student enrollment of 
1,186,659. (Oluwole and Green, 2008). Charter schools enroll more African-American students, 
low-performing students, and a greater percentage of students who qualify for free and reduced 
lunch program (Ibid, p.6). Student enrollment in the 199801999 school year was evenly divided 
between white and minority students but by the 2001-2002 school year enrollment had shifted to 
one-third white, two-thirds minority (p.6). Charter school enrollment is racially isolated from 
traditional public schools (Frankenberg & Lee, 2000). Enrollments in at least six states is over 
50% black and are located mostly in urban areas and the enrollment of six states is over 50% 
white. On average, black charter school students attend charter schools with majority black 
students (Ibid).  
 Fourteen states have enacted racial-balancing provisions as part of the state’s 
charter school statute. These states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
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and Wisconsin (Oluwole & Green, 2008). For example, California’s racial balancing provisions 
is as follows,  
the governing authorizer shall not deny a petition for the establishment of a 
charter school unless it makes written factual findings, specific to the particular 
petition, setting forth specific facts to support one or more of the following 
findings…reasonably comprehensive description of the means by which the 
school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance among its pupils that is reflective 
of the general populations residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the school 
district to which the charter petition is submitted. Cal. Educ. Code section 4760 
(b)(5) 
 
The other states employ similar language regarding racial balancing and can be divided into two 
types of racial balancing provisions. Hortatory racial balancing provisions urge racial balancing 
rather than require specific racial balancing numbers (Oluwole & Green, 2008) whereas 
mandatory racial balancing provisions require charter schools within the state to go beyond 
identifying means for racial balancing but rather mandate specific racial balancing percentages or 
ones that are reasonably reflective of the school district as a whole (Ibid). In the aftermath of 
Parents  racial balancing provisions in state charter school statutes should be considered given 
the ruling and its wording on racial balancing in K-12 schools.  
 Hortatory provisions will likely pass constitutional scrutiny because these provisions urge 
means to achieve balancing rather than identify specific means to achieve balancing. Unlike the 
Seattle and Louisville plans struck down by the Court, that specifically require racial balancing 
within the schools, the hortatory plans are likely to remain constitutional because only the 
identification of means to achieve racial balancing is required, nothing further. (Oluwole & 
Green, 2008). However, the states mandating specific racial balancing percentages or numbers 
reflective of the district at large may encounter legal problems. First, the plurality ruling in 
Parents clearly states that racial balancing in K-12 schools is not recognized as a compelling 
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interest under the strict scrutiny test. While Kennedy’s concurrence does leave a door open for 
the recognition of racial balancing as a compelling interest, state charter statutes requiring either 
percentage balancing or balancing reflective of overall school district enrollment may be subject 
to valid legal challenge.  Additionally, as previously discussed, the fact that statutes using either 
percentage or reflective standards for racial balancing in charter schools have not articulated a 
stopping point for integration efforts, these plans may further violate the standards handed down 
in Parents.    
The Parents decision is also likely to have an effect on the efficient and productive 
implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act. Olwuole and Green (2008) argue given the 
close tie between race and the achievement gap as well as race and low-performing schools, the 
sanction and federal funding provisions of No Child Left Behind are fundamentally race 
conscious provisions focused on improving academic achievement. As previously discussed, a 
government action can be subject to the strict scrutiny analysis even if race-conscious measures 
are not explicitly identified as such. Because No Child Left Behind has two measures potentially 
seen as race-conscious (funding and sanction on low-performing schools), states should consider 
how the recent Parents decision and the Justices’ reasoning behind the decision has the potential 
to impact the constitutionality of parts of the No Child Left Behind Act.  
 The No Child Left Behind Act, as discussed briefly in Chapter I is the 2002 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. No Child Left Behind focuses, 
in part, on the racial achievement gap in American schools. While there are no specific race-
conscious policies in NCLB such as mandated student assignment policies according to race or 
redistricting to address racial segregation, there are provisions that consider race. First, states 
must report data on student achievement broken down by multiple demographic groups including 
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race in order to receive federal funding. Second, schools must meet or exceed level of academic 
achievement for all students, including students of all races. Schools also face sanctions and 
penalties if proficiency levels are not yet. Schools with high concentrations of minority students 
are likely to be at risk of these sanctions. Parents may have left the door open to challenges of 
the sanction and progress provisions of NCLB. The first reason Parents may be influential is the 
plurality’s reasoning that the Louisville and Seattle plans had a minimal impact on the 
assignment of students. Meaning, the Court did not find the number of students affected by the 
policy to have a great enough effect to warrant the plans to be narrowly tailored enough to meet a 
compelling interest. For example, the Court reasoned that because “Jefferson County estimates 
that the racial guidelines account for only 3% of assignments” (Parents, p. 2760) the plans was 
minimally effective. Similarly, the Court reasoned,  
Seattle’s racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students 
between schools…the tiebreaker’s annual effect is this merely to shuffle a few handfuls 
of different minority students between a few schools” (p. 2759) 
The Court made clear that both the Seattle and Louisville plan would have benefited, under strict 
scrutiny analysis, from showing a greater impact on the actual student assignments. Therefore, 
race-conscious provisions within NCLB focused on sanctions for school districts who do not 
meet progress requirements or race-conscious funding calculations that are not minimally 
effective may be vulnerable to strict scrutiny test failure (Oluwole & Green, 2008). 
 NCLB may be vulnerable post-Parents because of the Court’s articulation and focus on 
the fact that in order to further prove race-conscious policies are narrowly tailored a serious, 
good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives must first occur. Therefore, states issuing 
sanctions or funding based on race-conscious measures should have strong evidence race-neutral 
alternatives had been considered. As Oluwole and Green (2008) argue,  
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Therefore, states must consider race-neutral alternatives before implementing the 
Act's sanctions and remedies or funding with a consciousness of race. Because 
student achievement gaps continue to have a strong black-white racial component 
not entirely explained by race-neutral factors (such as socio-economic status), 
race-conscious measures under NCLB seem logically necessary. Moreover, 
various studies demonstrate a positive relationship between race-conscious 
targeting of financial resources and   outcomes for racial minorities.  In essence, 
substantial evidence shows that race-conscious measures are necessary to closing 
the racial achievement gap. However, to pass narrow tailoring muster, before 
pursuing race-conscious measures, states must document their consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives and their reasons for concluding that these alternatives 
would not accomplish the ends desired. (p. 300).  
States would be prudent to consider ways in which the Parents decision may affect certain 
provisions such as sanctions and targeted funding because such provisions may be thought to be 
race-conscious. The Court in Parents made clear the importance of governmental policies to 
have a greater than minimal effect in achieving a compelling interest in order to be considered 
narrowly tailored enough to meet the scrutiny test. Further, the Court made clear its requirement 
that any race-conscious measures should not be implemented before a good faith effort has been 
made to explore other race-neutral alternatives. States and the federal government should be 
aware of the potential strict scrutiny problems that could arise from continuing to implement 
NCLB provisions that could be considered and argued to be race-conscious because of the link 
between low-performing schools and high percentages of minority students.  
A further consideration of the role NCLB will play post Parents is a possible increased 
emphasis on student transfer options available to students under NCLB provisions. Schools are 
likely to feel the influence of the Parents decision not only on ongoing or proposed student 
assignment policies but also parallel pressure to increase academic achievement under NCLB 
(Holley-Walker, 2008, p.932). NCLB mandates schools failing to attain an adequate (as defined 
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by the Act) amount of yearly progress (AYP) for two consecutive years will be identified as ‘in 
need of improvement’. Schools failing to meet yearly progress standards will face sanctions or 
school closure. These measures have already greatly impacted schools, especially in urban areas 
with high percentages of minority students. A disproportionate number of these schools are 
facing sanctions or closure under NCLB (Holley-Walker, 2008). There is a clear link between 
racially isolated minority schools, often in urban areas, and NCLB sanctions. For example, in 
California, the average Latino and African American student attends a school where over 80% of 
their peers are nonwhite. Less than 40% of Latino and African American students meet fourth 
grade proficiencies in reading. 2,204 of California schools have been labeled in need of 
improvement under NCLB (U.S. Department of Education, 2008, p.1). These numbers reveal a 
tension between the provisions of NCLB and the holding in Parents: because some of the 
racially isolated urban districts facing NCLB sanction are using race conscious student 
assignment plans to combat segregation, these schools face a new wave of litigation post-
Parents. A return to neighborhood schools is likely given the new constraints on using race in 
student assignment plans. As Holley-Walker (2008) summarizes,  
Due to the persistence of residential segregation, especially in large urban areas, 
neighborhood schools will mean increased racial isolation. If there is 
corresponding low performance on test scores schools in these racially isolated 
minority schools, we will see more school facing sanctions. (p. 9.34).  
This tension for low-performing, racially isolated schools is an issue districts will need to 
consider in moving forward with both crafting new assignment plans and addressing federal 
guidelines for progress.  
 The transfer policy may be a positive avenue for schools to pursue racially integrated 
schools. For example, in Greensboro, North Carolina, black students have transferred out of 
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racially isolated low-performing schools to majority white schools will higher levels of 
achievement under the student transfer provision of NCLB (Dillon, 2007, A1). However, being 
that the United States Department of Education reports that of over 5 million students who are 
eligible for the student transfer option, only about 120,000 actually transfer, this option will not 
likely replace student assignment plans previously in place before the Parents litigation (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2008, p.1). There is the option of inter-district transfers under NCLB: 
a policy wherein students from failing schools may apply to enter a school outside their district 
on a voluntary basis. It is easy to see, however, why schools would be hesitant to accept students 
from lower-performing districts on a voluntary basis given the increased pressures NCLB places 
on all schools to meet yearly progress standards. As previously discussed, this provision may be 
at odds with the Court’s decision in Milliken wherein the Court made clear its position on inter-
district transfers to combat desegregation. Because desegregation efforts cannot be compelled 
beyond an individual district (as in the case of Milliken, between urban and suburban districts), 
the inter-district voluntary transfer provision may present further constitutional issues given the 
increased spotlight on assignment plans post-Parents.    
D. Implications Beyond K-12 Education  
 In addition to its obvious effect on K-12 education, the Parents decision could implicate 
other institutions such as colleges and universities, affirmative action in the work place, and even 
the way in which desegregation research is conducted and subsequently considered by the Court.  
 When considering the far-reaching implications of the Parents decision, it is worthwhile 
to move beyond examination of how schools can and have been structuring integration plans in 
legally permissible ways to a consideration of how the Court will consider scientific evidence in 
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school desegregation in the future given the important role social science research has played in 
Court reasoning. The Court has historically relied on scientific evidence of unequal educational 
opportunities throughout the school desegregation cases. For example, in Brown the Court relied 
on evidence that de jure segregation resulted in psychological harm to minority students. The 
Court cited the adverse effects on minority children to support its consideration of scientific 
evidence,  
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of 
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a 
child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to 
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive 
them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school 
system Brown p.494 
 
The Court in Brown did not articulate how much it relied on this evidence but the inclusion of 
the information in the opinion itself does illustrate the Court felt the evidence important enough 
to include in its brief opinion as justification for its holding. Even though the Court need not rely 
on social science research in reaching its legal conclusions, clearly the detrimental effects of de 
jure segregation on minority children played a role in its constructivist interpretation of the equal 
protection clause.  
 The Court also considered evidence and expert testimony in Grutter and Gratz to further 
help clarify the educational benefits of diversity in higher education (Frankenberg & Garces, 
2008) and to justify recognition of student diversity in higher education as a compelling interest. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, cited the benefits of diversity in higher 
education,  
The Law School's claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its amici, 
who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity. In 
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addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous 
studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better 
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better 
prepares them as professionals. p.330  
 
This important consideration of scientific evidence on the Court is illustrative of how influential 
such research has been on the desegregation cases. Being that the Court has historically 
identified only two compelling interests relating to race and education, (again, the diversity of 
the student body in higher education and remedying past discrimination in both K-12 and higher 
education) O’Connor’s reasoning is a sign of how influential research can be on justifying the 
Court’s holdings. Here, the Court recognizes the educational benefits resulting from student body 
diversity and how these benefits impact the workforce and society at large. These constructivist 
considerations show first, how the Court justifies its holding under the equal protection clause 
and strict scrutiny test and second, how research is able to influence on the Court on important 
issues. While the Court is not legally obligated to consider social science evidence, indeed the 
Court, being the Highest Court of the nation, is obligated only to follow its own reasoning and 
precedent, clearly such research can be influential on important issues such as justification for 
compelling interests and fundamentally, for the fact that segregation is harmful for minority 
children.  
 However, the issues surrounding the use of social science research in judicial conclusion 
is not without controversy. Social science evidence can be bias, inconsistent, and unreliable. 
Therefore, disputes arise over whether or not such research should be relied on by the Court 
(Frankenberg & Garces, 2008, p.706). Regardless of this consideration, the fact remains the 
Court has historically considered social science research and continued to do so in the Parents 
case. Of the sixty-four amicus briefs submitted to the Court for consideration in the Parents 
196 
 
litigation, twenty-seven include substantial discussion of social science evidence (Frankenberg & 
Garces, 2008, p.707). The briefs were submitted for consideration by individual researchers, 
research centers, and civil rights organizations (Ibid). Most of the briefs were filed in defense of 
the Seattle and Louisville student assignment plans. Two briefs of these argue research has not 
justified the addition of K-12 diversity as a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test.  
 If social science research should be used by the Court, it is reasonable to argue its use 
should be used properly, with due attention paid to potential biases, conflict, and inherent issues 
of validity present in every research study. Both the Justices joining in the plurality and the 
dissenting opinion cite research but come to differing overall conclusions. Frankenberg and 
Garces (2008) argue the Justices misused research findings in the Parents case and further argue 
the way in which research was considered will result in long-lasting implications for researchers 
hoping to meaningfully influence Supreme Court reasoning in future desegregation cases. First 
and most obviously, researchers must be aware of the legal parameters of the Court’s most recent 
decision if they hope to influence future policy and future Court decisions. Researching methods 
of integration that are now not legally permissible would be a wasteful pursuit. Future research 
must be conducted mindful of the Court’s holding in Parents. It is also important for social 
science researchers submitting briefs to the Court (and other lower courts) to remember the 
Justices may not be trained in reading research findings and or skilled at understanding the 
methods behind the research. Frankenberg and Garces (2008) argue the three most important 
things for researchers submitting briefs to the Court to be sure are clear are:  
(1) the findings; (2) the strength of the research; and (3) how particular findings 
relate to an issue under consideration. Social scientists and/or lawyers can 
better communicate these points to the courts by increasing their own 
understanding of the ways in which judges approach cases. For example, 
researchers might help frame how their findings illuminate some of the 
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elements of narrow tailoring or how findings that relate to a compelling 
interest speak to the purposes of schooling recognized by the Court. 
Researchers might also help demonstrate the persistence of de jure segregation 
to address the legal distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. 
Researchers could be cognizant of communicating their findings to audiences 
outside the social science community by publishing their work in venues 
intended to reach broader audiences, such as in law or policy journals; 
presenting research talks to a legal or interdisciplinary convening; or working 
with advocates regarding a particular topic to ensure that relevant social 
science is appropriately incorporated into the legal or policy debate. (p. 746).  
 
In light of the way research was included in the Parents decision, Frankenberg and Garces 
(2008) recommend school board craft their student assignment policies with the help of studies 
conducted at the local level, and ones tailored to evaluating the specific methods used in their 
plans. Both Justice Breyer in the dissent and Justice Roberts in the plurality note the value of 
studies conducted at the local level as they are more indicative of effectiveness of the specific 
plans and fault the studies presented by the schools because they did not present studies linking 
the compelling interest of diversity in K-12 education to their specific plans (p.746). 
 Also relevant for social science researchers to note moving forward given Parents is the 
Justices’ foreshadowing that race-neutral plans may be able to pass strict scrutiny analysis. 
Additionally, researchers should consider the legal distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation.   Researchers should investigate the efficacy of race-neutral assignment plans.  
 With regard to the difference between de jure and de facto segregation, the law makes a 
significant distinction between the two. In fact one of the only two recognized compelling 
interests in education stem from remedying past direct acts of de jure segregation. This 
distinction is so important that cases may hinge directly on this issue before any other 
considerations are made on the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test. For example, 
Justice Roberts discusses the lack of evidence showing de jure segregation in the two school 
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districts to justify the plans failure to meet the strict scrutiny test. Researchers hoping to submit 
research to the Court in hopes of promoting future compelling interests should point out the 
negative effects of school segregation do not change whether or not segregation is due to 
purposeful act on the part of laws or the school board when compared to segregation due to non-
direct action such as residential housing segregation.  
Some legal scholars argue Parents will also have an effect on use of race in higher 
education admissions policies. Some legal scholars argue that even though the Parents decision 
applied only to K-12 education, the ruling would suggest the Court was open to revisiting its 
holding in Grutter and Gratz. Even though the Parents decision did not ultimately contain any 
mention of impact on higher education, the majority did rely heavily on the previous higher 
education cases and some scholars believe the decision is important to higher education and 
could have set a trend towards revisiting the 2003 decisions (Pohorylo, 2009, p.696).  
The Court in Parents, as previously discussed, did rely on the holding in Grutter to 
justify that while race can be used as a factor in assignment plans, it cannot be the deciding 
factor in such plans. Therefore, the Court has acknowledged a gray line separating higher 
education and K-12 education. While it is clear Grutter is still controlling law in the realm of 
affirmative action in higher education, it is important to note that colleges and universities should 
consider the Parents decision because of the potentially blurred line between K-12 school and 
institutions of higher education (Pohorylo, 2009, p. 716).  
The first area that may impact higher education is the requirement that school student 
assignment policies must exhibit substantial success rates in maintaining a diverse student body 
or plans may fail the strict scrutiny test. While the defendant school board in Parents argued the 
assignment plans were necessary to maintain a diverse student body, the Court was not 
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convinced that the effect had a substantial enough effect to warrant the policies. In fact, the Court 
found that because using race as the deciding factor in the assignment policies resulted in what it 
considered only minimal diversity, the schools did not prove that other factors other than race 
would have been better to consider when evaluating the overall goal of achieving diversity. The 
Court referred back to Grutter to point out that the plan at the University of Michigan law school 
was highly effective because it had tripled the number of minority students in the law school. In 
the future, following the ruling in Parents higher education institutions should be aware of this 
potential requirement. Although it is, of course, not a hard and fast requirement that colleges and 
universities are now required to show when implementing affirmative action plans, it is 
important to potential foreshadowing on how the Court will handle future challenges to such 
plans. (Pohorylo, 2009, p. 717).  
Additionally, in order to satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement colleges and 
universities would be prudent to make sure other race-neutral alternatives have been considered 
before implementing an affirmative action plan. One of the reasons why the Seattle and 
Louisville plans failed the strict scrutiny test was because other race-neutral plans were not 
seriously considered. The Court found Seattle rejected other race-neutral plans after giving little 
or no consideration to these plans while Louisville did not consider any alternatives. As 
previously discussed, the Court in Grutter did articulate this requirement but Parents was a clear 
indicator that the Court will continue to consider this requirement very seriously in future higher 
education or K-12 cases. It would also be wise for colleges and universities to document 
consideration of these alternative plans so that they may provide evidence of their considerations 
if plans are legally challenged. (Pohorylo, 2009, p. 718). Examples of other race-neutral 
affirmative action plans that increase the number of minority students in institutions of higher 
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education are partnerships with traditionally low performing secondary schools to broaden the 
applicant pool of those who are made aware of higher education opportunities. Partnership 
strategies include after-school tutoring programs offered by college student organizations and 
offering faculty to aid in teaching shortages at low-performing secondary schools. The benefit of 
these programs is two-fold. In addition to increasing the number of minority applicants to 
colleges and universities because such students are made more aware of the existence and 
availability of institutions of higher education, by improving academic opportunity through 
partnerships, colleges increase the number of applicants who qualify for admission.  
Yet another way in which colleges and universities may be affected by the ruling in 
Parents is through the renewed focus of the Court on prohibiting the use of predetermined ranges 
for minority student enrollment. As previously discussed, the Court in Grutter ruled the 
Michigan plan was permissible because the goal for the number of minority students to be 
admitted was not a set number, but rather a meaningful number so that the diversity of the 
student enrollment would be enhanced. While quota systems have been prohibited by the Court, 
(Gratz) the Court has allowed for this meaningful number standard. In the Parents case the 
student assignment plans did not employ a quota method but a rather the use of a predetermined 
range that would conform with the demographics of the student enrollment across the districts as 
a whole. Because the Court struck down the predetermined range, one very similar to that in 
Grutter the Court may have foreshadowed its future intolerance of both the predetermined range 
and meaningful number consideration in both K-12 and higher education cases (Pohorylo, 2009, 
p. 721).  
Although the impact of Parents on higher education may be nuanced and subtle, colleges 
and universities would be prudent to take note of the reasoning provided by the Court on these 
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important issues. Because the Parents decision relied on Grutter to some extent, it is reasonable 
to consider that K-12 decisions such as Parents may similarly influence future higher education 
cases. The line between K-12 and higher education policies may be blurred in the future and 
given the strong stance the Court took in prohibiting the use of race as a deciding factor in K-12 
student assignment policies, the future impact may be significant on affirmative action cases in 
higher education.  
Although the scope of this study is limited to the effects of Parents on schools and 
education, it is interesting to note some scholars have considered the decision’s impact not only 
on higher education, as just discussed, but also on affirmative action in the workplace. Planer 
(2008) discusses the potential impact on workplace affirmative action within the contact of the 
equal protection clause, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Parents decision. She argues 
Title VII and the fourteenth amendment have historically worked in different ways to protect 
affirmative action. Title VII has been interpreted to allow employers wide flexibility to engage in 
affirmative action whereas the equal protection clause was less permissive on how and why 
employers could engage in certain hiring practices (Planer, 2008, p.1334). Therefore, if the Court 
considered a compelling interest justifiable under the equal protection clause, it would surely be 
acceptable under VII. The decision in Grutter gave employers more flexibility under equal 
protection than it had before because for the first time the Court had acknowledged the benefits 
of diversity in of itself rather than diversity only to remedy past discrimination. The Court in 
Grutter relied, in part, on sociological factors that included the workforce. For example, the 
majority in Grutter reasoned,  
These benefits [of diversity] are not theoretical but real, as major American 
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global 
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marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, 
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints (p.330) 
 
Because affirmative action plans in both higher education and the workplace are subject to strict 
scrutiny under the equal protection clause, the way in which the Court interprets the fourteenth 
amendment in education cases has the potential to impact affirmative action programs in the 
workplace. Just as Grutter expanded Court recognized compelling interests to include promotion 
of diversity, the decisions in Parents and its holding on compelling interest can limit the use of 
affirmative action in the workplace because a majority of the Court did not agree that achieving 
racial diversity in K-12 schools was compelling.  While it is true Kennedy’s concurrence did in 
fact articulate his belief diversity in K-12 education was indeed a compelling interest, his view 
was not shared in Justice Robert’s plurality opinion and given the confusion surrounding the 
decision, it is possible future challenges to affirmative action in the workplace will be subject to 
a stricter interpretation of what diversity as a compelling interest means as defined by the Court. 
As Planer (2008) argues, the definition offered by Kennedy is more restrictive than the one 
recognized by the Court in Grutter because he argues race-conscious measures cannot be used to 
achieve the compelling interest. Rather, Kennedy reasons race-neutral alternatives must be used 
in order to achieve the compelling interest of diversity in K-12 education.  Further, Kennedy 
does not mention the ‘social benefits’ realized as an important aspect to diversity to which much 
attention was paid in the Grutter opinion. As Planer (2008) concludes,  
Although the decision in Parents  is far from straightforward in terms of making a 
clear assertion about the future of diversity, both the plurality's and Justice 
Kennedy's close, careful analysis of the school district's actual ends, as opposed to 
accepting the purported ends of diversity at face value, limits diversity as a goal 
of affirmative-action programs. While diversity is not forever restricted only to 
the realm of higher education, the message of the plurality, and of Justice 
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Kennedy in particular, is that diversity cannot be a broad term applied to 
programs in which racial considerations are factors. (p.1353).  
Lastly, workplace affirmative action programs would be wise to note the Court in Parents 
explicitly acknowledged the holding in Grutter to apply specifically to higher education and 
lower courts that applied the strict scrutiny analysis upheld in Grutter to realms outside higher 
education were incorrect (Parents at p. 2754). While the reasoning in Grutter placed great 
emphasis on the benefits of diversity for the sake of societal progress as a whole, including the 
workplace, Parents moved away from broader considerations and focused more on a definition 
of diversity as discussed in Grutter to apply to higher education and little else.  
Chapter V. Conclusion  
I. Resegregation and the Benefits of Integration  
Given that students attending public schools have experienced increased segregation in 
the last two decades, issues surrounding racial make-up of student enrollment are important to 
examine. In this study I analyzed the ways in which the Supreme Court has historically 
influenced desegregation in schools and considered specifically how the Court’s interpretation of 
the fourteenth amendment continues to affect such issues.  
The problem of school resegregation is of crucial importance given the documented 
benefits of integration and the longstanding relationship between impoverished students and 
segregated schools. Since the early 1990s segregation has increased (Orfield, 2001). At the same 
time, schools with majority minority student enrollments are experiencing high levels of poverty. 
About 90 percent of majority minority schools serve populations with high levels of poverty 
(Orfield, 2001). Student achievement is also a serious problem in the nation’s schools and is 
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often linked to mostly minority-segregated schools. Students attending segregated, majority 
minority schools experience poor teacher quality, inadequate curriculum, and limited social 
networks in addition to concentrated poverty (Wells & Frankenberg, 2007). Graduation rates 
among students in these schools are declining while dropout rates rise (Darling-Hammond, 
2007).  
The benefits of racial integration were supported through social science research during 
the time of Brown and continue to be documented through current research as well. Such benefits 
included increased rates of high school graduation and college attainment for African American 
students (Crain, 1970). Documented advantages to the integration of K-6 students also supported 
school desegregation efforts during the Civil Rights Era. For example, African-American 
elementary school students in integrated schools had better math skills than their peers in 
segregated schools (Zdep, 1971). Current research supports integration and its link to student 
achievement and increased social skills. A 2006 study by Kurlaender & Yun found students in 
integrated schools show an increased ability to interact and feel comfortable with peers from 
backgrounds different than their own. Similarly, Orfield & Lee (2004) found students in 
integrated schools, score higher on tests, are more likely to go onto higher education, and are 
better at socially interacting with members of different backgrounds.  
In addition to the empirical evidence, multicultural theory also supports the benefits of 
integration. Fundamentally, notions of equal opportunity and the importance of integrated 
schooling is crucial to social progress and equity. Although multicultural education is not a focus 
of this study, literature and research in the field serve as even further support of integration. 
There are two main themes connecting multicultural education and school desegregation: 1)  
commitment to the ultimate goal of equitable educational opportunity for all students, and 2) the 
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link between integration as a tool to promote democratic ideals through working towards as well 
as an end to deeply entrenched institutionalized racism (Banks, 1997). Civil equality through 
tolerance and appreciation of diversity are important goals of education (Gutman, 2007). Critical 
race theorists argue the law in general has been fundamental in perpetuating institutionalized 
racism (Billings & Tate, 2006).  
II. Desegregation Cases   
 The Supreme Court examined such issues as early as 1899, in Cumming (wherein the 
Court endorsed racially segregated schools reasoning such segregation was constitutional when 
interpreted by the equal protection clause), and most recently in 2007 in Parents . Throughout 
the over 100 years between these cases the Court has addressed desegregation in K-12 education 
in a series of over 20 cases. After the Supreme Court extended its approval of segregated 
schooling (from segregation between black and white students to segregation between other 
minorities and white students) in Gong Lum (1927), the Court considered segregation of 
institutions of higher education. In this series of four cases, the Court hinted at a gradual move 
away from its endorsement of segregation. First in Missouri (1938) the Court ruled it was 
unconstitutional for a state to require a black student seeking legal education to find education 
out of state because no black law school in the state had been established. In Sipuel (1948) the 
Court ruled a state has a constitutional obligation to provide a legal education to black students. 
In Sweatt (1950) the court went further in requiring states not only to provide a legal education to 
black students (Sipuel) but also an education equal to that afforded the white students. Pushing 
the concept of equality in higher education a step further the Court required institutions of higher 
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education to integrate not only the entire university itself but also individual classrooms within 
such universities in McLaurin (1950).  
These cases were a prelude to the Court’s monumental decisions in Brown I and Brown 
II. The Court held segregated schooling unconstitutional and subsequently held school must 
integrate “with all deliberate speed.” In response to delay tactics the Court responded firmly in 
Cooper (1959) again asserting its authority over state and local issues, and again in Griffin 
(1968) by ruling public schools cannot be closed in an attempt to avoid integration.  
The Court then ruled on specific integration policies, ruling freedom of choice plans 
unconstitutional in Green (1968) and mandated faculty integration in Montgomery (1969). 
Further, in Swann (1971) the Court approved bussing and placed the burden of proving 
nondiscriminatory practices with school districts when they had been found to be acting in 
intentionally discriminatory ways in Keyes (1973).  
Beginning with Milliken (1974) and Pasadena (1976) the Court began to change its 
course by refusing to extend its support of integration. This was marked by its ruling that inter-
district bussing was unconstitutional as well as the holding that districts are not held 
constitutionally responsible for segregation caused by residential segregation patterns. During 
this series of cases decided in the 1970s, the Court moved back to issues of higher education, 
ruling racial quotas unconstitutional in Bakke (1978).  
In the series of early 1990s cases, the Court made it easier for school districts to gain 
unitary status thereby making it easier to end court ordered integration (Dowell, Freeman 
Jenkins). In the early 2000s, the last time the Court would deal with issues of race in education 
(in these instances higher education) before 2007, the Court ruled affirmative action to be 
constitutionally permissible in Grutter but held point systems in admissions policies to be 
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unconstitutional in Gratz. Finally, in 2007 the Court held race cannot be the deciding factor in 
student assignment policies in Parents. 
III. Phases of Interpretation  
 Supreme Court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment and equal protection clause 
has had a direct impact on school desegregation and student enrollment. While no direct 
relationship was found between specific mode of interpretation, direct or indirect, constructivist, 
originalist or strict textualist (no opinions were found to employ strict textualist interpretation), 
the Court’s interpretation does change over time in an explicit way. This study found four 
distinct phases of interpretation. First, the Court interpreted the equal protection clause to permit 
segregation both in public life as well as K-12 education. Beginning in the late 1930s the Court 
entered a second phase wherein there was a shift towards a less permissive interpretation of the 
equal protection clause. In a series of four higher education cases between 1938 and 1950 the 
Court gradually held racial segregation and unequal educational opportunity in institutions of 
higher education impermissible under the fourteenth amendment. This intolerance for 
segregation crossed over from the higher education to K-12 in the series of cases beginning with 
Brown I and ending with Keyes nearly twenty years later. During this time segregation in public 
schools sharply declined. The Court continually expanded what was defined as impermissible 
under the equal protection clause with regard to segregated and unequal K-12 education. 
However, in 1974 beginning with Milliken through present, as shown in the Court’s most recent 
opinion on the issue in Parents, the Court stopped expanding definitions of de jure segregation as 
well as showed a tolerance for school segregation occurring because of residential segregation 
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patterns. Beginning in 1974 the Court reached a plateau of interpretation wherein it neither 
expanded nor retracted its interpretation of the equal protection clause.  
 The four phases of interpretation do parallel racial make-up of student enrollment in K-12 
education. During the first phase of interpretation, segregation was at historically high levels 
given the Court’s holdings allowing for de jure segregation. These high levels continued into the 
second phase of interpretation when the Court slowly chiseled away at segregation in higher 
education. Desegregation of schools occurred during the third phase of interpretation when the 
Court no longer permitted de jure segregation and when it expanded the definition of de jure 
segregation as well as what was held impermissible under the fourteenth amendment. Levels of 
desegregation declined during the fourth phase of interpretation. Over the next few years it will 
be apparent whether or not school segregation will increase because of the decision in Parents.  
Findings of this study suggest if the Court does not change its method of interpretation again, 
levels of desegregation will continue to decline. However, schools do have the opportunity to 
promote alternative methods of integration.  
  
IV. Current State of Law  
While the Court’s interpretation of the fourteenth amendment has undoubtedly affected 
school desegregation, the current state of federal desegregation law may not be as complicated as 
many think. The Court has been quite clear in its assertion that although promotion of diversity 
in K-12 education is a compelling interest, using race as the deciding factor in assignment plans 
will not pass legal scrutiny. Specifically, the two plans subject to litigation were not sufficiently 
‘narrowly tailored’ to pass the strict scrutiny test. However, future student assignment plans such 
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as those based on socio-economic status, poverty level, residential neighborhoods, grade 
configuration, or controlled choice do not trigger the strict scrutiny test. Further, important to 
note is the Court’s major problems with the Seattle and Louisville plans was that they were not 
narrowly tailored to the extent necessary to prove to the Court that they used the least restrictive 
means necessary to achieve the end goal of diversity.  
This study contributes to the already established research and literature on issues of 
school desegregation in K-12 education.  By focusing specifically and solely on how the Court’s 
judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment has evolved over time, this study will 
contribute to the overall understanding and analysis of how the law affects education in a broad 
sense and specifically how the Court has influenced school desegregation. The Supreme Court, 
being the highest court of the nation, is instilled with the authority to greatly influence the daily 
operations of schools and decisions made my policy makers and school administrators. An 
understanding of where the Court has come from and where it may go in its interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment is immensely useful in understanding how the racial make-up of schools 
has been affected, and how integration can be achieved within the legal bounds set by the Court.  
V. Implications for Theory and Policy  
 This study’s findings show how powerful an impact the Court’s interpretation can have 
on school segregation and specifically, on how schools can implement plans for integration.  The 
theoretical purpose of this study was to understand the ways in which the Court has influenced 
these issues and in turn must be considered as one of the most influential factors impacting 
student enrollment in K-12 schools.  I have drawn conclusions on how the Supreme Court has 
changed its approach to desegregation, desegregation remedies, and student assignment plans 
over the course of school desegregation litigation.  
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 The findings of this study show the limitations of theories promoting integration as an 
end without considering how the law places constraints on integration methods and plans. While 
multicultural theory emphasizes integration as a way to promote democratic ideals, missing from 
the literature is recognition of how the Supreme Court’s judicial interpretation affects such 
promotion (Gutman, 2007). Further, multicultural theory must go a step further in its assertion 
that segregation has been perpetuated as part of institutional racism and consider how the 
Supreme Court may have historically played a role in such racism (Nieto, 2004; Grant, 2006).  
Critical race theorists argue racial discrimination is central to judicial proceedings and crafting of 
both the intent and language of the law. However, I believe critical race theorists fail to 
recognize the true place of the law within broader social goals.  
 Although both general multicultural education theorists and more, specifically, critical 
race theorists, believe integrated classrooms are necessary, little attention is given to the realities 
of law-making and the judicial process. CRT stops short of presenting a well-crafted plan for 
integration within the bounds of the law and does not offer substantial legal analysis beyond 
pointing out the law’s failure in dealing with issues Brown hoped to address. CRT offers little 
help to law-makers whose ultimate decisions must rest within the bounds of Supreme Court 
precedent. Further, critical race theorists have not showed a true sense of understanding of the 
parameters within which the Supreme Court promulgates the law surrounding desegregation.  
CRT articulates the problems surrounding segregation in the public schools and offers discussion 
of what the goals should be in more of a historical context rather than focusing on the current and 
future legal framework. I believe there is little helpful discussion of how racial integration should 
be addressed post- Parents  in current CRT literature. That is, I believe CRT does not help 
discussions focused on how schools can actually achieve legally permissible integration plans 
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now and in future years within the bounds of Supreme Court precedent. As, Posner (1997), a 
federal Judge, articulates,  
What is most arresting about race theory is that…it turns its back on the Western 
tradition of rational inquiry, forswearing analysis for narrative. Rather than 
marshal logical arguments and empirical data, critical race theorists tell stories-
fictional, science-fictional, autobiographical, anecdotal-designed to expose the 
pervasive and debilitating racism of America today (p.42).  
 
Posner (1997) goes on to attack critical race theorists as ‘poor role models’ and who are 
‘deeply misinformed.’  It is my hope this study will offer multicultural education and critical race 
theorists an understanding of how the Supreme Court is likely to view student assignment plans 
in the future.  
Further, this research reveals the great extent to which the Court influences how the goals 
of multicultural education can be attained. During the first phase of interpretation (1899-1938), 
hopes of achieving the goals of multicultural education were stifled during the time of Court-
sanctioned school segregation. However, during the second (1938-1954) and third (1954-1974) 
phases of interpretation, multicultural education was at the forefront of the Court’s reasoning in 
support of racial integration in the schools. While the Court may not have identified the benefits 
of school desegregation using the term ‘multicultural education,’ it is clear the Court’s support of 
integration grew from recognition of goals similar to those found in the basic goals of 
multicultural education such as equal opportunity and a promotion of democratic ideals. While 
the fourth phase (1974-present) of interpretation directly impacts and often reverses student 
assignment plans, it should not imply the basic goals of multicultural education cannot be 
achieved.  
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On the level of policy the findings of this study will influence school, state, and federal 
integration action plans.  Schools hoping to promote equity, equal educational opportunity, and 
democratic ideals must make sure their policies and plans fall within the bounds of the law. This 
study’s findings offer an understanding of how schools can legally craft policies promoting 
integration. Further, this study’s findings implicate state and federal policy in that policy makers 
must consider how the Court evaluates integration plans. Understanding the evolution of 
Supreme Court interpretation will help policy makers recognize potential fourteenth amendment 
issues and, as this study demonstrates, must be aware of how the Court applies equal protection 
clause analysis to policies and integration plans. Much of the literature post-Parents viewed the 
decision in a negative light. I believe many have misunderstood the Court’s ruling. As I have 
clarified here, the Court ruled race cannot be the deciding factor in student assignment policies. 
However, race can still be used as one of several factors. Further, given socio-economic 
assignment policies do not trigger strict scrutiny, plans based on SES are likely to remain legal 
and effective given the relationship between SES and race. While schools do need to be sure 
their policies are in line with the holding in Parents I believe the reaction to the decision was 
much more negative than necessary. While some may argue the Court, now headed by 
conservative Justice Roberts, signaled their unwillingness to be supportive of integration, it by 
no means the Court has repealed its recognition that some methods of integration are legal. I 
argue the present Court is not hostile to integration as some argue, but rather, have forced 
schools to consider race among many factors in student assignment policies. This may make it 
harder for purely race-based assignment policies to operate but it does not make it impossible for 
race to be considered as an extremely important factor.  
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Even a superficial analysis of Supreme Court desegregation case law would reveal an 
obvious connection between social progress and Court interpretation of the equal protection 
clause. I believe the phases of interpretation are deeply influenced by social progress. For 
example, the Court, perhaps fully aware of the upheaval the holding in Brown would create, 
decided the series of higher education cases pre-Brown as a way to lay the groundwork for the 
1954 decision. Arguably the Court was waiting for signs of a society able to sustain the change 
Brown marked. As the country experienced resistance to desegregation, the Court supported 
integration efforts throughout the third phase of expansion. I believe the Court responded during 
the third phase of segregation wherein it was continually expanded its interpretation of the equal 
protection clause. With each new case in this phase the Court expanded its interpretation of the 
clause to include specific remedies such as bussing. I believe this was in direct response to the 
massive delays to integration many schools and communities implemented. During this time 
period the Court reinforced its judicial authority by responding to resistance with further support. 
However, in the phase I have identified as the fourth plateau phase I believe the Court backed 
away from further expansion because the realities of implementation became clear. Schools, 
faced with residential segregation, faced the difficult task of achieving integration. I believe the 
Court began to make it easier to grant unitary status because they recognized social challenges 
the Court could not address. In the fourth phase, the one in which Parents was decided, the Court 
continued its refusal to expand the equal protection clause to include student assignment policies 
that use race as a deciding factor. I believe, over the course of desegregation litigation, the Court 
has responded to social progress. At the same time, however, the Court has also been aware of its 
limited role.  While the four phases of interpretation reflect a change in the Court’s approach to 
the equal protection clause, there are several possible external reasons these shifts occur. I 
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believe the phases are also influenced by the views of those sitting on the Court (Chemerinsky, 
1991). This is an area where future research would be beneficial. More closely tied to the issues 
explored in this study, I believe these four phases are simultaneously influencing and being 
influenced by social trends.  
By design the Supreme Court can only decide issues before it on a case by case basis and 
therefore cannot choose the social issues it wishes to address. However, again and by design, the 
Court often hears cases of the utmost social importance. Historically, school desegregation has 
been the subject of numerous Supreme Court cases. I believe the Court in the future will address 
this issue again. Now, it is up to schools to pursue integration methods within the framework of 
Parents cognizant of how the Court is likely to rule in the future. 
While it is clear the executive branch has influenced the promotion of integration 
(Epperson, 2008), this study shows how influential the Court has been regardless of presidential 
policy. Future administrations should promote policies promoting desegregation through 
alternative plans such as socio-economic integration as such plans do not present the same 
challenges race-conscious policies have faced.   Second, on the level of legislative policy, future 
law makers must consider crafting plans that withstand Supreme Court scrutiny. For example, 
market-based reforms such as vouchers and opt-out provisions under NCLB have not yet been 
the subject of Supreme Court litigation. Laws promoting integration using market-based reforms 
may escape equal protection clause problems.  
VI. Further Research 
Further research on how the Supreme Court has influenced school desegregation would 
benefit from an expansion of the data analyzed in this study. It would be beneficial to consider 
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judicial interpretation as it has changed according to political views of the Court Justices 
(Chemerinsky, 1991). This analysis would allow for an increased understanding of how school 
desegregation is affected by the make-up of the Court and would allow for an analysis of the 
importance and impact of the political views of the Justices on student enrollment in schools. In 
addition, future research considering the effects of Parents on student enrollment is important in 
understanding the long-term effect of the decision. Such future research will be based on 
desegregation statistics post-2007. Additionally, given the increasingly large Latino student 
population in the nation’s public schools, examining the effects of judicial interpretation on 
Latino student segregation is important and relevant to K-12 school desegregation issues overall.   
While the Supreme Court has historically exerted great influence on the ways in which 
schools can address racial segregation in K-12 public schools, there may be reason to be hopeful 
about new integration plans that do fall within the bounds set by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the equal protection clause influences the racial make-up of 
student enrollment and most recently correlates with increasing rates of segregation. Future 
interpretation will continue to influence student enrollment post-Parents but schools can be 
confident plans based on factors other than race do not currently require strict scrutiny analysis 
under the fourteenth amendment.   
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